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I 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates FDI versus export decisions under oligopoly in the trade 
liberalization, and examines how trade liberalization affects welfares in the Hotelling 
model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly. It uses a four-firm two-country Cournot 
oligopoly model to resolve the conflict between the theory, which predicts that a 
reduction in trade costs discourages FDI, and the empirical evidence, which is that 
trade liberalisation has led to an increase in FDI, and shows that both FDI and 
exporting can co-exist in the same market, in line with recent trends. In the static 
game, a reduction in trade costs causes a decrease in FDI, and the outcomes are often 
a prisoners’ dilemma where the firms are worse off when they all undertake FDI than 
when all firms from both markets choose to export. To avoid it, firms can tacitly 
collude over their FDI versus export decisions when the game is infinitely-repeated. 
Then a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to 
undertaking FDI when trade costs are sufficiently high. The robustness of the analysis 
is checked by using the constant elasticity demand function. 
 
A two-country Hotelling model of spartial duopoly is developed to consider the 
welfare effects of trade liberalisation. It is shown that gains from trade occur when 
products are highly differentiated, and losses from trade occur when products are 
close substitutes, as the positive effect of more product choices overweighs the 
negative effect of the decreased home sales caused by trade liberalization when 
products are highly differentiated. This contrasts to Fujiwara (2009) who prove that 
there are always losses from trade in the Hotelling model. The reason behind is that 
the kinked demand market structure is often ignored, and by considering the full 
features of the Hotelling model, welfare effects depend on product differentiation and 
trade costs. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and the Motivations for this Research 
 
Prior to the 1980s, trade theory was dominanted by perfectly competitive market, 
which relied on the assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition 
in production. Then the so-called new trade theory adds the elements of increasing 
returns to scale, imperfect competition and product differentiation to the traditional 
trade model. In the new theory, trade and gains from trade can arise independently of 
any pattern of comparative advantage because of the product differentiation and the 
economies of scale.  
 
Oligopoly is the competition among a small number of large firms in the market, and 
plays a small role in the trade theory. However, many industries are dominated by a 
small number of firms empirically, and an increasing number of papers indicates that 
large firms account for the major share of exports and FDI as well as research and 
development
1
. In fact, the assumptions of perfect and monopolistic competition do not 
fit in the trade theory. For example, the assumption of infinitely elastic supply of 
atomistic firms, which do not engage in strategic interaction
2
, is not appropriate to the 
global market. Consequently, the study of oligopoly is suited to the special feasure of 
concentrated industries, such as the strategic behaviour and the persistence of profits 
by firms. 
 
This research joints the new industrial organization models, oligopoly in particular, 
with theories of trade and multinational enterprise, or foreign direct investment (FDI). 
It examines two aspects of trade under oligopoly: firstly, to look at FDI vs exporting 
decisions in Cournot oligopoly model, and secondly, to investigate the welfare effects 
in a Hotelling model of differentiated duopoly. 
  
According to IMF/OECD IMF (1993),OECD (1996), FDI is an investment in a 
foreign company where the foreign investor owns at least 10% of the ordinary shares, 
                                                 
1
 See Bernard, A. B., J. B. Jensen, et al. (2007).  
2
 See  Leahy, D. and J. P. Neary (2010).  
2 
 
undertaken with the objective of establishing a ‘lasting interest’ in the country, a long-
term relationship and significant influence on the management of the firm. FDI grew 
dramatically over the last few decades, far outpacing the growth of trade and income
3
. 
The period 1986-2000 saw an explosive growth of activity by multinational 
enterprises, as measured by flows of foreign direct investment. In that period, 
worldwide real GDP increases by 2.5% per year, and exports by 5.6% whereas 
worldwide real inflows of FDI increased by 17.7%
4
. Compare this with the pre-1985 
data, real world GDP, exports and FDI grew at closer trends. 
 
Other important facts of FDI include: the predominant source of supply of FDI is the 
advanced countries
5
. The US is the world’s largest foreign investor, followed by EU 
as a whole, which accounted for 71.2% of all outward stocks. However, the share of 
developing countries has been rising, and the increase of FDI flows to developing 
countries reflects the growing importance of FDI as a source of financing of these 
economies. A foreign subsidiary may take place in one of the two forms: either as a 
‘greenfield investment’, where a new plant is set up from scratch, or as a merger with 
or acquisition of an existing firm, known as M&A. The majority of FDI activities take 
place through M&A rather than through greenfield investment, especially to high-
income countries. In addition, most FDI is concentrated in skill- and technology-
intensive industries, and multinational enterprises (MNEs) are large companies 
compared with national firms, both in home and host countries. They are sometimes 
more productive than national firms. Finally, multinational firms are increasingly 
engaged in international production networks. This is to do with vertical specialisation, 
in which different stages of the production of a good takes place in different countries. 
There are generally two types of FDI: vertical and horizontal FDI. 
 
Vertical foreign direct investment refers to those that geographically fragment the 
production process by stages of production
6
. These stages could be the production of 
components or stages of the manufacturing process or service activities in a separate 
                                                 
3
 Stylized facts were discussed in Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, et al. (2004), Markusen, J. R. (2002), and 
Caves, R. E. (2007).  
4
 See UNCTAD (2000), chapter 1 of Markusen, J. R. (2002), and chapter 1of Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, 
et al. (2004) 
5
 According to Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, et al. (2004): 15 countries of the EU are classified as 
advanced countries in 2003. 
6
 See Markusen, J. R. (2002)  
3 
 
foreign plant. This is referred to as ‘vertical’ investment, as it breaks of the value-
added chain. The main drive of this type of FDI is that it enables them to benefit from 
lower production costs by moving different stages of the production process to 
countries with lower costs. Vertical FDI tend to be drawn to markets with lower 
factors costs. Trade costs are important for this type of FDI as products at different 
stages of the production may cross the board for quite a few times. Therefore, Vertical 
FDI favours low wage locations with good transport and trade links. 
 
Horizontal foreign direct investment refers to the foreign production of products and 
services roughly similarly to those the firm produces for its home market. For 
example, setting up a foreign plant to serve the foreign market, this is referred to as 
‘horizontal’ investment, as the same stage of the production process is duplicated. 
Firms undertake investment in order to gain some advantages in supplying local or 
regional markets, even though it may incur some plant-level costs. Horizontal FDI 
tend to locate in markets where it can improve its market access, but sales will be 
large enough to cover fixed costs of the plant. Market access may be good as the 
country itself has a large high-income population, or as the country is well located to 
access such markets
7
. 
 
FDI is primarily horizontal rather than vertical, so instead of breaking up the 
production process, and producing in different countries to lower the factor costs as in 
vertical FDI, the bulk of horizontal FDI aims to replicate production facilities abroad 
to benefit from good market access. Empirical evidence generally confirms this result: 
they show that the location of foreign subsidiaries is mostly driven by factors 
consistent with horizontal FDI, for example, Markusen (2001) shows that bilateral 
flows of FDI depend on the similarity of the market size as well as the ratio of skilled 
and unskilled labour between markets, and uses this evidence to oppose the influence 
of the vertical FDI. Brainard (1997) finds that FDI is increasing in transport costs, but 
decreasing in production scale economies.  
 
Multinationals have grown fast over the last three decades, far outpacing the growth 
of the trade. The experience of the 1990s shows that Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
                                                 
7
 See Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, et al. (2004)  
4 
 
has grown rapidly and trade costs have been reduced by trade liberalisation. An 
intriguing question is why has FDI grown so fast in an era when trade costs have been 
reduced by trade liberalisation. Intuitively, trade costs are associated with export, so a 
reduction in trade costs would increase the profitability of exporting relative to the 
profitability of undertaking FDI. However, the theory is in contradiction to the 
empirical evidence in 1990s. This is one of the key problems this study is trying to 
solve. 
 
1.1.1 Trade versus FDI under Oligopoly 
Having the conventional view that FDI should be horizontal, it is expected a fall in 
trade costs should discourage FDI as predicted in a proximity-concentration trade-off. 
However, the experience of the 1990s shows that FDI has grown rapidly when trade 
costs have been reduced by trade liberalisation. A standard theoretical framework 
proximity-concentration trade-off
8
suggests that firms invest in a foreign market when 
the benefits of avoiding trade costs outweigh the loss of economies of scale from 
producing exclusively in the home market. So it predicts that the horizontal FDI is 
discouraged when trade costs fall as the benefits of concentrated production outweigh 
the gains from improved market access. This concept, however, is in contradiction 
with the trend when trade costs
9
 fell dramatically during 1990s both technically and 
politically. 
 
The foundation of the proximity-concentrated trade-off has been analysed by Neary 
(2009). He shows that higher fixed costs are associated with more exports relative to 
FDI, and higher trade costs is associated with more FDI relative to exports
10
. This 
could be interpreted across time, across space, and across sectors. In terms of time, his 
model implies that a reduction in trade costs should encourage FDI relative to export. 
In terms of sectors, it implies that when trade costs are low, exports are preferred to 
FDI. In terms of space, a closer market favours exports and a further one favours FDI.  
 
                                                 
8
 See Horstmann, I. J. and J. R. Markusen (1992)  
9
 Trade costs include both tariffs and transport costs. 
10
 One firm can not engage in both trade and FDI as in Helpman, E., M. J. Melitz, et al. (2004)  
 
5 
 
There are some econometric evidence and case-study evidence to support the 
proximity-concentration hypothesis. Brainard (1993) considers the U.S. data, and 
shows that the level of outward FDI falls as trade costs increase, but the share of FDI 
in affiliate sales plus U.S. exports rises. Hence he confirms the prediction of the 
theory at least in relative terms that lower trade costs are associated with more exports 
than FDI, leading a substitution away from FDI towards exports, and Carr, Markusen 
et al. (2001) find the similar results. Brainard (1997) has provided empirical evidence 
to support the hypothesis, and he finds that the share of affiliate sales in industry-
country is increasing in transport costs, trade barriers, and corporate scale economies, 
and decreasing in production scale economies.  
 
Case study of Ireland in the 1930’s11 has proven the proximity-concentration trade off 
hypothesis: in 1937, a change in the Irish government had transformed this country 
from an open economy to a highly protected economy. Although Irish market is small, 
still the theory would expect a large inflow of FDI following the reduction of the trade 
costs and tariffs. However this did not happen immediately, but waited until six years 
later. The reason behind was to do with the political context: protection was 
introduced by the new government as part of campaign to cut down the influence of 
Briton at that time. So when British firms try to set up manufactories in Ireland, the 
new legislation forbid them doing so. Only when this law was relaxed in 1938, FDI 
increased significantly in Ireland.  
 
All these evidence are consistent with the implication of the proximity-concentration 
trade-off. However, this theory is contradicted with the huge increase in FDI in the era 
of trade liberalisation in 1990s. The hypothesis explained the Irish example in 1930s, 
when Ireland benefited from a huge increase in the FDI inflow, but it could not 
explain the experience in the 1990s, while FDI rose much faster than exports when 
trade costs fell dramatically. Neary (2009)suggests that this comes from an old 
literature initiated by Mundell (1957), who showed that exports and FDI are perfect 
substitutes rather than perfect complements in two-sector two-country Heckscher-
Ohlin model, and trade barriers encourage international capital flows. Then his model 
was extended by Markusen (1983), Jones and Peter Neary (1984), and they showed 
                                                 
11
 See Neary, J. P. (2009)  
6 
 
that if the induced capital flows enter export sector, falls in trade costs can encourage 
FDI, as countries are different either in technology or in endowments of sector-
specific factors.  
 
Leahy and Pavelin (2003)used an infinitely-repeated game to demonstrate the follow-
my-leader character in FDI observed by Knickerbocker (1973). It implies the positive 
interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, so domestic firms may be motivated 
to set up foreign production in the same country and to tacitly collude over outputs, 
which implies foreign investment by one firm bring incentive for others to follow suit. 
Neary (2009) explores two resolutions to the paradox: Firstly, intra-bloc trade 
liberalisation encourage horizontal FDI in trading blocs, since foreign firms establish 
plants in one country as export platforms to serve the bloc as a whole, and secondly, 
falling trade costs encourage cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), where a 
foreign firm purchase an existing firm in the host country. This form of FDI (M&As) 
are quantitatively more important than greenfield FDI. In his paper, he resolves the 
paradox built on export-platform FDI in Neary (2002).Mrazova and Neary (2011) 
derives a general result that characterizes how firms select themselves into exporting 
or FDI to serve a group of foreign countries, and how many plants they plan to 
establish. They show that only if firms’ maximum profits are supermodular in tariffs 
and production costs, then the most efficient firms establish one plant in each country, 
firms of intermediate efficiency establish only one plant and use it as an export 
platform, and the least efficient firms choose to export.  
 
Collie (2009) resolves the problem by using an infinitely-repeated game with both 
Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly models, and he only considers collusion over 
the choices of undertaking FDI or exporting. This study adopts Collie (2009)’s 
framework, extending his model into a four firms oligopoly, that located in two 
countries, and solved the conflicts between the theory and the empirical experience. 
Additionally, it adds two contributions, which will be mentioned in section 1.3. 
 
While the first part of the study focuses on the strategic choices between FDI and 
trade under oligopoly in the trade liberalization, the second part of this study 
examines how trade liberalization affects the welfare gains, profits, and the volume of 
trade in the Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly. 
7 
 
 
1.1.2 Trade under Oligopoly 
Welfare analysis has been studied in many literature, and under different types of 
markets. In a simple framework of the trade model under oligopoly, in order to look at 
each market in isolation, it is more convenient to make the assumption that markets 
are segmented. This enables firms to decide their outputs or prices for each market 
endogenously. Another common assumption to consider one market in isolation is to 
assume that firms produce at constant marginal costs. This is to make sure that 
outputs or prices decision in one market have no implications for the costs at which 
other markets can be served.  
 
Brander (1981) first presents a reciprocal-markets model, he considers a Cournot 
duopoly model, where products are identical and outputs are shared between home 
and foreign countries, and there is only one firm from each country that compete in 
this industry. This model is symmetric and both home and foreign firms have the 
same marginal cost and the same trade costs. Brander and Krugman (1983) also uses 
the reciprocal-markets model to consider free trade under Cournot oligopoly with 
identical products. Both of them have identified that intra-industry trade can be 
expected even in the identical goods. Meanwhile, the welfare under the multilateral 
free trade is in a U-shape of the trade costs, and the reason for which will be 
illustrated next when considering a Cournot competition.  
 
Output Competition 
Considering the output competition of symmetric multilateral free trade between two 
identical countries first, if product differentiation is allowed, the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium can occur. Leahy and Neary (2010) presents a general setup and 
concludes that oligopoly competition is an independent determinant of trade. Brander 
(1981) analyses two-way trade in identical products and shows that it is true even 
when the products are identical. When goods are more differentiated, the volume of 
trade increases further, because consumers can enjoy a variety of goods. Secondly, 
when the trade cost is closer to its prohibitive level, each firm is selling more in its 
home market than its exports to the foreign market, as there is a penalty on the foreign 
sales. Then there is a ‘reciprocal dumping’ by Brander and Krugman (1983): the price 
8 
 
of each firm in equilibrium yields a lower mark-up over cost on its exports than on its 
sales in the home country. 
 
Then the effect of trade costs on the profits of the firm will be examined. By focusing 
on the home firm, its total profits are the sum of its home sales and its export to the 
foreign market. Leahy and Neary (2010) derives the profits that are decreasing in 
trade costs at free trade, but increasing in them at neighbourhood of autarky in a linear 
demand function. So the profits are in a U-shape in trade costs. There are two reasons 
for the shape: Firstly, at free trade, an increase in the trade costs has a negative effect 
on the exports, but has a positive effect on a firm’s home sales, and the negative effect 
dominants, so total profits and sales decrease in trade costs. Secondly, at autarky, 
there is no export initially, so a change in trade costs affects profits on exports rarely, 
but a fall in the trade costs of the foreign firm will reduce the sales and the profits of 
the home sales, as they were at the monopoly level initially. Consequently, a 
reduction in trade costs reduces the home firm’s total profits. 
 
Finally, the effects of changes of trade costs on welfare will be looked at. Since the 
model is symmetric, if focusing on home firm only (symmetric model), its total 
welfare is the sum of the home consumer surplus and its total sales in both markets. 
Consumer surplus will rise when trade costs fall, as a reduction in trade costs lowers 
the prices to the home consumers. Home firm’s total profits are illustrated earlier that 
it is a U-shape in relation to the trade costs. Adding up the profits of the home firm 
and consumer surplus, the welfare can be analysed as follows: 
 
 Starting from autarky, if trade costs fall, consumer surplus increases as the 
competition intensify the market, leading to lower prices. On the other hand, 
home profits and sales fall for the reduced prices. Hence these two effects in 
the home market cancel out, the fall in total profits overweight the rise in 
consumer surplus, and the welfare fall when trade costs falls starting from 
autarky. Alternatively speaking, opening up to trade will always lead to a 
welfare gain as stated in Brander and Krugman (1983). 
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 Starting from free trade, if trade costs rise, consumer surplus falls as the prices 
of both firms to the home consumers will increase. Home firm’s total sales and 
profits will fall as well as illustrated earlier. Hence the overall welfare of home 
firm fall when trade costs rise starting from free trade. 
 
Consequently, home firm’s welfare is also in a U-shape with the trade costs. An 
alternative explanation of the U-shape of the welfare in trade costs was provided by 
Brander and Krugman (1983), where they think the welfare effects are interesting. 
When trade costs fall if they are closer to a prohibitive level, the welfare will decline 
because a competitive effect, which is positive in sales, is dominated by the increased 
waste due to the trade costs. When the trade costs are low, the competitive effect 
dominants the increased waste.  
 
Price Competition 
This subsection will consider the price competition of symmetric multilateral free 
trade between two identical countries, and analyse how the effects of trade 
liberalisation affects trade and welfare in this case. The welfare effects under the 
Bertrand competition are first derived by Clarke and Collie (2003). They add the 
effect of product differentiation in the free trade under Bertrand duopoly, and prove 
that there are always gains from trade. They present a two country Bertrand duopoly 
model with linear demands and constant marginal costs, and allow for differences 
between the two countries in terms of demand and cost functions. Their conclusion is 
that the level of welfare never falls below the autarky level under both unilateral and 
multilateral free trade.  
 
According to Clarke and Collie (2003), profits are also U-shaped under Bertrand 
competition. Together with the fact that consumer surplus is monotonically 
decreasing in the trade costs
12
, the welfare under free trade in the Bertrand model is 
also U-shaped as in the Cournot case. However, the competition effect under Bertrand 
duopoly is stronger than under Cournot duopoly, which means that even when trade 
may not take place in the home market, it can still affect home firm’s behaviour as 
there is a potential threat of export to the home country. Leahy and Neary (2010) 
                                                 
12
 A rise in trade costs will reduce the prices of both firms in the home country, which will reduce the 
welfare of home consumers. 
10 
 
derives a general result showing that when the trade costs reach its prohibitive level
13
 
under Bertrand competition, home firm’s outputs are still higher than the 
unconstrained monopoly outputs. Yet the home firm would not raise its price, as the 
foreign competitor would have earned positive profits by exporting, and lower home 
firm’s profits. Only when the trade costs reach a prohibitive level under Cournot 
competition, home firm can be an unconstrained monopolist facing no threat or 
potential competition. This pro-competitive effect where home firm is constrained by 
the threat only occurs in the Bertrand competition, whereas free trade only has an 
effect if trade actually happens in the Cournot competition.  
 
The welfare effects under Bertrand duopoly are slightly different from the ones under 
Cournot duopoly due to this pro-competitive effect where trade or competition does 
not actually occur. Start from autarky where trade costs are at a Cournot prohibitive 
level under Bertrand competition, trade liberalisation will increase the welfare of the 
home country initially, because this is the region where home firm faces the potential 
competition from foreign firm, but trade does not actually happen. Thus there is no 
waste on the transport cost, and the prices of the products are lowered by the trade 
liberalisation, leading to welfare and profit gains. As trade costs decrease further to 
below the threshold level of Bertrand competition, trade occurs, and the welfare in 
terms of trade costs will be the usual U-shape as in the Cournot competition
14
. 
Nevertheless, Clarke and Collie (2003) finds that the welfare never fall below the 
autarky level under Bertrand oligopoly, while it could do under Cournot oligopoly, 
and induce losses from trade. 
 
Finally, to conclude the difference between the Bertrand and Cournot results: the fact 
that trade promotes a competition effect applies to both cases, but it is stronger under 
the Bertrand competition, in which home firm behaves as a constrained monopoly 
even when trade may not take place. In this case, welfare increases as a result of a 
reduced price and this pro-competitive effect under the trade liberalisation. When 
trade costs fall further, however, the relationship between the welfare and trade costs 
                                                 
13
 This prohibitive trade costs are at some intermediate level, which is lower than the prohibitive cost 
under Cournot competition. For details see Leahy, D. and J. P. Neary (2010) and Clarke, R. and D. R. 
Collie (2003)  
14
 See Leahy, D. and J. P. Neary (2010): figure 1: welfare and trade costs under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition, both are U-shaped in trade costs, but welfare falls after certain point under Bertrand 
competition. 
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are in a similar U-shape fashion. In addition, the welfare under Bertrand completion is 
always above the autarky level, but it is not always the case under Cournot 
competition. The Hotelling model this study has adopted exhibits the features of 
Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, and without market expansion effect. 
 
1.2 Objectives of this study 
The context of this study is embedded in a large volume of literature analysing trade 
versus FDI in a Cournot Oligopoly, as well as the welfare effects of free trade and 
gains from trade under imperfect competition by using a Hotelling model. The 
specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
I. To examine the FDI versus exporting decision under Cournot oligopoly by 
using linear-demand function in a two-country four-firm model; 
II. To re-examine the FDI versus exporting decision under Cournot oligopoly by 
using constant elasticity function and two-country four-firm model; 
III. To analyse the welfare effects of free trade, gains from trade and the volume 
of trade by constructing a product space in a two-country Hotelling model of a 
spatial duopoly.  
 
1.3 Outline and Contributions of this study 
This study includes three analyses, which are to be found in chapter two to four. The 
organisation of this study, together with a brief description of the main contribution of 
each chapter is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 analysed the export versus FDI decisions in a two-country four-firm model 
with identical products under Cournot oligopoly. In the static game, a reduction in the 
trade cost will lead the firms switch from undertaking FDI to exporting. The outcomes 
are that two firms in the same country choose to undertake FDI if the fixed cost is 
relatively low, or one firm chooses to export while its competitor from the same 
country chooses to undertake FDI if the fixed cost is relatively high. Thus, this model 
shows that both export and FDI can exist as an equilibrium outcome in the world 
when the trade cost is sufficiently high. However, prisoners’ dilemmas might exist. If 
based on one market, both firms in the same country might make lower profits when 
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they both undertake FDI than when they both export. If based on both markets, if the 
fixed cost is relatively low, all firms might make lower profits when they all 
undertake FDI than when they export. If the fixed cost is relatively high, the 
equilibrium profits when one firm in each country undertakes FDI while its 
competitor in the same country export might be higher than the profits when all firms 
export. This is due to the intensified competition caused by FDI. The prisoners’ 
dilemma can be avoided in an infinitely-repeated game when all firms tacitly collude 
over their FDI versus export decisions, as collusion over FDI can be sustained by the 
threat of Nash-reversion strategies if the trade cost is sufficiently high. Then a 
reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI 
when the trade cost is sufficiently high, as in the infinitely-repeated game , a reduction 
in a sufficiently high trade costs lessen the profitability of collusion, and that explains 
the experience of the increasing FDI in 1990s. Also it is shown that a reduction in the 
fixed cost may lead firms to switch from undertaking FDI to exporting when the fixed 
cost is relatively high.  
 
Chapter 3 studies uses constant elasticity demand function to check the robustness of 
the results from chapter 2, and it has been confirmed that all the results are quite 
general. In the static game, a reduction in the trade cost will lead the firms switch 
from undertaking FDI to exporting. The same outcomes are achieved that two firms in 
the same country choose to undertake FDI if the fixed cost is relatively low, or one 
firm chooses to export while its competitor from the same country chooses to 
undertake FDI if the fixed cost is relatively high. Again it shows that both export and 
FDI can exist as an equilibrium outcome in the world when the trade cost is 
sufficiently high. The prisoners’ dilemmas still exist. If the fixed cost is relatively low, 
all firms might make lower profits when they all undertake FDI than when they export. 
If the fixed cost is relatively high, the equilibrium profits when one firm in each 
country undertakes FDI while its competitor in the same country export might be 
higher than the profits when all firms export, due to the intensified competition caused 
by FDI. In an infinitely-repeated game, the prisoners’ dilemma can be avoided, as 
collusion over FDI can be sustained by the threat of Nash-reversion strategies if the 
trade cost is sufficiently high. Then a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch 
from exporting to undertaking FDI. 
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The main contribution of chapter 2 and chapter 3 to the current literature are: firstly, a 
reduction in the fixed cost may increase the incentive to collude and therefore lead 
firms to switch from undertaking FDI to exporting when the fixed cost is relative high 
in an infinitely repeated game. Secondly, there exist multiply equilibia in both static 
game and infinitely-repeated game, so both export and FDI can co-exist in the same 
market when the trade cost is relatively high, which is in line with the current trend in 
the globalised world. 
 
Chapter 4 aims to examine how trade liberalisation affects the welfare gains from 
trade, and volume of trade in the Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly 
by constructing a product space between the trade costs and marginal disutility, which 
associated with product differentiation. The results turn out to be different from 
Fujiwara (2009), who proves losses-from-trade proposition at any trade costs. By 
considering the kinked-demand structure in the Hotelling model which Fujiwara 
(2009)ignores, it shows that there are gains from trade when products are highly 
differentiated and losses when products are close substitutes. When there is pro-
competitive effect in the competitive market, there are neither gains nor losses. The 
volume of trade is increasing in the degree of product differentiation when products 
are close substitutes, and decreasing in the degree of product differentiation when 
products are sufficiently differentiated.  
 
The last chapter is the conclusion. It provides a discussion of the overall findings and 
implications of this research. 
 
1 
 
Chapter 2: FDI versus Exporting under Cournot Oligopoly 
2.1 Introduction 
Multinationals have grown fast over the last three decades, far outpacing the growth 
of the trade. Especially the period 1986 to 2000 saw a dramatic growth in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in real terms, yet FDI flows remain much smaller than trade 
flows in the same period
15
 . The experience of the 1990s shows that FDI has grown 
rapidly and trade costs have been reduced by trade liberalisation.  
 
A standard theoretical framework proximity-concentration trade-off
16
 has been 
discussed in a lot of literature and it predicts that the horizontal FDI is discouraged 
when trade costs fall. This concept, however, is in contradiction with the trend. The 
proximity-concentration trade-off suggests that firms invest in a foreign market when 
the benefits of avoiding trade costs outweigh the loss of economies of scale from 
producing exclusively in the home market. Brainard (1997) provides empirical 
evidence to support this hypothesis, but does not explain the fast growth of FDI in an 
era of trade liberalisation. Neary (2009) explores two resolutions to the paradox: First, 
intra-bloc trade liberalisation encourage horizontal FDI in trading blocs, as foreign 
firms build plants in one country as platforms for the whole bloc, and second, cross-
border mergers, which are quantitatively more important than greenfield FDI, are 
encouraged by falling trade costs. Leahy and Pavelin (2003) used an infinitely-
repeated game to demonstrate the follow-my-leader character in FDI observed by 
Knickerbocker (1973). It implies the interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, 
so domestic firms may be motivated to tacitly collude over outputs.  
 
Collie (2009) resolves the problem by using an infinitely-repeated game with both 
Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly models, and he considers collusion over the 
choices of undertaking FDI or exporting. His theory started with the static game in a 
symmetric Cournot duopoly model. Two firms located in two countries may export to 
their competitor’s market or undertake FDI. The decision is based on the trade cost 
incurred with exporting and the fixed cost incurred with undertaking FDI. Firms are 
                                                 
15
 Stylised facts on FDI are presented in chapter one of Markusen, J. R. (2002), and chapter one of 
Barba Navaretti, Giorgio, et al. (2004)  
16
 See Horstmann, I. J. and J. R. Markusen (1992) 
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more likely to undertake FDI if the trade cost is high or the fixed cost is low. In a 
static game, one firm’s decision of undertaking FDI will lead to an intensified 
competition in its competitor’s market, and reduce its competitor’s profits in its home 
market. Hence, when both firms undertake FDI, both of them make lower profits in 
each market than when they both export. This is often a prisoners’ dilemma. He then 
solves this problem by looking at an infinitely-repeated game when the firms tacitly 
collude over their choice of undertaking FDI or exporting, and a reduction in trade 
costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI when the trade cost 
is high. However, his model is based on a two firm two country world, where his 
results might not cover all the equilibrium cases. For example, there is only one Nash 
equilibrium that both firms would undertake FDI, and this approache does not really 
address that both FDI and exports can co-exist in the same market, even with identical 
firms, in line with recent trends in the globalized world. 
 
The key innovation in this model is to adopt Collie (2009)’s framework, extending his 
model into a four firms oligopoly, that located in two countries. It then allows 
Cournot oligopolistic competition between the firms producing identical products. A 
four-firm two-country world has added three more contributions: firstly, there exist 
multiply equilibria: the new equilibrium is that one firm in each country will choose 
to undertake FDI while its competitor in the same country exports when the fixed cost 
of undertaking FDI is relatively high. Hence firms choose different 
internationalisation strategies such that both export and FDI can co-exist in the same 
market. Secondly, the asymmetric equilibria in which ex-ante identical firms choose 
differenet strategies can emerge in an infinitely-repeated game. Finally, a reduction in 
the fixed cost may increase the incentive to collude and therefore lead firms to switch 
from undertaking FDI to exporting when the fixed cost is relative high in an infinitely 
repeated game. The model has checked the robustness of Collies (2009)’s work, and 
conclude the similar results: a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from 
exporting to undertaking FDI when the trade cost is relatively high, and collusion over 
FDI can be sustained as Nash equilibrium using Nash-reversion trigger strategies.  
 
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) develop a simple Cournot duopoly 
model with trade, where two firms produce commodity in two identical countries. 
Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and Smith (1987) view FDI as a strategic 
3 
 
investment in models of intra-industry trade under oligopoly.
17
 They consider the case 
of a horizontal FDI and assume that the technology of production involves a firm-
specific cost such as R&D and a plant-specific cost. In this research, there is only a 
plant-specific cost, and it is considered as a sunk cost when a firm builds a factory in 
its own country. Each firm needs to decide whether to export to their competitor’s 
market or to undertake FDI. Undertaking FDI incurs the fixed cost while exporting 
incurs the trade costs, and firms are more likely to undertake FDI if the trade costs 
(the fixed cost) are low (high) as it will increase the profitability of exporting relative 
to the profitability of undertaking FDI.  
 
Influenced by the investment behaviour of Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and 
Smith (1987), Horstmann and Markusen (1992)and Rowthorn (1992) developed 
symmetric two-country trade models in which market structure is determined 
endogenously as a result of plant location choices by firms. The result in these models 
is the existence of multiple equilibria, given by the production technology of both 
firm specific and plant specific fixed costs, due to the endogenized multinational 
firms. The market structure in the present model is in the similar fashion, but by 
assumption firms have already built their manufactories in the market, so that their 
decision is only whether to export or to undertake FDI in the foreign market. This 
assumption is made to avoid the problem of multiple equilibria arising from the 
complex market. Nevertheless, there exist two equilibria in this model: (1) all firms 
undertake FDI when the fixed cost is relatively low as in Collie (2009) and (2) one 
firm in each country undertakes FDI while other firms export to the foreign country 
when the fixed cost is relatively high. This equilibrium is an important result that 
shows the possibility of the existence of both FDI and exports in one market, which 
reflect the exact trading activities in a globalised world. 
 
Motta (1992) analysed the impact of a tariff by a foreign country. In his model, a 
multinational competes with a local firm in the foreign country. The tariff may induce 
the multinational to shift away from the investment as the local firm may enter the 
industry as a result of the tariff, and this result runs contrary to the traditional tariff 
argument. Motta (1996), Norman and Motta (1993) and Neary (2002) have 
                                                 
17
 See Caves, R. E. (2007) for a broader knowledge about empirical literature on multinational 
enterprise and FDI.  
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considered the effects of the internal trade liberalisation on the pattern of FDI into a 
two-country model and three-country model, that a reduction in trade cost within a 
trade bloc may encourage FDI. While most papers assume that all firms are equally 
likely to engage in FDI, Neary (2002) assumes that the potential multinational has a 
first-mover advantage. The present model also considers the first-mover advantage in 
equilibrium (2) in an infinitely-repeated game as mentioned above. The concept fits 
well the case when one firm in each country possesses more technological or 
organisational advantage (for example, more information) which may make it more 
likely than its competitor from the same country to become a multinational in the first 
place.  
 
Most literature on FDI and export under oligopolistic competition has used static 
game theory models, except for Leahy and Pavelin (2003), who used an infinitely-
repeated game to demonstrate the follow-my-leader character in FDI observed by 
Knickerbocker (1973). It implies the interdependence between firms’ FDI decisions, 
so domestic firms may be motivated to tacitly collude over outputs. The present 
chapter does not consider collusion over outputs but the collusion over the decision of 
undertaking FDI or exporting. 
 
This chapter is organised in the following way. Section two presents a theoretical 
framework of FDI under Cournot oligopoly. Section three presents the static game 
theory model, followed by the infinitely-repeated game in section four. The 
conclusions are in section five. 
 
2.2 The model 
In the symmetric model, the world consists of two countries with two firms in each 
country, and they produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot 
oligopolists in the two markets. 
 
These two countries are labelled A and B, and the firms in country A are labelled one 
and two, while the firms in country B are labelled three and four. Firm one and firm 
two are owned by shareholders who are resident in country A, referred as the home 
market, and firm three and firm four are owned by shareholders who are resident in 
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country B, referred as the foreign market. It is assumed that firm one and firm two 
have incurred sunk costs to design their products and to build factories in country A, 
and by symmetry, firm three and four have incurred the same sunk costs in country B. 
 
The firms play a two-stage static game. In the first stage, the firms independently 
decide whether to export to supply the other country or to undertake FDI by building 
a factory in the other country. Export incurs a trade cost (transport cost or import tariff) 
of k per unit, and undertaking FDI incurs a fixed cost of G per period. In the second 
stage, they compete in a Cournot outputs game in the two markets, which are assumed 
to be segmented. All firms incur a constant marginal cost of c regardless the location 
of their production. In each country, there is a representative agent who has an 
identical, quadratic, quasi-linear utility function, which yields linear demand functions. 
 
The utility function in country A is: 
 
   
2
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2
A A A A A A A A A AU x x x x x x x x z

           (1) 
 
where 
iAx is the consumption of the product of firm i , and Az is the consumption of 
the numeraire good in country A. Parameter  is the consumers’ maximum 
willingness to pay for the product, and  is inversely related to the size of the market. 
The representative consumer in country A then solves the utility maximisation 
problem by the first order condition, which yields the inverse demand functions in 
country A, and it is linear in 
iAx . The products are assumed to be perfect substitutes, 
so the inverse demand functions are the same for four firms in the home market 
(country A):  
 
 1 2 3 4A A A A Ap x x x x            (2) 
 
Since the model is symmetric, the inverse demand functions are the same for country 
B. In order to analyse the profits and the outputs of the firms under all strategic 
combinations in the static game, it is easier to look at the profits of the home firms in 
country A first, in response to the strategies of the foreign firms in country B. Then 
the profits of the foreign firms in country B are symmetric. Consequently, the total 
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profits of all firms in both markets (the world) will be the summation of the above two. 
There are three strategic combinations in each market: (1) both firms in the same 
market choose to export, (2) one firm undertakes FDI while its competitor in the same 
market chooses to export, or (3) both firms undertake FDI. 
 
2.2.1 Both firms choose to export 
Consider the home market (country A), when firm three and firm four in the foreign 
country choose to export, the marginal cost of firm one and firm two will be c and the 
marginal cost of firm three and firm four will be c k , assuming an interior solution 
where all firms have positive profits in both countries. Thus the operating profits of 
the firms in country A will be: 
 
 1 1A A Ap c x       2 2A A Ap c x    
 3 3A A Ap c k x        4 4A A Ap c k x       (3) 
 
In Cournot competition, each firm makes the best response to its competitors’ outputs, 
so maximises the profits in response to its outputs while holding the other firms’ 
outputs fixed. Taking the derivatives of Cournot oligopoly ( 0iA iAx   ), as shown 
in the appendix, the outputs, prices and profits of the four firms are solved. For 
country A variables, the superscript EE denotes that both firm three and firm four are 
exporting to country A: 
 
1 2
2
5
EE EE
A A
c k
x x


 
    3 4
3
5
EE EE
A A
c k
x x


 
   
 
4 2
5A
EE c kp
  
         (4) 
 
2
1 2
2
25
EE EE
A A
c k
 

 
    
 
2
3 4
3
25
EE EE
A A
c k
 

 
   
 
Regardless what strategies firm three and firm four would choose, firm one’s outputs 
and profits are always equal to those of firm two, as the above equations simply show 
how foreign firms’ strategies affect home firms’ decisions. If the trade cost is 
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prohibitive, i.e. 3 4 0
EE EE
A Ax x  , when   3k k c   , the exports from firm three 
and firm four to country A and the profits of both firms from exports will be zero. 
When the trade cost reaches its prohibitive level k , firms will stop trading between 
the two markets, then firm one and firm two share the duopoly profits in country A, 
while firm three and firm four produce outputs and sell them solely in country B. 
Symmetry of the model implies that: 1 3
EE EE
A Bx x , 2 4
EE EE
A Bx x , 3 1
EE EE
A Bx x , 4 2
EE EE
A Bx x ,
EE EE
A Bp p , 1 3
EE EE
A B  , 2 4
EE EE
A B   3 1
EE EE
A B  , and 4 2
EE EE
A B  ,where the superscript 
EE of country B variables denotes that firm one and firm two are exporting to country 
B. 
 
2.2.2 One firm exports, the other firm undertakes FDI 
When firm three chooses to export to country A, and firm four chooses to undertake 
FDI in country A, the marginal cost of firm one, firm two and firm four will be c , but 
the marginal cost of firm three will be c k . Assuming the outcome is an interior 
solution where all firms have positive sales, the operating profits (before the fixed 
cost) of the firms in the home market (country A) will be: 
 
  1 1A A Ap c x       2 2A A Ap c x    
  3 3A A Ap c k x        4 4A A Ap c x      (5) 
 
If the superscript EF of country A variables denotes that firm three is exporting to 
country A, and firm four is undertaking FDI to supply country A, the usual 
derivations for a Cournot oligopoly yield the outputs, prices and profits of the four 
firms as shown in the appendix: 
 
1 2 4
5
EF EF EF
A A A
c k
x x x


 
      3
4
5
EF
A
c k
x


 
  
4
5
EF
A
c k
p
  
         (6) 
 
2
1 2 4
25
EF EF EF
A A A
c k
  

 
     
 
2
3
4
25
EF
A
c k


 
  
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By comparison, the prices in (6) are lower than the prices in (4). This is because FDI 
intensifies competition. When firm four undertakes FDI, the prices set by firms are 
lower than the prices when it exports to country A, which reduces the profits of firm 
one and firm two in country A. Moreover, the outputs and profits (before the fixed 
cost) of firm four has increased from exporting to undertaking FDI in country A, i.e.
4 4
EF EE
A Ax x , 4 4
EF EE
A A   while the outputs and profits of firm three, which does not 
change its exporting strategy, are lower when firm four switches to undertaking FDI 
in country A, i.e. 3 3
EF EE
A Ax x , 3 3
EF EE
A A  . Symmetry of the model implies that
3 4 2 1
EF EF EF EF
B B B Ax x x x   , 1 3
EF EF
B Ax x , 
EF EF
B Ap p , 3 4 2 1
EF EF EF EF
B B B A      , 1 3
EF EF
B A  , 
where the superscript EF of country B variables denotes that firm one is exporting to 
country B, and firm two is undertaking FDI in country B. 
 
The exports of firm three to country A and its profits from exports will be zero if the 
trade cost is prohibitive, i.e. 3
EF
Ax =0, so   4k k c   . When the trade cost 
reaches its prohibitive level k , firm three will stop exporting to country A, yet it still 
produces and sells the products in country B. In this case, only firm four will supply 
country A by undertaking FDI. The profits and the sales of exporting from firm three 
to country A becomes zero, hence there is a corner solution equilibrium, where firm 
three sets its price equals to the marginal cost c k . The profits, outputs and prices of 
the four firms under the Cournot oligopoly when k k  are: 
 
 1 1A A Ap c x       2 2A A Ap c x      (7) 
 4 4A A Ap c x       3 3A A Ap c k x     
 
Which yields: 
 
 
1 2 4
4
F F F
A A A
c
x x x


        3 0
F
Ax
   
 
3
4
F
A
c
p
           (8) 
 
 
2
1 2 4
16
F F F
A A A
c
  

          3 0
F
A
   
9 
 
where the superscript F of country A variables denotes that firm three is not 
exporting to country A, but firm four is undertaking FDI in country A. Symmetry of 
the model implies that if k k : 2 3 4 1
F F F F
B B B Ax x x x
      , F FB Ap p
  , 
2 3 4 1
F F F F
B B B A   
      , 1 3 0
F F
B A 
   , 1 3 0
F F
B Ax x
   where the superscript F of 
country B variables denotes that firm one stops trading with country B, but firm two is 
undertaking FDI in country B. 
 
When firm three chooses to undertake FDI, and firm four chooses to export, the 
marginal cost of firm one, firm two and firm three will be c , and the marginal cost of 
firm four will be c k . The results are reciprocal to the above ones when firm three 
chooses to export and firm four undertakes FDI. The interior outcome is as follows: 
 
1 2 3
5
FE FE FE
A A A
c k
x x x


 
      4
4
5
FE
A
c k
x


 
  
4
5
FE
A
c k
p
  
         (9) 
 
2
1 2 3
25
FE FE FE
A A A
c k
  

 
     
 
2
4
4
25
FE
A
c k


 
  
 
Symmetry of the model implies that 3 4 1 1
FE FE FE FE
B B B Ax x x x   , 2 4
FE FE
B Ax x , 
FE FE
B Ap p , 
3 4 1 1
FE FE FE FE
B B B A      , 2 4
FE FE
B A  , where the superscript FE of country B variables 
denotes that firm one is undertaking FDI in country B, and firm two is exporting to 
country B. 
 
Similarly, the corner solution occurs when firm four stops exporting to the country A, 
only firm three is trading with country A. That is when 4 0
FE
Ax  ,   4k k c   . 
Hence firm four sets its price equal to marginal cost c k and its sales in country A 
are zero. Recalculate the profits, outputs and prices of the three firms under the 
Cournot oligopoly:  1 2 3 4
F F F
A A Ax x x c 
      ,  3 4FAp c
   , 
 
2
1 2 3 16
F F F
A A A c    
      , 4 0
F
A
  . Symmetrically, It implies that 
1 3 4 1
F F F F
B B B Ax x x x
      , 1 3 4 1
F F F F
B B B A   
      , and F FB Ap p
  , 2 4 0
F F
B A 
   where the 
10 
 
superscript F   of country B variables denotes that firm one is undertaking FDI in 
country B, but firm two stops trading with country B when trade cost reaches k . 
 
2.2.3 Both firms undertake FDI 
When both firm three and firm four undertake FDI, the marginal cost of all firms will 
be c , so the outcome is an interior solution where all firms generate positive sales. 
The operating profits (before the fixed cost) of the firms will be: 
 
  1 1A A Ap c x       2 2A A Ap c x     
  3 3A A Ap c x       4 4A A Ap c x      (10) 
 
If the superscript FF  of country A variables denotes that both firm three and firm 
four are undertaking FDI to supply country A, the derivations for a Cournot oligopoly 
yield the outputs, prices and profits of the four firms, as in the appendix, are: 
 
 
1 2 3 4
5
FF FF FF FF
A A A A
c
x x x x



      
4
5
FF
A
c
p
 
   
 
 
2
1 2 3 4
25
FF FF FF FF
A A A A
c
   


          (11) 
 
Compare prices in (11) with (4) and (6), the prices set by all firms are the lowest when 
both firm three and firm four undertake FDI in country A than when one of them 
exports or both of them export to country A, i.e. 
FF EF FE EE
A A A Ap p p p   , which 
further proved that FDI intensifies competition. In addition, it is worth noting that the 
outputs and profits (before the fixed cost) of firm three and firm four in country A are 
higher when both firms undertake FDI than when both firms export to country A. i.e. 
3 3
FF EE
A A  , 4 4
FF EE
A A  , which is not consistent with what has been discussed in 
literature survey.
18
 This is because the fixed cost of undertaking FDI is not taken into 
account here yet. Next section will present a static game theory model of FDI under 
                                                 
18
 In a two-country two-firm model, when both firms undertake FDI, the outcome is a 
prisoners’dilemma where both firms have lower profits when they both undertake FDI than when they 
both export.  
11 
 
Cournot oligopoly, where the fixed cost of undertaking FDI enters the decisions of the 
game.  
 
2.3 Static Game 
Since each firm can choose to export or to undertake FDI, and there are four firms, 
there are sixteen possibilities to consider for interior outcomes. The model is 
symmetric so the profits of the firms are also symmetric. Denote the operating profits 
(before the fixed cost) of a firm from sales in the two countries as: 
EEEE  when all 
firms choose to export; 
EEFF  when home firms choose to export and foreign firms 
choose to undertake FDI; 
EFEF  when firm one and firm three choose to export and 
firm two and four choose to undertake FDI; 
FFFF  when all firms choose to 
undertake FDI etc. Meanwhile, there is a possibility of a corner solution when one 
firm undertakes FDI, and its competitor from the same market exports to the other 
country. It happens when the trade cost arrives at k ( k k ), the firm that has chosen 
to export will stop trading and its sales become zero, denoted by subscript . Hence 
there are 
F EE  when firm one is undertaking FDI, firms two stops trading while firm 
three and firm four are exporting to country A, so firm two’s profit in foreign country 
becomes zero. Similar rule applies to 
F FE , F EF , F FF , FEE , FEF , FFE  ,
FFF and F F  etc. Therefore, using(4), (6), (8), (9) and (11), the operating profits 
(before the fixed cost) of firm one or firm two from sales in the two countries are as 
follows: 
 
Interior solutions: (when k k ) 
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
2 3
25 25
EE EE EE EE
EEEE A B A B
c k c k 
   
 
   
        
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
3
25 25
FF EE FF EE
EEFF A B A B
c c k 
   
 
  
        
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
3
25 25
EF EE EF EE
EEEF EEFE A B A B
c k c k 
   
 
   
         
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
2 4
25 25
EE EF EE FE
EFEE A B A B
c k c k 
   
 
   
        
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   
2 2
1 1 2 2
4
25 25
EF EF EF FE
EFEF EFFE A B A B
c k c k 
   
 
   
         
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
4
25 25
FF EF FF FE
EFFF A B A B
c c k 
   
 
  
        
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
2
25 25
EE FE EE EF
FEEE A B A B
c k c k 
   
 
   
                  (12) 
 
2
1 1 2 2
2
25
EF FE EF EF
FEEF FEFE A B A B
c k
   

 
        
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
25 25
FF FE FF EF
FEFF A B A B
c c k 
   
 
  
        
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
2
25 25
EE FF EE FF
FFEE A B A B
c k c 
   
 
  
        
   
2 2
1 1 2 2
25 25
EF FF EF FF
FFEF FFFE A B A B
c k c 
   
 
  
         
 
2
1 1 2 2
2
25
FF FF FF FF
FFFF A B A B
c
   


       
 
Corner solutions (when k k k  ) 
   
2 2
1 1
2
25 16
EE F
F EE A B
c k c 
 
 


  
       
   
2 2
1 1
25 16
EF F
F FE F EF A B
c k c 
 
 

 
  
          
   
2 2
1 1
25 16
FF F
F FF A B
c c 
 
 


 
                (13) 
 
2
1 1
2
0
25
EE F
FEE A B
c k
 



 
      
 
2
1 1 0
25
EF F
FFE FEF A B
c k
 


 
 
       
 
2
1 1 0
25
FF F
FFF A B
c
 




      
13 
 
 
2
1 1
8
F F
F F F F A B
c
 

 
  

      
 
2
1 1 0
16
F F
FF F F A B
c
 

 
   

       
 
The above profits are the total profits of firm one (firm two) in both countries (the 
world). for example, 
EEEF is the profits of firm one in country A when firm three 
exports to country A and firm four undertakes FDI to supply country A, plus the 
profits of firm one in country B when both firm one and firm two export to the foreign 
market, that is, 1 1
EF EE
A B  . There are twelve equations in (12), not sixteen as 
mentioned previously, because when considering firm one’s profits, it does not matter 
whether firm three exports and firm four undertakes FDI, or the other way around, 
both have the same effect on the profits of firm one and firm two in the home market. 
Hence, 
EEEF EEFE  , EFEF EFFE  , FEEF FEFE   and FFEF FFFE   for firm 
one and firm two. 
 
These profit levels in the second-stage outputs game can be put into a two-by-two 
payoff matrix, where the rows denote the strategies of firm one and the columns 
denote the strategies of firm two. As markets are segmented, firm one and firm two’s 
decisions in the foreign country will not be affected by the choices of their 
competitors from the foreign country
19
. Therefore the game will only focus on firm 
one and firm two’s payoffs in the foreign market (country B). The payoff matrix is as 
follows with the first number in a cell the profits of firm one in country B and the 
second number is the profits of firm two in country B. The matrices in table 2-1 and 
table 2-2 show the interior payoffs where firms take different strategies when the 
trade cost is smaller than the prohibitive trade cost   4k c  . 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Notice that firm one and firm two’s outputs in the home country will be affected by foreign firms’ 
decision, as different strategy yields different outputs that affect home products. However home firms’ 
decision in the foreign market will not be affected by foreign firms’s decisions in the home market. We 
will focus on one home firm’s decision (FDI vs Export) in the foreign country later on, and its profits at 
home will be cancelled out regardless what foreign firms’ decision. Only its profits in the foreign 
market is taken into account.  
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Payoff  Matrix 
Firm 2 
Export FDI 
Firm 1 
Export 1
EE
B      ,     2
EE
B  1
EF
B      ,     2
EF
B G   
FDI 1
FE
B G      ,    2
FE
B  1
FF
B G       ,     2
FF
B G   
Table 2-1: interior payoff matrix when k k  
 
The first cell on the left hand side shows a pair of payoffs in country B when both 
firm one and firm two decide to export, and the second cell on the left presents a pair 
of payoffs in country B when firm one undertakes FDI while firm two exports, so the 
fixed cost of undertaking FDI G  is taken off from firm one’s profits. Cells on the 
right hand side show the pairs of payoffs in country B when firm two undertakes FDI 
while firm one chooses to export (top cell) or to undertake FDI (bottom cell). Table 2-
2 is the substitution of the payoffs in Table 2-1 from (12), and all the payoffs contain 
the trade cost k  and the fixed cost G . 
 
Payoff  Matrix 
Firm 2 
Export FDI 
Firm 1 
Export 
 
2
3
25
c k

 
  ,  
 
2
3
25
c k

 
 
 
2
4
25
c k

 
 , 
 
2
25
c k
G


 
  
FDI 
 
2
25
c k
G


 
  , 
 
2
4
25
c k

 
 
 
2
25
c
G



    ,   
 
2
25
c
G



  
Table 2-2: substitution of the interior payoff matrix when k k  
 
The matrices in table 2-3 and table 2-4 show the corner payoffs where firm one or 
firm two stops exporting and its sales become zero in country B, 1 2 0
F F
B B 
   , when 
the trade cost is between   4k c   and   3k c  .  
 
Payoff  Matrix 
Firm 2 
Export FDI 
Firm 1 
Export 1
EE
B       ,      2
EE
B  1
F
B

     ,     2
F
B G
   
FDI 1
F
B G
      ,    2
F
B

 1
FF
B G      ,    2
FF
B G   
Table 2-3: corner payoff matrix when k k k   
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Table 2-4 is the substitution of the payoffs in Table 2-3 from (13). When firm one 
(firm two) undertakes FDI, firm two (firm one) will stop trading if the trade cost 
reaches k , and its sales and profits from exporting become zero as shown in Table 2-
4. 
 
Payoff  Matrix 
Firm 2 
Export FDI 
Firm 1 
Export 
 
2
3
25
c k

 
  ,  
 
2
3
25
c k

 
 0      ,       
 
2
16
c
G



  
FDI 
 
2
16
c
G



       ,      0 
 
2
25
c
G



    ,   
 
2
25
c
G



  
Table 2-4: substitution of the corner payoff matrix when k k k   
 
They are all symmetric matrices that follow from equations (12) and (13). Notice that 
when a firm chooses to undertake FDI, the payoff is the total profits minus the fixed 
cost G of building a factory in the other market. That is to say, in the static game, 
undertaking FDI is profitable for a firm if the operating profits (before the fixed cost) 
of undertaking FDI minus the fixed cost are greater than the profits of exporting.  
 
2.3.1 Equilibria for the game 
Solving the game for equilibria, there are two cases: a firm’s competitor in the same 
market chooses to export or a firm’s competitor in the same market chooses to 
undertake FDI to supply foreign country. Considering firstly that when a firm’s 
competitor in the same country chooses to export, the firm will only choose to 
undertake FDI if it gives higher payoffs than it chooses to export. Refer back to the 
left hand side of table 2-1, where firm one and firm two compete in country B, and 
firm two chooses to export to country B. When firms in country B (firm three and 
firm four) choose to export, undertaking FDI is profitable for firm one if 
FEEE EEEEG   . When firm three (firm four) chooses to export, firm four (firm 
three) chooses to undertake FDI, undertaking FDI is profitable for firm one if 
FEEF EEEFG   ( FEFE EEFEG   ). When both foreign firms choose to undertake 
FDI, undertaking FDI is optimal for firm one if 
FEFF EEFFG   . As markets are 
16 
 
segmented, the decisions of the firms in the foreign market are independent of the 
choices of their competitors in the home country, thus only the profits of firm one and 
firm two in the foreign market (country B) are considered, and their profits in the 
home market are not affected
20
.  
 
When the trade cost is smaller than the prohibitive trade cost k  (the interior solution), 
if the fixed cost of FDI of firm one is less than the critical value: 
FEEE EEEE FEEF EEEF FEFE EEFE FEFF EEFFG         , by using (12), it 
would choose to undertake FDI, when its competitor in the same country chooses to 
export up to k . 
 
 1 1
FE EE
B BG      if k k      (14) 
 
When firm one undertakes FDI, there is a corner solution where firm two will stop 
exporting to the foreign market at the prohibitive level k . Once the trade cost arrives 
at k , only
F EE , F EF , F FE  and F FF are taken into account, referring to the left 
hand side of table 2-3. Regardless what strategies firm three and firm four choose, it is 
profitable for firm one to undertake FDI if 
F EE EEEEG   , F EF EEEFG   , 
F FE EFEEG    or F FF EEFFG   . Hence, for k k k  , if the fixed cost of 
FDI is less than the critical value: 
F EE EEEE F EF EEEF F FE EEFE F FF EEFFG            , firm one will 
choose to undertake FDI than to export, by using (13) and (12): 
 
1 1
F EE
B BG  
      if k k k     (15) 
 
When firm two exports, firm one will export up to the prohibitive cost   3k c  , 
where both firms in country A stop exporting as it is not profitable to do so. Therefore, 
undertaking FDI is a preferred strategy for a firm if the fixed cost of FDI is less than 
                                                 
20
 Regard to the strategic choice, home firms only need to consider their profits in the foreign market. 
For example, if foreign firm three and four decide to export (undertake FDI) to the home market, firm 
one’s profit in the home market is 1
EE ( 1
FF ), which will be cancelled out when firm one decides 
whether to undertake FDI or export to the foreign market. Thus only the profits if home firms in the 
foreign market matter, and the strategic choice by foreign firms do not affect them.  
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the critical value G when the firm’s competitor in the same market chooses to export, 
using (14), (15), (12) and (13), it can be shown that: 
 
 
  
8
0
25
3 3 3 4 12
0
400
k c k
if k k
G
c k c k
if k k k


 

 
 

 
      

   (16) 
 
The critical value of the fixed cost of FDI G above is a two-segmented concave 
quadratic curves in the trade cost up to the prohibitive k , where G reaches its peak. It 
is shown in figure 2-1 with the parameter values: 40  , 1  and 14c  . 
Undertaking FDI is preferred to exporting for a firm in the region where G G  when 
its competitor in the same market chooses to export before the trade cost reaches 
  4k c  and stop trading thereafter, whereas exporting is preferred for both firms 
in the region G G . Thus a reduction in trade costs will only shift firms from 
undertaking FDI to exporting as suggested in most theoretical literature. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2-1: Static game under Cournot Oligopoly 
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Considering secondly that when a firm’s competitor in the same country chooses to 
undertake FDI, a firm will only choose to undertake FDI if it brings higher payoffs 
than it chooses to export. By looking at the right hand side of table 2-1, regardless 
what the foreign firms’ strategies are, when firm two chooses to undertake FDI, 
undertaking FDI is more profitable for firm one if 
FFEE EFEEG   , where firm 
three and firm four are exporting. The same principle applies to the states where firm 
three exports and firm four undertakes FDI or the other way around or both undertake 
FDI, so firm one will choose to undertake FDI if 
FFEF EFEFG   , or 
FFFE EFFEG    or FFFF EFFFG   . Hence undertaking FDI is preferred to 
exporting for a firm when its competitor in the same market has chosen to undertake 
FDI, if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value 
FFEE EFEE FFEF EFEF FFFE EFFE FFFF EFFFG         : 
 
 1 1
FF EF
B BG       if k k     (17) 
 
With a corner solution, where firm one would stop exporting if the trade cost reaches
k , the profits and the outputs of firm one become zero (refer back to the right hand 
side of table 2-4). For k k k  , if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value 
G , Firm one will choose to undertake FDI: 
   
2 2
1 1 0
25 25
FF F
B B
c c
G
 
 
 
         if   k k k    (18) 
 
To sum up, if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value G , undertaking FDI 
is preferred to exporting for a firm when its competitor in the same country 
undertakes FDI, using (18), (17) (12) and (13), it can be shown that: 
 
 
 
2
8 2
25
25
k c k
if k k
G
c
if k k k




 


 

 

     (19) 
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The critical value of the fixed cost of FDI G  is shown in figure 2-1. For k k , it is a 
concave quadratic curve that is increasing in the trade cost k . For k k k  , it is 
horizontal and is independent of the trade cost, as the firm’s profits from exporting to 
the other country become zero. By comparing (19) and (16), it can be shown that
G G . 
 
 
  
28
0
25
7 7 12 12
0
400
k
if k k
G G
c k c k
if k k k

 


 

  
      

 
 
In the region under G , a firm will choose to undertake FDI when its competitor in the 
same country undertakes FDI, and the firm will also choose FDI when that competitor 
chooses to export (G G ). Therefore undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for both 
firms in the same market when G G , whereas only one firm in each market chooses 
FDI in the region where G G G  . Again, the figures show that a reduction in trade 
costs will only lead firms to shift from undertaking FDI to exporting according to G . 
This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: under a static game in Cournot oligopoly, undertaking FDI is a 
dominant strategy for both firms in a market in the region where G G , while only 
one firm in each market chooses to undertake FDI in the region G G G  .  
 
In addition, there is a possibility that prisoners’ dilemma exists in the region G G , as 
undertaking FDI is the dominant strategy for both firms in the same country, yet the 
profits (before the fixed cost) when both firms undertake FDI are lower than the 
profits when both firms export. This is due to the more intense competition brought 
by the FDI in the market.  
 
2.3.2 Prisoners’ dilemma 
The Prisoners’ dilemma is the most fundamental game that involves two suspects for 
a crime might not cooperate even if it is in both of their best interests to do so. In a 
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classic form of a static game, cooperating is strictly dominated by defecting, thus the 
Nash equilibrium of the game is to defect for both players, as it gives both higher 
payoffs. In this model of four-firm two-country Cournot oligopoly, two firms compete 
with each other in the same country, and each firm chooses whether to export or to 
undertake FDI to supply the other country. Undertaking FDI will intensify 
competition in the other country and therefore reduce the profits of the competitor in 
the home market. Thus if both firms decide to undertake FDI, both will end up with 
lower profits than when both export. This outcome of the game is therefore prisoners’ 
dilemma. 
 
When the fixed cost is between G  and G , the Nash equilibrium is that one firm 
undertakes FDI while its competitor in the same market exports up to k . The profits 
of the equilibrium when undertaking FDI while its competitor in the same market 
exports up to k  might be lower than the profits when all firms export. Therefore there 
is a possibility of Prisoners’ dilemma in this region. 
 
When the fixed cost is below G , the Nash equilibrium is that both firms in the same 
market undertake FDI, but the profits when both firms undertake FDI could be lower 
than when both firms export. Hence there is a possibility of Prisoners’ dilemma for 
this equilibrium when G G  as well. To examine the prisoners’ dilemma, this section 
considers the equilibria of all firms in both countries. 
 
Prisoners’ dilemma between four firms in two countries 
Since two markets are symmetric, the equilibria for both countries are also symmetric. 
When the fixed cost is between G  and G , the Nash equilibrium is that one firm in 
each market chooses to undertake FDI, while its competitor in the same country 
chooses to export up to the prohibitive trade cost k (
FEFE  or F F  ). However, there 
is a possibility of Prisoners’ dilemma, as the profits of the Nash equilibrium might be 
lower than the profits when all firms choose to export.  
When one firm in each country undertakes FDI, the firm will have a higher profits 
than when all firms choose to export if 
FEFE EEEEG   ( F F EEEEG    ) when 
k k ( k k k  ). This occurs if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value: 
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   
   
 
 
FEEE EEEE FEFE FEEEFEFE EEEE
n
F F EEEE F EE EEEE F F F EE
if k k
G
if k k k     
        
  
         
 
 
Where the first bracket shows the profits gain of a firm from undertaking FDI while 
its competitors from both home and foreign market choose to export up to the 
prohibitive level, and the second bracket shows the effect on a firm’s profits when one 
of its competitors from the foreign market also chooses to undertake FDI. Using the 
definition of G  in (14) and (15) , the critical value 
nG can be described as: 
 
 
  
  
FEFE FEEE
n
F F F EE
if k k
G G
if k k k  
  
  
   
 
 
By using equations (12) and (13),  
 
 
 
  
2 2 3
0   
25
9 9 8 8
0   
400
FEFE FEEE
F F F EE
k c k
if k k
c k c k
if k k k


 

  
  
    


        

           (20) 
 
A firm that undertakes FDI makes lower profits when one of its competitors from 
foreign market also chooses to undertake FDI than when all of its competitors from 
both markets choose to export, 
FEFE FEEE   ( F F F EE    ) when k k
( k k k  ), so that
nG is always smaller than G , as FDI intensifies competition. 
Substitute (20) into 
nG : 
 
 
 
   
2
6 6 11
0       
25
9 8 2 2 13
0       
200
n
k c k
if k k
G
c k c k
if k k k


 

 
 

 
   
  

             (21) 
 
To compare 
nG  and G , subtract nG  from G  using (21) and (19): 
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 
   
2
2 2 5
0   
25
8 13 2 2
0   
200
n
k c k
if k k
G G
k k c c
if k k k


 

 
 

  
   
  

  
 
The critical value 
nG  is a two-segmented concave quadratic that is increasing in the 
trade cost up to the prohibitive trade cost k as shown in figure 2-2, and it is below G  
and G . In the region under 
nG , there is no prisoners’ dilemma, as the profits of the 
Nash equilibrium where one firm in each country undertakes FDI while their 
competitors export, is greater than the profits when all firms export. In the region 
above G , on the other hand, indicating a prisoners’ dilemma, where the equilibrium  
profits are smaller than the profits when all firms export. Since this Nash equilibrium 
only occurs when the fixed cost is between G  and G , and
nG  is below this region 
(
nG  is below G ), the shaded area under nG  in figure 2-2 is not relevant. Thus there is 
always a prisoners’ dilemma when G G G  . 
           
 
 
Figure 2-2: Prisoners’ dilemma in the world in the static game whenG G G   
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When the fixed cost is below G , the Nash equilibrium of both countries is that all 
firms choose to undertake FDI. When all firms in both countries undertake FDI, they 
will have higher profits than when they all export if 
FFFF EEEEG   , and this 
happens if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value: 
 
   
   
 
ˆ
 
FEEE EEEE FFFF FEEE
FFFF EEEE
F EE EEEE FFFF F EE
if k k
G
if k k k 
      
    
      
 
 
Where the first bracket indicates the profits gain of a firm from undertaking FDI while 
its competitors from both countries export up to k , and the second bracket shows the 
effect on a firm’s profits if its competitors from both home and foreign markets switch 
from exporting to undertaking FDI. Using the description of G , the critical value Gˆ
can be described as 
  ˆ
  
FFFF FEEE
FFFF F EE
if k k
G G
if k k k
  
  
   
, by using (12) and (13): 
 
 
 
   
2 2
6 6 5
0   
25
7 16 2
0   
400
FFFF FEEE
FFFF F EE
k c k
if k k
c c k
if k k k


 


  
    


   
     

         (22) 
 
Once again it shows that FDI intensifies competition, a firm that undertakes FDI 
makes lower profits when its competitors from both countries undertake FDI than 
when they export, 
FFFF FEEE   ( FFFF F EE  ) when k k ( k k k  ), so Gˆ is 
always smaller than G . To look at the relationship between Gˆ  and G , Gˆ  can be 
decomposed into the following: 
 
   
   
 
ˆ
 
FFFF EFFF EFFF EEEE
FFFF EEEE
FFFF FFF FFF EEEE
if k k
G
if k k k 
      
    
      
 
 
As G  can be defined as 
FFFF EFFF   or FFFF FFF  , according to (18) and (17): 
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 ˆ
 
EFFF EEEE
FFF EEEE
if k k
G G
if k k k
  
  
   
 
 
By using (12) and (13): 
 
 
   
2 2
3 2 2
0  
25
3 2
0 0  
25
EFFF EEEE
EEEE
k c k
if k k
c k c k
if k k k


 
  
    


    
     
          (23) 
 
A firm that exports up to k  makes lower profits when its competitors from both 
markets undertake FDI than when they export, 
EFFF EEEE   ( FFF EEEE  ). 
Therefore Gˆ is always smaller than G  as shown in figure 2-4. Substitute (22) into Gˆ : 
 
 
 2 2 13ˆ
25
k c k
G


 
              (24) 
 
In the region under Gˆ in figure 2-3, all firms prefer undertaking FDI to exporting, and 
all firms prefer undertaking FDI to the case that one firm in each country undertake 
FDI while its competitor in the same country exports ( Gˆ  is in the region under G ). 
Therefore undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for all firms under Gˆ ( ˆG G ), and 
the profits when all firms undertake FDI are higher than the profits when all firms 
export, there is no prisoners’ dilemma when ˆG G for all firms.  
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Figure 2-3: Prisoners’ dilemma in the static game when G G  
 
 
Proposition 2: Under Cournot oligopoly, for firms in the same country, undertaking 
FDI is a dominant strategy when 
sG G , and there is no prisoners’ dilemma. For all 
firms in both countries, undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy when ˆG G , and 
there is no prisoners’ dilemma. 
 
The critical value Gˆ in (24) is a concave quadratic that reaches its maximum point 
when trade cost is  ˆ 13k c   where it is smaller than k and ˆ2k k as shown in 
figure 2-3. The critical value Gˆ is increasing for ˆk k and decreasing for ˆk k . The 
explanation of the quadratic concave is that when ˆk k , the profits of a firm when all 
country export (
EEEE ) is decreasing and it is increasing when 
ˆk k . This is because 
an increase in the trade cost will increase the marginal cost of the firm while it will 
also increase the marginal costs of its competitors. Hence it is a situation of a negative 
effect on export from the firm versus a positive effect on domestic sales from its 
competitors. Thus when the trade cost is relatively low, the price-cost margins are 
similar for the firms in both markets, but the effect on export is direct while the effect 
on domestic sales is indirect. Then the absolute size of the negative effect on the 
export is bigger than that of the positive effect on domestic sales, and the profits of 
26 
 
exporting is decreasing. On the other hand, when the trade cost is relatively high, the 
price-cost margins affect domestic market more than on exports than the absolute size 
of the positive effect on domestic sales is lager than that of the negative effect on 
export, and the profits of exporting is increasing.  
 
To sum up, comparing figure 2-2 with figure 2-1, undertaking FDI is a dominant 
strategy for all firms in both countries in the region ˆG G and there is no prisoners’ 
dilemma. In the region Gˆ G G  , there is a prisoners’ dilemma when all firms will 
choose to undertake FDI, but profits are lower than when they all export due to the 
same reason (more intensive competition and the fixed cost of undertaking FDI). In 
the region G G G   of figure 2-2, there is a Prisoners’ dilemma where one firm in 
each country undertakes FDI while their competitors from both markets choose to 
export up to the trade cost k , but the profits are lower than when all firms export.  
 
Consequently, in the region G G G  , the Nash equilibrium is that only one firm 
undertakes FDI while its competitor in the same market chooses to export up to the 
prohibitive level k  in figure 2-3. In the region G G , the Nash equilibrium is that 
both firms from the same country undertake FDI. Since the model is symmetric, the 
equilibira are that one firm from each market undertakes FDI when G G G  or all 
firms undertake FDI when G G . When the fixed cost is above G , both firms in the 
same country will choose to export due to the high fixed cost of FDI. Next section 
will extend the static game to an infinitely-repeated game theory of FDI to avoid the 
prisoners’ dilemma. 
 
2.4 The Infinitely-Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Game 
In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, each player has an opportunity to punish the other 
player for previous non-cooperative play. If the number of steps is known by both 
players in advance, economic theory says that the two players should defect again and 
again, no matter how many times the game is played. However, this analysis fails to 
predict the behaviour of human players in a real iterated prisoners’ dilemma situation. 
Only when the players play an indefinite or random number of times can cooperation 
be an equilibrium. Technically a subgame perfect equilibrium means that both players 
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defecting always remain an equilibrium and there are many other equilibrium 
outcomes. In this case, the incentive to defect can be overcome by the threat of 
punishment. 
 
In the infinitely-repeated Cournot oligopoly game, firms can overcome the prisoners’ 
dilemma problem by tacitly colluding. Friedman (1971) proposed that Nash reversion 
trigger strategies can sustain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an infinitely 
repeated game. A Nash reversion trigger strategy is a grim trigger strategy, which 
applies to repeated prisoner's dilemmas: a player begins by cooperating in the first 
period, and continues to cooperate until a single defection by her opponent, following 
which, the player defects forever. In this infinitely-repeated game, firms cooperate 
until one firm deviates, and any deviation triggers a permanent retaliation in which all 
firms revert to the static game equilibrium at every period thereafter. So it is a 
punishment with a static equilibrium forever. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is 
an equilibrium such that firms’ strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every 
subgame, even in the continuation after a deviation. Hence the equilibrium in the 
infinitely-repeated game is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium since Nash 
equilibrium  strategies are used in all subgames. 
 
The collusive outcome where all firms choose to export could be sustained as a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by the threat of Nash reversion trigger strategies in 
the infinitely-repeated game. If the discount factor is sufficiently high, the collusive 
outcome (all firms choose to export) is sustained by the threat of reversion to the Nash 
equilibrium outcomes in the infinitely-repeated game. Therefore, the static game Nash 
equilibria outcomes where all firms undertake FDI or one firm in each country 
undertakes FDI while their competitors export are not preferred. 
 
In an infinitely repeated game, in each period, all firms simultaneously decide 
whether to export or to undertake FDI to supply the other market in the first stage and 
choose their outputs as Cournot oligopolies in the second stage of the game. It is 
assumed that firms only collude over the undertaking FDI versus exporting decision. 
The grim trigger strategy is the collusion that all firms choose to export, and the 
profits are EEEE . However, if one firm deviates in one period, it would be follwed by 
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the static game Nash equilibria profits: (1) FFFF  in the region below G , where all 
firms in both markets choose to undertake FDI, or (2)  FEFE F F    in the region 
between G  and G , where one firm in each country chooses to undertake FDI and 
their competitors from each country choose to export up to the trade cost k . This is 
repeated in every period and all firms know all previously chosen outputs. Oligopolies 
can use the threat of the static Nash equilibrium (deviation) to sustain the collusive 
outcomes if firms care enough about the future. 
 
Since there are two Nash equilibrium profits in the infinitely-repeated game as 
mentioned previously, they should be taken into account separately according to the 
size of the fixed cost G  of FDI. The Next two sub-sections will discuss the grim 
trigger strategies. 
 
2.4.1 Collusion when G G  
Following the “grim trigger strategy” for firm one when the fixed cost G of FDI is in 
the region under G , there are two options: 
 All firms have played the collusive profits EEEE  in all previous periods, and 
they would play in this period as well. 
 One firm did not play the collusive profits hence deviate with profits 
 FEEE F EE G    in one period, followed by Nash equilibrium profits 
FFFF G  . 
Then firm one’s present value of all its future profits at time t if all firms play the grim 
trigger strategy (export) is: 
 
2
1
1
 ...
1
    
1
c
EEEE EEEE EEEE
t
EEEE EEEE
t
V  





      
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

 
 
Where   is the discount factor and is between 0 and 1. The firms’ discount rate   
depends on interest rate and other factors such as the time needed for cheating to be 
detected and the probability that the product may be outdated. All firms’ objective is 
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to maximise the present value of profits, and that depends on the discount factor 
which is largely affected by the interest rate. Firm one’s discounted value of profits if 
deviating from the equilibrium path at 1t  is: 
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That is to say, firm one has no incentive to deviate if c dV V . Hence all firms 
choosing to export is a Nash equilibrium if the present discounted profits from 
collusion (all firms export) exceed the present discounted value of profits from 
cheating (choosing to undertake FDI when its competitors from the home country and 
the foreign country have chosen to export) for one period, and thereafter followed by 
the Nash equilibrium profits of all firms (all firms choose to undertake FDI): 
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           (25) 
 
When the fixed cost G of FDI is in the region under G , a subgame Nash equilibrium 
could be the collusive outcome where all firms choose to export, and firms are 
earning jointly maximised profits. However, if a firm deviates (undertaking FDI) to 
increase its single period (discounted) profits, the other firms are, in response, likely 
to revert to the safe position (static Nash equilibrium) where all firms undertake FDI 
for the rest of the periods. So by deviating, a firm makes a short-term gain but get a 
lower profit in all future periods. That means if the discount factor is sufficiently high 
or the firms are patient enough, then they can resist the temptation to deviate, and the 
collusive outcome where all firms choose to export can be sustained by the threat of 
Nash reversion strategy where all firms choose to undertake FDI in an infinitely 
repeated game. 
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Since this equilibrium involves one firm exports, and the other firm in the same 
country undertakes FDI for the first period, there will be an interior solution and a 
corner solution. Firm two will stop exporting when the trade cost reaches its 
prohibitive level k . So the first equation shows that when k k , the present value of 
the profits of a firm when all firms export is greater than the present value of the 
profits when cheating (undertake FDI) for one period, and followed by all firms 
choosing to undertake FDI. This agrees with the first-mover advantage in section 2.1, 
that the firm which undertakes FDI first gains the profits while its competitors who 
have chosen to export suffer, resulting in the retaliation by its competitors who will 
also choose to undertake FDI for the following periods, so that all firms earn lower 
profits than the subgame Nash equilibrium position.  
 
The second equation shows that when k k k  , once firm one decides to deviate by 
undertakeing FDI, firm two will stop exporting to the foreign market due to the high 
trade cost, while firm three and firm four have chosen to export for the fist period, 
followed by all firms will revert to the static game equilibrium  where all firms choose 
to undertake FDI forever. Thus only when (25) is satisfied, the collusive outcome can 
be sustained as a subgame Nash equilibrium and all firms can maximise their joint 
profits. In addition, as the profits of the firm when all firms export are greater than the 
profits when all firms undertake FDI in (25), the prisoners’ dilemma is avoided in this 
infinitely repeated game.  
Rearrange(25), the collusive outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium if the 
fixed cost of FDI is greater than the critical value: 
 
 
    
    
*
1  
1  
FEEE EEEE FFFF EEEE
F EE EEEE FFFF EEEE
if k k
G
if k k k
 

 
       
 
       
       (26) 
 
Since G is defined as 
FEEE EEEE   when k k , or F EE EEEE   when k k k  , 
and Gˆ is defined as 
FFFF EEEE  , the critical value  G 
  can be described as: 
 
    ˆ1G G G                    (27) 
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 *G   is a convex combination of G and Gˆ , weighted by the discount factor  . 
When the discount factor becomes zero, the critical value *G equals G (i.e. 0   
implies *G G ), and when the discount factor becomes one, the critical value *G
equals Gˆ (i.e. 1   implies * ˆG G ). Meanwhile, the critical value of the fixed cost 
is always lower in the infinitely repeated game than in the static game if the discount 
factor is above zero, this is because G  is above Gˆ , and  *G  is decreasing in the 
discount factor . 
 
If substitute (16)and (24) into (27), the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI that 
determines whether the collusion outcome is a Nash equilibrium over all firms in both 
markets is: 
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400
k c k c k
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c k c k
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  
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        

 
     
 

      (28) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Infinitely-Repeated Game under Cournot Oligopoly when G G G   
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Where    
2
9 64 0c k c k        . The critical value of the fixed cost  *G   
is shown in figure 2-4 by using the same parameters as in figure 2-1, and it is a two-
segmented concave quadratic of the trade cost for a number of discount factors 
 0,1 4,8 17,1   up to the prohibitive trade cost k 21. However, if combining figure 
2-3 and figure 2-4 (see figure 2-5), only the area under G is relevant to this game, as 
this is the area where the Nash equilibrium is that both firms in the same market 
undertake FDI in the static game. In the region between Gˆ and G in figure 2-5, the 
collusive outcome where all firms export can be sustained as Nash equilibrium in the 
infinitely repeated game whereas all firms would undertake FDI in the static game, 
and the prisoners’ dilemma as discussed in the static game is avoided here. Hence the 
collusive equilibrium can be sustained whenever the static game is a prisoners’ 
dilemma in the region * ˆG G G  . 
 
It is natural to assume that the discount factor changes over time. Clearly, the 
collusive outcome is easier to be sustained when the discount factor is larger. The 
higher the discount factor in a given period, the higher the collusive profits could be 
supported as a subgame Nash equilibrium in that period. The reason behind it is: a 
realisation of a higher discount factor leads to a stronger threat of future punishment, 
and higher profits without firms deviating.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 The reason of the chosen discount factors will be explained later. 
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Figure 2-5: Infinitely-Repeated Game under Cournot Oligopoly when G G  
 
 
2.4.2 Collusion when G G  
When the fixed cost G of FDI is in the region between G and G , a subgame Nash 
equilibrium is the collusive outcome where all firms choose to export, and firms are 
earning jointly maximised profits. However, like what happens in section 2.4.1, if a 
firm deviates (undertaking FDI) to increase its single period (discounted) profits, the 
other firms are, in response, likely to revert to the safe position (static Nash 
equilibrium ) where one firm in each country chooses to undertake FDI for the rest of 
the periods, while their competitors sustain their exporting strategy up to the trade 
cost k . Nevertheless, if the discount factor is sufficiently high, the collusive outcome 
where all firms choose to export can be sustained by the threat of Nash reversion 
strategy in an infinitely repeated game, and the prisoners’ dilemma in the static game 
can be avoided. 
 
When the fixed cost of FDI G is in the region above G , all firms choosing to export 
is a Nash Equilibrium if the present discounted profits from collusion (all firms export) 
exceed the present discounted value of profits from cheating (choosing to undertake 
FDI when its competitors from both countries have chosen to export) for one period, 
and thereafter followed by the Nash equilibrium profits above G  (one firm in each 
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country chooses to undertake FDI when their competitors in the same country have 
chosen to export), for both interior and corner solutions: 
 
   
   
1
 
1 1
1
 
1 1
EEEE FEEE FEFE
EEEE F EE F F
G G if k k
G G if k k k

 

 
  

         

         
  
         (29) 
 
The first equation shows that when k k , the present value of the profits of a firm 
when all firms export is greater than the present value of the profits when cheating 
(undertake FDI) for one period, and followed by the static Nash equilibrium where 
one firm in each country undertakes FDI, while the other firms have chosen to export 
thereafter. The Nash reversion strategy happens because when the firm cheats for one 
period, firms in the other market notice the advantage of cheating, and then one of 
them will make the move of switching strategy first, resulting the Nash equilibrium 
under the static game for the following periods. It means that the first firm in each 
market switching strategy by choosing FDI (cheating) has the advantage of gaining 
more profits, while its competitor in the same market loses the profits from sustaining 
its export strategy. 
 
The second equation shows the corner solution when k k k  , once firm one 
decides to deviate by undertaking FDI, firm two which has chosen to export will stop 
trading with the other country and the sales from exporting to the other country 
becomes zero, while firm three and firm four have chosen to export for the fist period, 
followed by all firms will revert to the static game equilibrium where only one firm in 
each country chooses to undertake FDI and their competitors will stop trading forever, 
due to the high trade cost ( k k ). It all comes to the problem of the timing, only the 
first firm in each market switching to the strategy of undertaking FDI wins, whereas 
its competitor in the same market will be forced out of the trading activity. 
 
Only when (29) is satisfied that the profits of the firm when all firms export are 
greater than the profits when one firm in each country undertakes FDI, leaving their 
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competitors exporting up to k , the collusive outcome can be sustained as a subgame 
Nash equilibrium and there is no prisoners’ dilemma in this infinitely repeated game.  
 
By rearranging (29), the collusive outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium if 
the fixed cost of FDI is greater than the critical value when k k , that is: 
 
 
     
     
1   
1   
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if k k
G
if k k k
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
 

  
       
 
       
 (30) 
 
Since 
nG is defined as FEFE EEEE   when k k , or F F EEEE    when k k k 
and the definition of G , the critical value  G   can be described as: 
 
   1 nG G G  
           (31) 
 
 **G   is a convex combination of G and nG , weighted by the discount factor  . 
When the discount factor becomes zero, the critical value **G equals G , and when the 
discount factor becomes one, the critical value **G equals 
nG . Similar to 
*G , the 
critical value of fixed cost **G is decreasing in the discount factor , and it is always 
lower in the infinitely repeated game than the critical value of the fixed costs in the 
static game.  
 
If substitute (21) and (16) into (31), the critical value of the fixed cost in the infinitely 
repeated game when there is only one firm in each market undertakes FDI is: 
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 (32) 
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Figure 2-6: Infinitely-Repeated Game under Cournot Oligopoly when G G  
 
 
Where   9 9 8 8 0c k c k         .  **G   is shown in figure 2-6 by using 
the same parameters as the previous figures, and it is a two-segmented concave 
quadratic of the trade cost for a number of discount factors  0,1 4,8 11,1   up to 
the prohibitive trade cost k . However, only the area between G and G in figure 2-2 
is relevant to this game, as this is the area where the Nash equilibrium is that one firm 
in each country undertakes FDI and their competitors export up to the trade cost k in 
the static game. Combining figure 2-2 and figure 2-6, yields figure 2-7, which shows 
that in the region between  G  and G , the collusive outcome where all firms 
export can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game whereas 
only one firm in each market would undertake FDI in the static game and there is no 
prisoners’ dilemma. Clearly, the firm that switches to undertaking FDI firstly will 
gain more profits at the expenses of its competitor’s profits in both countries, and the 
collusive outcome is easier to be sustained when the discount factor is larger ( 1  ). 
That is, if firms care about the future enough, they would look at the discount factor 
(interest rate) fluctuations. The higher the discount factor, the higher the threat of 
future punishment if firms deviate, which allows a higher collusive profits to be 
sustained. 
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Figure 2-7: Infinitely-Repeated Game under Cournot Oligopoly when G G  
 
 
Proposition 3: Under Cournot oligopoly, the collusive outcome where all firms export 
can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated 
game if *G G in the region ˆG G G  , or **G G in the region under G G G  , 
and the critical value is decreasing in the discount factor, * 0G    , ** 0G    . 
2.4.3 Effect of k and G on collusion 
To understand that how the trade cost affects the sustainability of collusion, it is 
worthwhile to look at how the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI depends on the 
trade cost. Considering the area under G first (see figure 2-5), differentiate (28) with 
respect to k , it gives: 
 
    
    
*
2 4 3 5 8
25
2 3 2 4 9
25
c k
if k k
G
k c k
if k k k
  

  

       
 
 
         

          (33) 
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For a sufficient lower trade cost where k k  the derivative is positive, but for higher 
trade costs, the derivatives are negative. The derivatives are negative if the trade cost 
is greater than critical value of k when * 0G k   : 
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            (34) 
 
The critical value of the trade cost *k is equal to the prohibitive trade cost, *k k , 
when the discount factor 0  , and it decreases to *k k when 1/ 4  , then it 
becomes a vertical line where *k k  when  1/ 4,8 /17  . As the discount factor 
increases, i.e. 8 /17  , *k decreases to the maximum of Gˆ  when 1  . In figure 2-
5, the curve labelled * *k k represents *k in (34) which joins the maximum point of the 
critical value of *G  so that *G is decreasing to the right of * *k k , and this is the region 
where a decrease in the trade cost will shift firms from exporting to undertaking FDI 
as shown in the shaded area. For example, in figure 2-5, when 8 /17  in the shaded 
region, a reduction in the trade cost might shift the equilibrium from E (where all 
firms export) to F (where all firms undertake FDI).  
 
When the trade cost is high, above k , a reduction in the trade cost will reduce the 
collusive outcome of the firm, as the negative domestic effect dominates the positive 
export effect abroad, and it will increase the profit of deviation. Hence the future 
punishment is smaller that it is hard to sustain the grim trigger strategy, and then firms 
would switch to the cheating mode.  
 
When the trade cost is lower, below k , it is less likely that firms would choose to 
undertake FDI when the trade cost is reduced, as a reduction in the trade cost will 
increase the collusive profits when the trade cost is low. The positive export effect 
will dominate the negative home sales effect. Then both future profits of collusion and 
future profits of cheating are increasing that the absolute value of the amount depends 
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on the trade cost and the fixed costs. So it is more likely that firms would sustain the 
collusive outcome in the region k k , and the shaded area where firms would like to 
switch the strategy is smaller. 
 
To look at the relationship between the trade cost and sustainability of collusion in the 
area above G , differentiate the critical value of the fixed cost (32) with respect to k , 
yields: 
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           (35) 
 
For low trade costs when k k  the derivative is positive, but for higher trade costs 
in the region k k k   , the derivative is negative. The derivatives are negative if the 
trade cost is greater than k when ** 0G k   : 
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             (36) 
 
The critical value of the trade cost **k is equal to the prohibitive trade cost, **k k , 
when the discount factor 0  , and it decreases to **k k when the discount factor 
increases to 1/ 4  , then it becomes a vertical line where **k k  until 1  . In 
figure 2-7, the curve labelled ** **k k represents **k in (36), joining the maximum point 
of the critical value of **G , and **G is increasing to the left of ** **k k but decreasing to 
the right of ** **k k . The shaded area in figure 2-7 represents the regime that firms 
switch from exporting to undertaking FDI as the trade cost is reduced. For example, 
when 1/ 4  in the shaded region, a reduction in the trade cost might shift the 
equilibrium from E (where all firms export) to F (where one firm in each country 
undertakes FDI while the other firm stops trading). Notice that it occurs in the region 
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where one firm in each market stop trading, k k k  . These results lead to the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Under Cournot oligopoly, if the trade cost *k k ( **k k ), the critical 
value of the fixed cost *G ( **G ) is decreasing in the trade cost, * 0G k    
( ** 0G k   ), and a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting 
to undertaking FDI. 
 
The combination of figure 2-5 and figure 2-7 lead to figure 2-8, where the shaded area 
is to the right of ** **k k ( * *k k ) if G G (G G ). The reduction in the trade cost will 
lead the firms shift from exporting to undertaking FDI in the shaded area. The reason 
is that when the trade cost is sufficiently high, even there is a reduction, the profits of 
collusion 
EEEE  will be reduced, and the profits of the firm if cheating FEEE ( F EE ) 
(undertakes FDI while its competitors have chosen to export up to k  ) will increase, 
and the profits of the Nash equilibria where all firms undertake FDI,
FFFF , or one 
firm in each market undertakes FDI ,
FEFE ( F F  ), will not be affected. As a result, 
a reduction in trade costs makes it harder to sustain the collusive outcome, and may 
lead to a switch to the static game Nash equilibrium where one firm undertakes FDI 
while its competitor exports, or to the Nash equilibrium where both firms undertake 
FDI. 
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Figure 2-8: Combination of Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-7 
 
 
Interestingly, the switch of the strategies could happen outside the shaded region in 
figure 2-8 as well. To illustrate the relationship between the trade cost and FDI further, 
a certain discount rate (e.g. 1 3  ) will be used for both *G and **G , so that 
 * 1 3G   is below G  and  ** 1 3G   is above G  as shown in figure 2-9. For 
simplicity, figure 2-9 ignores the boundary critical value of the fixed cost * *k k and 
** **k k  from figure 2-8, leaving  ** 0G G   ,  ** 1 3G   , G ,  * 1 3G    and 
 *ˆ 1G G    from top to bottom. In the region of  1 3G G G    , the 
subgame equilibrium is that all firms export (collusive outcome 2E
22
): in the region 
 1 3G G G    , the equilibrium is that one firm in each country undertakes FDI 
and their competitor in the same country exports (1E1F) up to k  when their 
competitors stop trading (1F); in the region  1 3G G G    , the equilibrium is 
the collusive outcome (all firms export 2E), and in the region under  1 3G   , all 
firms choose to undertake FDI (2F), as shown in figure 2-9. 
 
                                                 
22
 Notice that it only shows one country’s equilibrium. 2E means both firms in one country will export. 
As the model is symmetric, so firms in the other country will also export. When one firm in each 
country undertakes FDI. We use 1E1F instead on 2E2F to avoid the confusion. 
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Figure 2-9: Infinitely-Repeated Game under Cournot Oligopoly ( 1 3  ) 
 
Suppose G intersect  1 3G   at the point k k , if the trade cost falls in the 
region k k k  and within the region between    * **1 3 1 3G G G     , firms 
might switch from 2E (both firms in the same county choose to export) to 1E1F (one 
firm in each country chooses to undertake FDI) just across G as shown in the shaded 
area in figure 2-9. If the trade cost is reduced further to the outside of the shaded area, 
both firms from the same country will choose to export. Hence, a reduction in the 
trade cost may also lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI outside 
the shaded area in figure 2-8. Note that when the discount factor  is decreasing, the 
critical value of the fixed cost **G is increasing, therefore the area where the Nash 
equilibrium outcome (one firm exports while its competitor in the same country 
undertakes FDI) sustains is bigger, and so is the shaded area in figure 2-8. It leads to 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: Under Cournot oligopoly, a reduction in trade costs in the region 
k k k  may also lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI. The 
larger the discount factor , the better chance that firms will switch the strategy. 
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This is due to the same reason: when the trade cost is relatively high, a reduction in 
trade costs reduces the profitability of collusion (all firms export) but increase the 
profitability of cheating (undertakes FDI while its competitors in the world have 
chosen to export). This result confirms that there is an increase in the number of firms 
which undertake FDI when the trade cost is reduced by multilateral trade 
liberalisations in an era. 
 
It is also interesting to examine the relationship between the fixed cost and FDI. By 
looking at figure 2-9 vertically, the level of the fixed cost G will affect firms’ 
decision about their strategies. In the area of    * **1 3 1 3G G G     , a 
reduction in the fixed costs across G might shift the equilibrium from 1E1F 
(undertake FDI, while its competitor in the same country export if k k ) or 1F(the 
firm stops trading if k k ) to the collusive outcome (both firms chose to export), 
indicating that firms might switch from undertaking FDI to exporting as the fixed cost 
G decreases. It leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6: Under Cournot oligopoly, if the fixed cost G is reduced from the 
region G G G  to the region G G G   , it may lead firms to switch from 
undertaking FDI to exporting. 
 
When G  is greater than Gˆ , a reduction in the fixed cost may lead firms to switch 
from the collusive outcome 2E  to the static equilibrium 1 1F E ( 1 1F  ). This is 
because that if one firm deviates by undertaking FDI, it would be too expensive for its 
competitor in the same market to deviate. However, when the fixed cost is relatively 
lower (between  ** 1 3G   and  * 1 3G   ), a reduction in fixed costs makes it 
easier for its competitor to undertake FDI. Yet if all firms choose to undertake FDI, 
the punishment could be so bad that firms might as well collude instead of cheating, 
and the worse the punishment is, the easier it is to sustain the collusive outcomes ( is 
closer to one). Hence a reduction in the fixed cost could make it hard for the firms to 
deviate and sustain the Nash equilibrium (undertaking FDI while its competitor in the 
same country exports up to k ), and it may lead to a switch to the collusive outcome 
(both firms export). When the fixed costs decrease further to a even lower level, the 
punishment of deviating is not so bad and the discount value of  is closer to zero, the 
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long term profits of the Nash equilibrium would be greater than the long term profits 
of the grim trigger strategy, then all firms would undertake FDI. This finding is one of 
the points which Collie (2009) did not address. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The export versus FDI decisions have been analysed in a two-country four-firm model 
with identical products under Cournot oligopoly. In the static game, a reduction in the 
trade cost will lead the firms switch from undertaking FDI to exporting as shown in 
the literature. The outcomes are that two firms in the same country choose to 
undertake FDI if the fixed cost is relatively low, or one firm chooses to export while 
its competitor from the same country chooses to undertake FDI if the fixed cost is 
relatively high. Thus, this model shows that both export and FDI can exist as an 
equilibrium outcome in the world when the fixed cost is sufficiently high.  
 
However, there might be prisoners’ dilemmas. If based on one market, both firms in 
the same country might make lower profits when they both undertake FDI than when 
they both export. When based on the two markets, if the fixed cost is relatively high, 
all firms might make lower profits when they all undertake FDI than when they export. 
If the fixed cost is sufficiently high, the equilibrium profits when one firm in each 
country undertakes FDI while its competitor in the same country export might be 
lower than the profits when all firms export. This is a prisoner’ dilemma caused by the 
intensified competition.  
 
The prisoners’ dilemma can be avoided in an infinitely-repeated game when all firms 
tacitly collude over their FDI versus export decisions, as collusion over FDI can be 
sustained by the threat of Nash-reversion strategies if the trade cost is sufficiently 
high. Then a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to 
undertaking FDI when the trade cost is sufficiently high, as in the infinitely-repeated 
game , a reduction in a sufficiently high trade costs lessen the profitability of 
collusion, and that explains the experience of the increasing FDI in 1990s. Also it is 
shown that a reduction in the fixed cost may lead firms to switch from undertaking 
FDI to exporting when the fixed cost is relatively high.  
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This chapter uses linear demand function as in most of the literature, the constant 
elasticity demand function will be adopted to test the results in the subsequent chapter.  
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Appendix 
Operating profits and outputs 
Firms employ a Cournot strategy. That is, each firm maximises its profit assuming the 
outputs of other firms in each market remain the same. Firms stay in business as long 
as they make non-zero positive profits in each market. To begin with, we will look at 
the case when both firms in country B export to supply country A. Suppose that 
AX  is 
the total outputs supplied to country A: 
 
 
1 2 3 4A A A A AX x x x x     
  1 2 3 4A A A A A AP x x x x X           
 
1. When both firms choose to export 
Suppose both firms in country B choose to export, substitute (2) into (3), the operating 
profits (before the fixed costs) of the firms in country A are: 
 
 1 1
EE
A A AX c x           
 2 2
EE
A A AX c x           
 3 3
EE
A A AX c k x             (37) 
   4 4
EE
A A AX c k x       
 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
  1 1
1
0
EE
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

      (38) 
 2 2
2
0
EE
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

      (39) 
 3 3
3
0
EE
A
A A
A
x X c k
x

  

     

      (40) 
 4 4
4
0
EE
A
A A
A
x X c k
x

  

     

      (41) 
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The four first-order conditions are the reaction functions and constitute four equations 
with four unknowns 
1Ax , 2 Ax , 3Ax  and 4 Ax . Adding up equations from (38) to (41), we 
get: 
 
4 5 4 2 0AX c k            (42) 
 
Solve for 
AX , we get: 
 
 
4 4 2
5
A
c k
X


 
         (43) 
 
Now substitute (43) into equation (38), we get Cournot equilibrium  
1
2
5
A
c k
x


 
 . 
Then substitute 
AX into the equation (39), (40), and (41), we can solve for the Cournot 
equilibria 
2 Ax , 3Ax and 4 Ax , which yields equation (4) in section 3. There fore the 
operating outputs, prices and profits of the firms in country A are: 
 
1 2
2
5
EE EE
A A
c k
x x


 
    3 4
3
5
EE EE
A A
c k
x x


 
   
  1 2 3 4
4 2
5
EE
A A A A
c k
p x x x x

 
 
       
 
 
2
1 2 1
2
25
EE EE EE EE
A A A
c k
p c x

 

 
   
  
 
2
3 4 3
3
25
EE EE EE EE
A A A
c k
p c k x

 

 
      
 
2. When one firm exports and the other firm in the same country undertakes FDI 
Suppose firm three chooses to export to country A, and firm four chooses to 
undertake FDI in country A. For the interior solution, substitute (2) into(5), the 
operating profits (before the fixed costs) of the firms in country A are: 
 
 1 1
EF
A A AX c x      
 2 2
EF
A A AX c x      
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 3 3
EF
A A AX c k x             (44) 
   4 4
EF
A A AX c x      
 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
  1 1
1
0
EF
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

 
 2 2
2
0
EF
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

 
 3 3
3
0
EF
A
A A
A
x X c k
x

  

     

      (45) 
 4 4
4
0
EF
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

 
 
Solving for the Cournot equilibria using the same method as above, adding up all the 
first order conditions from (45), yields: 
 
 4 5 4 0AX c k      
 
then solve for 
1Ax by combining the above equation and the first equation of (45), 
solve for 
2 Ax by substitute the above equation to (45) and so on and so forth, which 
yields (6) in section 3. The operating outputs, prices and profits of the firms in 
country A are:  
 
1 2 4
5
EF EF EF
A A A
c k
x x x


 
      3
4
5
EF
A
c k
x


 
  
4
5
EF
A
c k
p X

 
 
    
 
 
2
1 2 4 1
25
EF EF EF EF EF
A A A A
c k
p c x

  

 
      
  
 
2
3 3
4
25
EF EF EF
A A
c k
p c k x



 
     
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For the corner solution, firm three will stop exporting up to a prohibited trade cost, 
thus from (7), the operating profits (before the fixed costs) of the firms in country A 
become: 
 
1 2 4A A A AX x x x     
 1 1
F
A A AX c x  

    
 2 2
F
A A AX c x  

          (46) 
   4 4
F
A a AX c x  

    
 
Where   means firm three stops trading with country A, so its profits and outputs I 
country A are zero, i.e. 3 0
F
Ax
  and 3 0
F
A
  . The price of firm three will just cover its 
marginal cost 3
F
Ap c k
   .The first-order conditions of (46)are: 
 
  1 1
1
0
F
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  



    

 
 2 2
2
0
F
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  



    

      (47) 
 4 4
4
0
F
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  



    

 
 3 4 3 0AX c      
 
3 3
4
A
c
X




  
Solving for the Cournot equilibria yields(8), where the operating outputs, prices and 
profits of the firms in country A are:  
 
1 2 4
4
F F F
A A A
c
x x x


         
 
3
4
F
A
c
p X

  

      
  
 
2
1 2 4 1
16
F F F F F
A A A A
c
p c x

  

           
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Similarly, when firm three chooses to undertake FDI and firm four chooses to export, 
the results are reciprocal. 
 
3. When both firms choose to undertake FDI 
Suppose both firms in country B choose to undertake FDI, substitute (2) into (10), the 
operating profits (before the fixed costs) of the firms in country A are: 
 
 1 1
FF
A A AX c x           
 2 2
FF
A A AX c x           
 3 3
FF
A A AX c x            (48) 
   4 4
FF
A A AX c x      
 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
  1 1
1
0
FF
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

 
 2 2
2
0
FF
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

 
 3 3
3
0
FF
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

      (49) 
 4 4
4
0
FF
A
A A
A
x X c
x

  

    

 
 4 5 4 0AX c     
 
4 4
5
A
c
X



  
 
Solving for the Cournot equilibria yields (11), where the operating outputs, prices and 
profits of the firms in country A are: 
 
1 2 3 4
5
FF FF FF FF
A A A A
c
x x x x



     
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4
5
FF
A
c
p X

 

    
  
 
2
1 2 3 4 1
25
FF FF FF FF FF FF
A A A A A
c
p c x

   


       
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Chapter 3: FDI versus Exporting under Cournot Oligopoly-
The constant elasticity demand function case 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the sustainability of collusion in an infinitely-repeated Cournot game 
have been focused on either proving that collusion can be sustained for a sufficiently 
large discount factor, or assuming a linear demand function so that the discount factor 
can be solved explicitly by relating to the parameters of the model. For instance, many 
authors have used linear functions to analyse how different mode of competition 
(Bertrand or Cournot competition), cost asymmetries, the number of the firms or 
product differentiation affect the sustainability of collusion. These factors do affect 
the sustainability of collusion to some extent, but there is a limitation that the results 
are restricted by this particular functional form: linear demand. One of the important 
factors that might affect the result is the elasticity of demand, and the effect of which 
on the sustainability of collusion could not be captured by linear demand functions, 
but can be addressed by constant elasticity demand function. This form of a function, 
however, has a disadvantage, that it could not give an explicit analytical result when a 
firm tries to deviate from collusion. Hence it does not allow an explicit solution for 
the discount factor to sustain the collusion in an infinitely repeated game, as it does by 
using linear demand in chapter two. The way to deal with this situation is to use 
numerical solutions, and the results are general and are surprisingly similar to those in 
chapter two, which confirms the robustness of the analysis.  
 
Chapter two assumes linear demand functions and uses a Cournot oligopoly to resolve 
the conflict between the theory, which predicts that trade liberalisation discourages 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and the empirical evidence, which is that a reduction 
in trade costs has led to an increase in FDI. When firms tacitly collude over FDI 
versus export decisions in an infinitely repeated game, the puzzle can be explained 
and collusion can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium for a sufficiently 
large discount factor. Therefore by assuming linear demand functions, the discount 
factor can be solved explicitly and relate to the parameters of the model. For instance, 
the previous analysis has indicated that how the trade costs k (incurred with export) 
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and the fixed costs G (incurred with FDI) affect the sustainability of collusion by 
using linear demand functions. However, such form of a function limits the analysis 
of how the parameters of the model affect the sustainability of collusion and thus the 
solution to the argument. By adapting constant elasticity demand function, the effect 
of the elasticity of demand on sustainability of collusion is analysed and it is proved 
that the outcomes are similar to those by linear demand function. 
 
3.2 The model 
The model in this chapter is similar to the one in chapter two, except that the demand 
function exhibits constant elasticity. The model is symmetric, and again consists of 
two countries with two firms in each country, labelled firm one and firm two in 
country A, along with firm three and firm four in country B. These firms produce 
homogeneous products and compete as Cournot oligopolists in the two markets 
(country A and country B).  
 
The firms play a two-stage game. At stage one, firms independently choose whether 
to export to the other country or to undertake FDI in the other country. At stage two, 
these firms compete in a Cournot oligopoly game in the two segmented markets. The 
products are assumed to be perfect substitutes, so each firm is facing the same 
constant elasticity demand function in country A: 
 
  1A A Ap Q Q
       (50) 
1 2 3 4A A A A AQ q q q q         (51) 
 
Where 
Ap is the market price in country A, iAq is the output of each firm in country A, 
AQ is the total industry output in country A, and  is the constant elasticity of demand, 
which is assumed to be larger than one. All firms are identical and incur a constant 
marginal cost of c .  
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3.2.1 Both firms choose to export:  
Using the example of country A, the profits of both firms in country A are 
 iA A iAp c q   . When both firm three and firm four export, their marginal cost will 
be c k , assuming an interior solution, so the operational profits of all firms are: 
 
 1 1A A Ap c q       2 2A A Ap c q    
 3 3A A Ap c k q        4 4A A Ap c k q       (52) 
 
The outputs, prices and profits of the firms are then solved by taking the derivatives of 
the above:   
 
   4 2 4 1Ap c k     
   4 2 4 1A AQ p c k
 
       
 
       
1
1 2 1 4 2 4 1 2
EE EE
A A A Aq q c p Q c k c k
 
  
 
        
       
1
3 4 1 4 2 4 1 2
EE EE
A A A Aq q c k p Q c k c k k
 
  
 
             (53) 
 
     
1 1 2
1 2 4 2 1 4 2
EE EE
A A c k c k
     
          
     
1 1 2
3 3 4 2 1 4 2
EE EE
A A c k c k k
     
           
 
The outputs of firms are shown in figure 3-1 in the appendix, where the sales of firm 
one and firm two are upward sloping, and those of firm three and firm four are 
downward sloping. This is because firm three and firm four export to country A, so an 
increase in the trade cost will reduce the motivation of exporting, and then reduce the 
supply to the home country, while home firms’ outputs are increasing with the trade 
cost. Since the sales from export are more sensitive to the trade cost, the outputs of 
firm three and firm four in the home market are steeper than the ones of home firms 
as shown in figure 3-1.  
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Firms stop trading when the trade cost is prohibitive, i.e. 3 4 0
EE EE
A Aq q  , meaning 
 2 1k k c    . Then the exports from firm three and firm four in country B to 
supply country A will be zero.  
3.2.2 One firm exports and the other firm undertakes FDI 
Using the example of country A again, if firm three chooses to export to country A, 
and firm four chooses to undertake FDI in country A, the marginal cost of country 
three will be c k , while the marginal costs of the other three firms are c . Assuming 
the outcome is an interior solution where all firms have positive sales, the operating 
profits (before the fixed cost) of the firms in country A will be: 
 
 1 1A A Ap c q       2 2A A Ap c q    
 3 3A A Ap c k q        4 4A A Ap c q      (54) 
 
The usual derivations for a Cournot oligopoly yield the outputs, prices and profits of 
the four firms as shown in the appendix: 
 
   4 4 1EFAp c k     
   4 4 1A AQ p c k
 
       
 
       
1
1 2 4 1 4 4 1
EF EF EF
A A A A Aq q q c p Q c k c k

  
 
               
       
1
3 1 4 4 1 3
EF
A A Aq c k p Q c k c k k
 
  
 
             (55) 
 
     
1 1 2
1 2 4 4 4 1
EF EF EF
A A A c k c k
      
         
     
1 1 2
3 4 4 1 3
EF
A c k c k k
    
        
 
Symmetry of the model implies that 3 4 2 1
EF EF EF EF
B B B Aq q q q   , 1 3
EF EF
B Aq q , 
EF EF
B Ap p , 
3 4 2 1
EF EF EF EF
B B B A      , 1 3
EF EF
B A  . 
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When firm three stops trading with country A, there is a corner solution, where the 
exports of firm three to country A and its profits from exports will be zero. It happens 
if the trade cost reaches its prohibitive level, i.e. 3
EF
Aq =0, when  3 1k k c    . 
Therefore, the profits, outputs and prices of the four firms under the Cournot 
oligopoly when k k  are: 
 
 1 1A A Ap c q       2 2A A Ap c q    
 4 4A A Ap c q      3 0A   
 
 3 3 1FAp c 
    
   3 3 1F FA AQ p c
 

              (56) 
1 2 4
1 3 1
1
3 3
F F F F
A A A AF
A
c
q q q Q
p c




   

   
       
  
  3 0
F
Aq
   
 
11 1
1 2 4 3 3 1
F F F
A A A c
      
             3 0
F
A
   
 
The outputs and sales in this scenario are shown in figure 3-2, where the demands of 
firm one, firm two and firm four are upward sloping, but the outputs for firm four is 
downward sloping for the same reason: the export from firm three is decreasing in the 
trade cost until k  reaches its prohibitive level k .  
 
When firm three chooses to undertake FDI, and firm four chooses to export, the 
results are reciprocal to the above ones, so the interior outcome is as follows:
1 2 3 1
FE FE FE EF
A A A Aq q q q   , 4 3
FE EF
A Aq q , 
FE EF
A Ap p , 1 2 4 1
FE FE FE EF
A A A A      , 4 3
FE EF
A A  . 
Symmetry of the model implies that 3 4 1 1
FE FE FE FE
B B B Aq q q q   , 2 4
FE FE
B Aq q , as shown in 
figure 3-3,
FE FE
B Ap p , 3 4 1 1
FE FE FE FE
B B B A      , 2 4
FE FE
B A  . The corner solution occurs 
when firm four stops exporting to the country A. That is, when 4
FE
Aq =0, when 
 3 1k k c    . The profits, outputs and prices of the three firms under the 
Cournot oligopoly are: 1 2 3 1
F F F F
A A A Aq q q q
      , 4 3 0
F F
A Aq q
   , F FA Ap p
  , 
1 2 3 1
F F F F
A A A A   
      , 4 3 0
F F
A A 
   .  
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3.2.3 Both firms undertake FDI 
When both firm three and firm four undertake FDI, the marginal cost of all firms will 
be c , so the outcome is an interior solution where all firms generate positive sales. 
The operating profits (before the fixed cost) of the firms will be: 
 
 1 1A A Ap c q       2 2A A Ap c q    
 3 3A A Ap c q       4 4A A Ap c q    
 
The derivations for a Cournot oligopoly yield the outputs, prices and profits of the 
four firms, as in the appendix, are: 
 
 4 4 1Ap c    
 4 4 1A AQ p c
 
            (57) 
   1 1 4 4 1 4FFiA A Aq c p Q c

             
   
1
4 4 4 1FFiA c c
 
  
 
   
 
The outputs for all firms are the same horizontal line. Because the trade costs do not 
affect FDI, and do not play any role here, the outputs of the firms are not affected by 
the trade cost. Next section will present a static game theory model of FDI under 
Cournot oligopoly, where the fixed cost of undertaking FDI enters the decisions of the 
game.  
 
3.3 Static Game 
In the first stage, each firm chooses whether to undertake FDI or to export to supply 
the other country. There are four firms, so there will be sixteen combinations among 
them. The model is symmetric so the profits of the firms are also symmetric. All the 
interior combinations and the corner combinations are similar to the ones in chapter 
two section 2.3. Although the numerical results are different, this step can be skipped, 
as the markets are assumed to be segmented.  
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The profits in the second-stage outputs game can be put into a two-by-two payoff 
matrix, where the rows denote the strategies of firm one and the columns denote the 
strategies of firm two. The payoff matrix is as follows with the first number in a cell 
the profits of firm one in country B and the second number the profits of firm two in 
country B. The matrix in table 3-1 shows the interior payoffs where firms take 
different strategies when the trade cost is smaller than k . 
 
Payoff  Matrix 
Firm 2 
Export FDI 
Firm 1 
Export 1
EE
B      ,     2
EE
B  1
EF
B      ,     2
EF
B G   
FDI 1
FE
B G      ,    2
FE
B  1
FF
B G       ,     2
FF
B G   
Table 3-5: Interior payoff matrix when k k  
 
The first cell on the left hand side shows a pair of payoffs in country B when both 
firm one and firm two decide to export, and the second cell on the left presents a pair 
of payoffs in country B when firm one undertakes FDI (after the fixed cost) while 
firm two exports. Cells on the right hand side show the pairs of payoffs in country B 
when firm two undertakes FDI while firm one chooses to export (top cell) or to 
undertake FDI (bottom cell). 
 
The matrix in table 3-2 shows the corner payoffs when the trade cost is between k  
and k . Then firm one or firm two stops exporting and its sales become zero in 
country B, 1 2 0
F F
B B 
   ,  
 
Payoff  Matrix 
Firm 2 
Export FDI 
Firm 1 
Export 1
EE
B       ,      2
EE
B  1
F
B

     ,     2
F
B G
   
FDI 1
F
B G
      ,    2
F
B

 1
FF
B G      ,    2
FF
B G   
Table 3-6: Corner payoff matrix when k k k   
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They are all symmetric matrices that follow from equations (53) to (55). Notice that 
when a firm chooses to undertake FDI, the payoff is the total profits minus the fixed 
cost G of building a factory in the other market.  
 
3.3.1 Equilibria for the game 
Solving the game for equilibria, there are two cases: a firm’s competitor in the same 
country chooses to export or to undertake FDI. In terms of the first case, the firm will 
choose to undertake FDI if it gives higher payoffs than it chooses to export. Refer 
back to the left hand side of table 3-1, where firm one and firm two compete in 
country B, and firm two chooses to export to country B. Then undertaking FDI is 
optimal for firm one if 1 1
FE EE
B BG    when k k , or 1 1
F EE
B BG 
   when k k k   
 
Therefore if the fixed cost of FDI of firm one is less than the critical value: 
1 1
FE EE
B BG     or 1 1
F EE
B BG  
  , given different value of the trade cost k , it will 
choose to undertake FDI when its competitor in the same country chooses to export, 
using (53) (56) and (55): 
 
         
       
1 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 21
1
4 1 2 4 2 2 2
2
1
2 3 3 1 3 2 2 4 1 2
6
c k c k c k c k k if k k
G
c c k c k k if k k k
   
     
   
   
     
      
           
 
           
 
  (58) 
 
The critical value of the fixed cost of FDI G  is a two-segmented concave quadratic 
curves in the trade cost up to the prohibitive trade cost k , similar to G in chapter two. 
It is shown in figure 3-5 with the parameter values: 1c  , and 10  . Undertaking 
FDI is preferred to exporting for a firm in the region where G G  when its 
competitor in the same market chooses to export before the trade cost reaches 
 3 1k c   and stop exporting thereafter, whereas exporting is preferred for both 
firms in the region G G . Thus a reduction in trade costs will only shift firms from 
undertaking FDI to exporting as suggested in most theoretical literature. 
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Considering the second case when a firm’s competitor in the same country chooses to 
undertake FDI, a firm will only choose to undertake FDI if it brings higher payoffs. 
Then undertaking FDI is more profitable for firm one if 1 1
FF EF
B BG    when k k , 
or 1 1
FF F
B BG 
   when k k k  . Hence undertaking FDI is a better strategy for a 
firm when its competitor in the same market has chosen to do it if the fixed cost of 
FDI is less than the critical value 
1 1
FF EF
B BG     or 1 1
FF F
B BG  
  , when the trade 
cost is prohibitive for firm two. Using (53), (56)and (55) 
 
     
 
1 1 21
11 1
1
4 1 4 4 4 3
4
4 4 1
c c k c k k if k k
G
c if k k k
   
  
  
 
    
   
          
   
 (59) 
 
The critical value of G  is shown in figure 3-5. For k k , it is a concave quadratic 
curve that is increasing in the trade cost k . For k k k  , it is horizontal and is 
independent of the trade cost, as the firm’s profits from exporting to the other country 
become zero. By comparing (58) and (59), it can be shown that G G . 
 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
( 1 4 ) 4 4(4 ) ( 3 ) 2( 2 (2 ) ( 2 ) 2(4 ) ( ) )
4
1
( 34 ( 1 4 ) 2(23 ( 1 3 ) 32 (2 ) ( 1 4 ) ( 2 ) )) 0
1
0
2
c c k c k k c k c k k c k c k
c c c k c k k
if k k
G G
if
       
         
    
    
          
             
                  
           



k k k



  

 
In the region under G , a firm will choose to undertake FDI when its competitor in the 
same country undertakes FDI, and the firm will also choose FDI when that competitor 
chooses to export (G G ). Therefore undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for both 
firms in the same market when G G , whereas only one firm in each market chooses 
FDI in the region where G G G  .  
 
Result 1: under a static game in Cournot oligopoly, undertaking FDI is a dominant 
strategy for both firms in a market in the region where G G , while only one firm in 
each market chooses to undertake FDI in the region G G G  .  
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3.3.2 Prisoners’ dilemma 
There is a possibility of prisoners’ dilemma in the region G G  and G G G  , as 
the dominant strategy of undertaking FDI might give lower payoffs than the strategy 
of export, due to the more intense competition by FDI.  
 
Since two markets are symmetric, the equilibria for all firms between two markets are 
also symmetric. When the fixed cost is between G  and G , the equilibrium is that one 
firm in each country undertakes FDI. They will have a higher profits than when they 
all choose to export if 
FEFE EEEEG    ( F F EEEEG    ) when k k  
( k k k  ). This occurs if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value: 
 
 
FEFE EEEE
n
F F EEEE
if k k
G
if k k k 
  
 
   
 
 
By using equations from chapter two: 
 
1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1
1
( 1 4 ) 4(4 ) ( ) 2 (2 )
2
1
43 ( 1 3 ) 32 (2 ) ( 1 4 )
6
n
c k c k ic k f k
c c k
k
G
if k k k
    
      
  
   
       
         

    
 
    
     
     
 (60) 
 
where 2 2 22 2 ( 1 )4 8c ck k        . The critical value nG  is a two-segmented 
concave quadratic that is increasing in the trade cost up to the prohibitive trade cost k
as shown in figure 3-6. It is below G  and G
23
. In the region under 
nG , there is no 
prisoners’ dilemma. In the region above G , there is a prisoners’ dilemma, where the 
equilibrium profits are smaller than the profits when all firms export. However, this 
Nash equilibrium only occurs between G  and G , and
nG  is below this region, so the 
shaded area in figure 3-6 which represents no prisoners’ dilemma is irrelevant. 
Therefore prisoners’ dilemma always exists when one firm undertakes FDI while its 
competitor from the same market exports in the region G G G  . 
                                                 
23
 The calculation of the fact that the critical value nG  is below G  and G is not mentioned here, 
because it is similar to what happened in chapter two. 
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When the fixed cost is below G , the Nash equilibrium is that all firms undertake FDI. 
They will have higher profits than when they all export if 
FFFF EEEEG   , and this 
happens if the fixed cost of FDI is less than the critical value: 
 
ˆ
FFFF EEEEG    
 
By using equations: 
 
 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 22 (2 ) ( 1 4 ) (2 ) 2 2 2 (1 4 8 )ˆ c c k c c k c c ck kG                             
 
In the region under Gˆ in figure 3-7, all firms prefer undertaking FDI to exporting, and 
all firms prefer undertaking FDI to the case that one firm in each country undertake 
FDI while its competitor in the same country exports ( Gˆ  is in the region under G
24
). 
Therefore undertaking FDI is a dominant strategy for all firms under Gˆ ( ˆG G ), and 
the profits (before the fixed cost) when all firms undertake FDI is higher than the 
profits when all firms export, there is no prisoners’ dilemma when ˆG G .  
 
Result 2: Under Cournot oligopoly, for all firms in both markets, undertaking FDI is 
a dominant strategy when ˆG G , and there is no prisoners’ dilemma. Prisoners’ 
dilemma exists between the region G G G  and the region Gˆ G G  . 
 
To sum up, in the region G G G  , the Nash equilibrium is that only one firm 
undertakes FDI while its competitor in the same market chooses to export up to the 
prohibitive level k . In the region G G , the Nash equilibrium is that both firms from 
the same country undertake FDI.  
 
The prisoner’s dilemma effect is decomposed into figure 3-6 and 3-7. In the region 
G G G   of figure 3-6, there is a prisoners’ dilemma where one firm in each 
country undertakes FDI while their competitors from both markets choose to export 
up to the trade cost k , but the profits are lower than when all firms export. In the 
                                                 
24
 The calculation of which is not mentioned as it is similar to the one in chapter two. 
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region Gˆ G G   of figure 3-7, there is a prisoners’ dilemma when all firms will 
choose to undertake FDI, but profits are lower than when they all export due to the 
same reason (more intensive competition and the fixed cost of undertaking FDI). Next 
section will extend the static game to an infinitely-repeated game theory of FDI to 
avoid the prisoners’ dilemma. 
 
3.4 The infinitely repeated game 
In the infinitely-repeated Cournot oligopoly game, firms can overcome the prisoners’ 
dilemma problem by tacitly colluding, and Nash reversion trigger strategies (Grim 
trigger strategy) can sustain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in an infinitely 
repeated game. If the discount factor is sufficiently high, the collusive outcome (all 
firms choose to export) is sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by the 
threat of reversion to the Nash equilibrium outcomes in the infinitely-repeated game. 
It is assumed that firms only collude over the undertaking FDI versus exporting 
decision, and choose outputs as Cournot oligopolies in the second stage of the game. 
 
In the static game, there are two Nash Equilibria, thus when considering the Nash 
equilibrium profits from the second period onwards in the infinitely-repeated game, 
these two static equilibria should be taken into account separately according to the 
size of the fixed cost G .  
 
3.4.1 Collision when G G  
When the fixed cost in the region under G , a subgame Nash equilibrium is the 
collusive outcome where all firms choose to export, and firms are earning jointly 
maximised profits. However, if one firm deviates (undertaking FDI) to increase its 
single period (discounted) profits, the other firms are, in response, likely to revert to 
the safe position (static Nash equilibrium) where all firms undertake FDI for the rest 
of the periods.  
 
All firms choosing to export is a Nash equilibrium if the present discounted profits 
from collusion (all firms export) exceed the present discounted value of profits from 
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cheating (choosing to undertake FDI when its competitors from the home country and 
the foreign country have chosen to export) for one period, and thereafter followed by 
the Nash equilibrium profits of all firms (all firms choose to undertake FDI).  
 
   
   
1
1 1
1
1 1
EEEE FEEE FFFF
FEEE F EE FFFF
G G if k k
G G if k k k

 

 


         

         
  
 
 
There will be an interior solution and a corner solution. Firm two will stop exporting 
when the trade cost reaches its prohibitive level k . Rearrange the above, as shown in 
chapter two, the collusive outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium if the fixed 
cost of FDI is greater than the critical value: 
 
    ˆ1G G G            (61) 
 
 *G   is a convex combination of G and Gˆ , weighted by the discount factor  . 
When the discount factor becomes zero, the critical value *G equals G , and when the 
discount factor becomes one, the critical value *G equals Gˆ . Meanwhile, as ˆG G  
and the critical value of fixed cost is decreasing in the discount factor , it is always 
lower in the infinitely repeated game than in the static game if 0  .  
 
 
1 1 2 1 2
1 1
1 1 1
1 1
*
1 2
1
( 1 4 ) ((1 )( 2 (2 ) ( 2 ) 2(4 ) ( ) )
2
4 ( 2 (2 ) ))
1
((1 )(23 ( 1 3 ) 32 (2 ) ( 1 4 ) ( 2 ) )
6
34 (2 ) ( 1 4 )
c k c k k c k c k
c c k
c c k c k k
c c
k
k
if k
G
    
   
      
  
    

   





       
   
         
     

         
 
        
   


1( (2 ) 2 ))
if k
c c k c
k k
   









 

 (62) 
 
Where 2 2 22 2 ( 1 )4 8c ck k        . The critical value of the fixed cost  *G   
is shown in figure 3-8 and figure 3-9 by using the same parameters, and it is a two-
segmented concave quadratic of the trade cost for a number of discount factors 
 0,0.264,0.497,1   up to the prohibitive trade cost k . However, only the area 
under G is relevant to this game. The collusive outcome is easier to be sustained when 
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the discount factor is larger, and the collusive equilibrium can be sustained whenever 
the static game is a prisoners’ dilemma, * ˆG G G  .  
 
3.4.2 Collusion when G G  
When the fixed cost of FDI G is in the region above G , all firms choosing to export is 
a Nash equilibrium if the present discounted profits from collusion (all firms export) 
exceed the present discounted value of profits from cheating (choosing to undertake 
FDI when its competitors from both countries have chosen to export) for one period, 
and thereafter followed by the Nash equilibrium profits above G  (one firm in each 
country chooses to undertake FDI when their competitors in the same country have 
chosen to export), for both interior and corner solutions: 
 
   
   
1
1 1
1
1 1
EEEE FEEE FEFE
EEEE F EE F F
G G if k k
G G if k k k

 

 
  

         

         
  
 (63) 
 
Only when (29) is satisfied, the collusive outcome can be sustain as a subgame Nash 
equilibrium and there is no prisoners’ dilemma in this infinitely repeated game.  
 
By rearranging (29), the collusive outcome can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium if 
the fixed cost of FDI is greater than the critical value when k k , by using the 
definition of 
nG , 
 
   1 nG G G  
        (64) 
 
 **G  is a convex combination of G and nG , weighted by the discount factor  . 
When the discount factor becomes zero, the critical value **G equals G , and when the 
discount factor becomes one, the critical value **G equals 
nG . Similar to 
*G , the 
critical value of fixed cost **G is decreasing in the discount factor , and it is always 
lower in the infinitely repeated game than in the static game.  
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If substitute (59) and (60) into(64), the critical value of the fixed cost in the infinitely 
repeated game when there is only one firm in each market undertakes FDI is: 
 
 
1 1 2 1
1 1 1
*
1
*
1
( 1 4 ) (2(4 ) (1 )( ) 2 (2 ) )
2
1
(23 (1 )( 1 3 ) 2 (2 ) ( 1 4 ) )
6
3
c k c k c k
c c
if k k
G
kk if k k
    
      
   
  



       
         
      
   


 
    

    (65) 
 
Where 2 2(1 ) 2 (1 2( 1 ) ) (1 4 ( 1 ))c ck k                .  **G   is 
shown in figure 3-10 by using the same parameters as the previous figures, and it is a 
two-segmented concave quadratic of the trade cost for a number of discount factors 
 0,0.27,0.76,1   up to the prohibitive trade cost k . However, only the area 
between G and G  is relevant to this game. Combining figure 3-6 and figure 3-10, 
yields figure 3-11. It shows that in the region between  G  and G , the collusive 
outcome where all firms export can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in the 
infinitely repeated game whereas only one firm in each market would undertake FDI 
in the static game and there is no prisoners’ dilemma. Clearly, the firm that switches 
to undertaking FDI faster will gain more profits at the expenses of its competitor’s 
profits in both countries, and the collusive outcome is easier to be sustained when the 
discount factor is larger.  
 
Result 3: Under Cournot oligopoly, the collusive outcome where all firms export can 
be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game if 
G G G  , or **G G G  and the critical value is decreasing in the discount factor, 
* 0G    , ** 0G     
 
3.4.3 Effect of k and G on collusion 
To understand how the trade cost affects the sustainability of collusion, it is 
worthwhile to look at how the critical value of the fixed cost of FDI depends on the 
trade cost. Considering the area under G , take the first order condition of ( )G   in 
(62) with respect to k  ( 0G k   ). The solution to this gives the trade cost 
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 k k  , which is a function of discount factor and the maximum point of the 
critical value G . Unfortunately, this function could not be solved analytically, but it 
can be solved by a given value for elasticity of demand. The solution then can be 
solved for the maximum of Gˆ  as a function of  . By substituting the discount factor 
from zero to one in  k  , then a line of * *k k can be plotted by Mathematica as a 
function of the trade cost
25
, jointing the maximum points of the critical value of G . 
Hence, for low trade costs when k k k   the derivatives of G k  are positive, but 
for higher trade costs in the region k k k k    , the derivatives are negative. 
 
A light blue line in figure 3-9 shows * *k k for given value of the elasticity ( 10  ) in 
the area under G , where G decreases on the left hand side of * *k k , and it increases 
on the right hand side of * *k k , i.e. the shaded area, and this area represents that a 
reduction in the trade cost cause firms switch from exporting to undertaking FDI, as 
shown by the arrow in figure 3-13.  
 
Using the same method to test the relationship between the trade cost and 
sustainability of collusion in the area above G , take the first order condition of 
( )G   in (65) with respect to k  ( 0G k   ). The solution of the critical value of 
k k  shows the boundary of how the derivatives of G k  change when trade 
costs increase, i.e. they are negative if k k . Again, by using a given value for 
elasticity of demand ( 10  ), and substituting the numerical discount factor  from 0 
to 1, a line of k k can be plotted by Mathematica as a function of the trade cost, 
jointing the maximum points of the critical value of G . On the right hand side of 
k k  , the critical value of G is decreasing with trade costs, indicating that a 
reduction in trade costs will cause firms switch from exporting to undertaking FDI, as 
shown in the shaded area in figure 3-11.  
 
Result 4: Under Cournot oligopoly, if the trade cost *k k ( **k k ), the critical value 
of the fixed cost *G ( **G ) is decreasing in the trade cost, * 0G k    ( ** 0G k   ), 
                                                 
25
 The code for calculating k k
 
is in the Appendix. 
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and a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking 
FDI. 
 
Figure 3-12 is the combination of figure 3-9 and figure 3-11, so the shaded area is to 
the right of ** **k k above G and * *k k  below G . There is a possibility that a reduction 
in the trade cost will lead the firms shift from exporting to undertaking FDI in the 
shaded area as shown in proposition four. Interestingly, the switch of the strategies 
could happen outside the shaded area in figure 3-12 as well. To illustrate the 
relationship between the trade cost and FDI further, a certain discount rate (e.g. 
0.38  ) will be used for both *G and **G , so that  * 0.38G   is below G  and 
 ** 0.38G   is above G  as shown in figure 3-13. For simplicity, figure 3-13 ignores 
the boundary critical value of the fixed cost * *k k and ** **k k , leaving  ** 0G G   , 
 ** 0.38G   , G ,  * 0.38G    and  *ˆ 1G G   . 
 
The relationship between the trade cost and FDI can be checked in more detail by 
looking at figure 3-13 horizontally. Clearly, the right hand side of ** **k k  and * *k k
from figure 3-12 indicate that a reduction in trade cost may lead firms switch from 
exporting to undertaking FDI. The question is if this is the only area that would 
happen. In the region of  0.38G G G    , the subgame equilibrium is that all 
firms export (collusive outcome 2E): in the region  0.38G G G    , the 
equilibrium is that one firm in each country undertakes FDI and their competitor in 
the same country exports (1E1F)up to k (1F); in the region  0.38G G G    , the 
equilibrium is the collusive outcome (all firms export 2E), and in the region under 
 0.38G   , the equilibrium becomes all firms choose to undertake FDI (2F), as 
shown in 3-14. 
 
Suppose G intersect  0.38G   at the point k k , if the trade cost falls in the 
region k k k   and within the region between    * **0.38 0.38G G G     , 
the firms might switch from 2E (both firms in the same county choose to export) to 
1E1F (one firm in each country chooses to undertake FDI) just across G as shown in 
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the shaded area in figure 3-13. If the trade cost is reduced further to the outside of the 
shaded area, both firms from the same country will choose to export. Hence, a 
reduction in the trade cost may lead firms switch from exporting to undertaking FDI 
even outside the area as shown in figure 3-12. Note that when the discount factor  is 
decreasing, the critical value of the fixed cost **G is increasing, therefore the area 
where the Nash equilibrium outcome (one firm exports while its competitor in the 
same country undertakes FDI) sustains is bigger, and so is the shaded area in figure 3-
12. It leads to the following proposition: 
 
Result 5: Under Cournot oligopoly, a reduction in trade costs in the region 
k k k   may also lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI. The 
larger the discount factor , the better chance that firms will switch the strategy. 
 
By looking at figure 3-13 vertically, the relationship between the fixed cost and FDI 
can be examined. This is because the level of the fixed cost G will affect the firms’ 
decision about their strategies. In the area of    * **0.38 0.38G G G     , a 
reduction in fixed costs across G might shift the equilibrium from 1E1F (undertake 
FDI, while its competitor in the same country export) or 1F(the firm stops trading 
when k k ) to the collusive outcome (both firms chose to export), indicating that 
firms might switch from undertaking FDI to exporting as the fixed cost G decreases. 
which leads to the proposition six in chapter two: 
 
Result 6: Under Cournot oligopoly, if the fixed cost G is reduced from the region 
G G G  to the region G G G   , it may lead firms to switch from undertaking 
FDI to exporting. 
 
The same reason applies that when the fixed cost is relatively high (between
 ** 0.38G   and  * 0.38G   ), a reduction in fixed costs makes it hard for firms to 
sustain the Nash equilibrium (undertaking FDI while its competitor in the same 
country exports up to k ), and may lead to a switch to the collusive outcome. This is 
because that if one firm deviates by undertaking FDI, it would be too expensive for its 
competitor in the same market to deviate. Thus when the fixed cost is relatively high, 
a reduction in fixed costs will reduce the profits from cheating, and reduce the profits 
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from Nash equilibria where all firms undertake FDI, or one firm in each market 
undertakes FDI, but increase the profits from the collusion outcome where all firms 
export.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter two has analysed the export versus FDI decisions in a two-country four-firm 
model under Cournot oligopoly by using linear demand function. This chapter uses 
constant elasticity demand function to check the robustness of the results from the last 
chapter, and it has been confirmed that all the results are quite general. In the static 
game, a reduction in the trade cost will lead the firms switch from undertaking FDI to 
exporting. The same outcomes are achieved that two firms in the same country choose 
to undertake FDI if the fixed cost is relatively low, or one firm chooses to export 
while its competitor from the same country chooses to undertake FDI if the fixed cost 
is relatively high. Again it shows that both export and FDI can exist as an equilibrium 
outcome in the world when the trade cost is sufficiently high.  
 
The prisoners’ dilemmas still exist. If the fixed cost is relatively low, all firms might 
make lower profits when they all undertake FDI than when they export. If the fixed 
cost is relatively high, the equilibrium profits when one firm in each country 
undertakes FDI while its competitor in the same country export might be higher than 
the profits when all firms export, due to the intensified competition caused by FDI.  
 
The prisoners’ dilemma can be avoided in an infinitely-repeated game when all firms 
tacitly collude over their FDI versus export decisions, as collusion over FDI can be 
sustained by the threat of Nash-reversion strategies if the trade cost is sufficiently 
high. Then a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to 
undertaking FDI when the trade cost is sufficiently high, as in the infinitely-repeated 
game ,a reduction in a sufficiently high trade costs lessens the profitability of 
collusion.  
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Appendix 
Operating profits and outputs 
Firms employ a Cournot strategy. That is, each firm maximises its profit assuming the 
outputs of other firms in each market remain the same. Firms stay in business as long 
as they make non-zero positive profits in each market. The demand function exhibits 
constant elasticity by using the function, 
AQ is total outputs supplies to country A. 
 
   1A A Ap Q Q
         (66) 
 
AAAAA qqqqQ 4321   
 
 
1. When both firms choose to export 
 
Suppose both firm three and firm four in country B choose to export to country A, 
substitute (66) into Error! Reference source not found., the operating profits (before 
the fixed costs) of the firms in country A are: 
 
 11 1EEA A AQ c q       12 2EEA A AQ c q    
 13 3EEA A AQ c k q       14 4EEA A AQ c k q     
 
The first-order conditions are: 
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The four first-order conditions are the reaction functions and constitute four equations 
with four unknowns 
1Aq , 2 Aq , 3Aq  and 4 Aq . Adding up equations from (67) to (70), 
we get: 
 
 
1
4 4 2Ap c k

 
   
 
        (71) 
 
Solve for 
Ap , we get: 
 
    4 2 4 1Ap c k           (72) 
 
Now substitute (72) into equation (66), we get Cournot equilibrium 
   4 2 4 1A AQ p c k
 
       . Then substitute AQ and Ap  into the equations 
(67), (68), (69), and (70), we can solve for the Cournot equilibria 
1Aq , 2 Aq , 3Aq  and 
4 Aq , which yields equation (53) in section 3.2.1.  
 
2. When one firm exports and the other firm in the same country undertakes 
FDI 
 
Suppose firm three chooses to export to country A, and firm four chooses to 
undertake FDI in country A. For the interior solution, substitute (66) into (54), the 
operating profits (before the fixed costs) of the firms in country A are: 
 
 11 1EFA A AQ c q       12 2EFA A AQ c q    
 13 3EFA A AQ c k q       14 4EFA A AQ c q    
 
The first-order conditions are: 
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      (73) 
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Solving for the Cournot equilibria using the same method as above, adding up all the 
first order conditions from(73) to (76), yields: 
 
 
1
4 4Ap c k

 
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 
 
 
then solve for 
Ap : 
 
    4 4 1Ap c k     
 
Now substitute 
Ap  into (66), we get Cournot equilibrium 
   4 4 1A AQ p c k
 
       . Then substitute AQ and Ap  into the equations (73), 
(74), (75), and (76), we can solve for the Cournot equilibria 
1Aq , 2 Aq , 3Aq  and 4 Aq , 
which yields equation (55) in section 3.2.2.  
 
For the corner solution, firm three will stop exporting up to a prohibited trade cost, the 
operating profits (before the fixed costs) of the firms in country A become: 
 
1 2 4A A A AQ q q q     
 
 11 1FA A AQ c q        12 2FA A AQ c q     
 14 4FA A AQ c q     
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Where   means firm three stops trading with country A, so its profits and outputs in 
country A are zero, i.e. 3 0
F
Aq
  and 3 0
F
Aq
  . The price of firm three will just cover its 
marginal cost 3
F
Ap c k
   .The first-order conditions of are: 
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Solving for the Cournot equilibria by adding up the above equations, the price is 
 3 3 1Ap c 
   , substitutes it into (66), the total outputs supply in country A is 
   3 3 1A AQ p c
 

 
      . Then the outputs and profits are shown in (56).  
 
Similarly, when firm three chooses to undertake FDI and firm four chooses to export, 
the results are reciprocal. 
 
3. When both firms choose to undertake FDI 
 
Suppose both firms in country B choose to undertake FDI, the operating profits 
(before the fixed costs) of the firms in country A are: 
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The first-order conditions are: 
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Solving for the Cournot equilibria yields (57) by using the same method, where the 
operating outputs, prices and profits of the firms in country A are: 
 
1
4 4Ap c

 
  
 
   
 4 4 1Ap c    
 4 4 1A AQ p c
 
       
1 4 1
1
4 4
FF
iA A
A
c
q Q
p c




   
     
  
   
   
1
4 4 1
4
FF
iA
c
c
 
  
 
   
  
76 
 
  
 
Figure 3-1: Outputs of firms when firm 3 and firm 4 export 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-2: Outputs of firms when firm 3 exports and firm 4 undertakes FDI 
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Figure 3-3: Outputs when firm 3 undertakes FDI, and firm 4 exports 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-4: Outputs when both firm 3 and firm 4 undertake FDI 
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Figure 3-5: Static Game under Cournot duopoly 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-6: Prisoners’ dilemma in both countries in the static game when 
G G G   
 
 
79 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-7: Prisoners’ dilemma in the static game when G G  
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-8: Infinitely-repeated game under Cournot oligopoly when G G  
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Figure 3-9: Infinitely-repeated game under Cournot oligopoly when G G  
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-10: Infinitely-repeated game under Cournot oligopoly when G G  
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Figure 3-11: Infinitely-repeated game under Cournot oligopoly when G G  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3-12: Combination of figure 3-9 and figure 3-11 
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Figure 3-13: Infinitely-repeated game under Cournot oligopoly if 0.38   
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Code for k k   
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Chapter 4: International trade in a Hotelling model of 
differentiated duopoly 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the central topics in international trade is the welfare effects of free trade 
under imperfect competition. The welfare effects of free trade under Cournot duopoly 
have been analysed by many literature, and they proved that losses from trade could 
happen. However, the analysis of welfare effect on another important case, Bertrand 
duopoly with product differentiation, has been rarely mentioned in the past, as it is 
expected to be similar to the Cournot duopoly case. Clarke and Collie (2003) analyse 
the welfare effects in the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products, and 
they prove that there are always gains from trade under both unilateral free trade and 
multilateral free trade. Nevertheless their results are sharply contradicted by Fujiwara 
(2009), who considers a Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and 
proves that welfare under free trade is less than welfare under autarky for any 
transport cost, and there are always losses from trade. Then it would seem interesting 
to consider what exactly happens to the welfare in the Bertrand duopoly model with 
product differentiation, so this chapter re-examines the welfare effect of the Hotelling 
model of the spatial duopoly by constructing a product space between the trade costs 
and marginal disutility, which associated with product differentiation and concludes 
that there is a possibility of losses from trade.  
 
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983) are the first to analyse the welfare 
effects of trade in a Cournot duopoly with homogeneous products. Assuming 
segmented markets, they show that there might be losses from multilateral free trade 
when the initial transport cost is too high (close to the prohibitive level). This is due to 
the fact that the negative effect of waste in transport outweighs the positive effect of 
competition promoted by trade. When the transport cost is sufficiently low, on the 
other hand, there are always gains from trade. Brander and Krugman (1983) also 
show that there will be gains from trade provided there is free entry of firms. They 
conclude that the relationship between welfare of trade and the trade costs is in a U-
shape under Cournot duopoly. Markusen (1981) assumes integrated market, and 
proves that there are gains from trade even no trade will actually occur. In his two-
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country model, outputs of both firms increase with a pro-competitive effect. In our 
model, pro-competitive effect exists in the competitive market, but the outputs could 
not change due to the structure of the Hotelling model, whereas the price of the home 
firm is reduced so that foreign firm could not enter the home market. 
 
Clarke and Collie (2003) introduce Bertrand duopoly with differentiated product to 
re-analyse the welfare gains/losses by using a two country Bertrand duopoly model 
with linear demands and constant marginal costs to demonstrate that welfare in trade 
is always larger than welfare in autarky for any transport cost. The reason is that the 
increase of the consumer surplus caused by a lower price of the home firm, and the 
positive effect of a wider variety of differentiated products overweigh a fall in the 
profits of the home firm, resulting gains from trade in the unilateral free trade for any 
transport cost. Since welfare under multilateral free trade is the welfare under 
unilateral free trade plus the profits of the export to the foreign country by the home 
firm, there must also be gains from trade.  
 
Fujiwara (2009) reconsiders the result of Clarke and Collie (2003) in a Hotelling 
model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly, and his conclusion sharply contrasts to 
theirs. He proves that welfare under free trade is less than welfare under autarky for 
any transport cost, and there are always losses from trade. There might be a few 
reasons behind the difference between these two papers, one is that he ignores the 
kinked-demand structure in the spatial model
26
. In fact, this structure is often 
overlooked in many literature, due to the complexity arises when calculating the range 
of the prices in equilibria. Another reason is that he has made an unrealistic 
assumption: 4a c   27, so that the prohibitive trade costs of pro-competitive effect 
is greater than the prohibitive trade costs of autarkic equilibrium. These two points 
might lead to the incorrect result of the welfare analysis: losses from trade are 
everywhere. 
 
This chapter builds upon the welfare analysis of Clarke and Collie (2003) and 
Fujiwara (2009), and adopts the Hotelling’s model of spatial duopoly to analyse the 
welfare under both unilateral free trade and multilateral free trade as well as gains 
                                                 
26
 The Kinked demand structure is not an assumption, and exists in the Hotelling model 
27
 Refer to Fujiwara K.(2009), where  is marginal disutility  
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from trade. The innovation of the current chapter is: 1) It discusses the kinked demand 
market structure which is ignored in Fujiwara (2009), 2) it considers the pro-
competitive effect without making any assumptions of the values of the factors so the 
results could be more comprehensive, and 3) It analyses the volume of the trade and 
how product differentiation affects the welfare and the trade volume. The results are 
losses are possible in the Bertrand duopoly model, which is similar to those in the 
Cournot duopoly model. So gains from trade occur when products are highly 
differentiated, and losses from trade occur when products are closer substitutes. In 
another word, welfare under free trade is less than welfare under autarky when the 
market is competitive; welfare under free trade is higher than welfare under autarky 
when the market is uncovered; welfare under free trade is the same as welfare under 
autarky when there is a pro-competitive effect; and finally welfare gain/loss is 
ambiguous when there is kink in demand.  
 
To our knowledge, a spatial competition model of Hotelling (1929) type can provide a 
different implication of trade liberalisation and welfare analysis and captures very 
realistic consumer’s and producer’s features. The modified version of the linear model 
of Hotelling (1929) is used in this chapter instead of the circular road model of Salop 
(1979). There are three types of Hotelling models: 1) those both prices and locations 
are chosen, 2) those locations are fixed and price is chosen
28
, and 3) those prices are 
fixed and locations are chosen. The second type of price competition will be focused 
on
29
, so it is a Bertrand duopoly. MÃrel and Sexton (2010) uses the canonical 
Hotelling duopoly model to investigate the existence and characteristics of 
asymmetric kinked-demand equilibria, and characterized the continuum of 
asymmetric kinked-demand equilibria. The current paper has adopted the similar 
method to derive the kinked-demand equilibria, but assuming firms incur asymmetric 
costs: foreign firm bear the trade costs. Troncoso-Valverde (November 2004) allow 
firms to choose the degree of purposeness of the product, i.e. the transportation cost 
coefficient, before compete in prices.  
 
Another important aspect of international trade is to look at the relationship between 
the volume of trade and the degree of product differentiation. Bernhofen (2001) 
                                                 
28
 See Tirole, J. (1988)  
29
 The assumption of exogenous location can be very restrictive, as in Fujiwara, K. (2009)  
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integrates the product expansion and import competition aspects of trade into an 
oligopoly model, and shows that the volume of trade is increasing in the degree of 
differentiation under Bertrand oligopoly and Cournot oligopoly by using Bowley 
demand function. Collie and Le (2010) uses Shubik-levitan demand function to avoid 
market expansion effect from product differentiation, and they find that the volume of 
trade is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is low, 
and increasing in the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is high for 
both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly. Collie and Le (2011) analyses product 
differentiation, the volume of trade and profits under both Cournot and Bertrand 
Duopoly. The Hotelling model of Bertrand oligopoly developed in this chapter has the 
same advantage that an increase in product differentiation does not affect the size of 
the market, thus no market expansion effect
30
. The results are the volume of trade is 
increasing in the degree of differentiation when products are close substitutes, but 
decreasing in the degree of differentiation when products are sufficiently 
differentiated.  
 
The model in this chapter assumes that trade is costly due to the transport costs of 
trade costs as it is referred, there is no free entry, marginal cost is constant, and 
markets are segmented. The contributions of this chapter are: firstly, it develops the 
Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly in the international study, so there 
is no market expansion effect, meaning increasing the degree of product 
differentiation will not affect the market size. Secondly, this study completes the 
unanswered part of the Hotelling model: the kinked demand market structure in the 
trade, where the welfare effect is umbiguous. Thirdly, the best response functions of 
the Bertrand trade model are not symmetric as the traditional Bertrand Hotelling 
model stated, and this asymmetry is caused by the trade cost associated with the 
foreign export.   
 
                                                 
30
 Intuitively, market size and trade affect the toughness of competition in the market, which then 
influence the producer and exporter in that market. Thus average markups and productivety respond to 
market size and its intergration through trade. Larger markets exhibit higher level of product 
differentiation. Thus an increase in product differentiation would increase the size of the market and 
that would influence the volume of trade too. We try to discuss the relationship between product 
differentiation and trade volume, so it is better not to consider the effect of market size on trade volume. 
Then it is important to analyse trade volume in a model in which the degree of product differentiation 
does not affect the size of the market. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents a basic Hotelling model, 
characterizes autarkic equilibria, derives reaction functions and then trade equilibria, 
Section 4.3 considers the welfare effects of free trade, section 4.4 illustrates the gains 
from trade proposition, section 4.5 and section 4.6 demonstrate the volume of trade 
and how trade liberalisation affect profits, and section 4.7 concludes this chapter.   
 
4.2 The model 
Consider a Hotelling’s linear city model where goods are horizontally differentiated. 
Suppose there are two firms (one and two) allocated in two countries (A and B). 
Country A is the home country where firm one is based, and country B is the foreign 
country where firm two is based. In each country, there is a continuum of consumers 
uniformly distributed along a one-dimensional space of product characteristics, 
defined by the unit length interval in  0,1 , and each of them wanted to buy one unit 
of the product or none. The disutility from consuming a variety other than one’s ideal 
variety is in the distance alone this interval. 
 
In product space, the two firms have the same constant marginal cost of production. 
They are located at the two ends of the unit segment, where home firm one is at point 
0, and foreign firm two is at point 1, and these locations are exogenously determined. 
Thus x  is the distance between consumer and firm one in the home market, whereas 
 1 x  is the distance to firm two in the home market. Consequently, the consumer’s 
utility is 
1a p x   if buying from firm one, or  2 1a p x    if buying from 
firm two, where a  is the reservation price that is large enough for consumer to buy a 
unit of the product
31
,  1 2p p is the price of the good produced by firm one (firm two), 
and  denotes the marginal disutility per unit of distance. Then x  is disutility of the 
distance between the chosen product and consumer x ’s ideal product.32 Notice that the 
distance in this model is measured in a product space rather than in a physical 
distance. This model is symmetric and the markets are assumed to be segmented, thus 
it is efficient enough by only looking at home market’s economy. In addition, the 
                                                 
31
 assuming a c  
32
 Here we do not interpret   as the usual transportation costs as it does in large Literature, because it 
will cause confusion between consumer’s disutility from consuming different good and the trade costs 
associated with export. 
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products are differentiated more for consumers when   is higher. the degree of 
product differentiation is inversely related to the intensity of competition among firms. 
When  increases, competition between the two firms falls, and when it becomes zero, 
all consumers can go to either firm for the same cost zero in the absence of product 
differentiation. 
 
4.2.1 An Autarkic equilibrium 
Under autarky, each imperfectly competitive firm acts as a monopoly in its own 
country and faces no competition. There are two cases for autarky in the Hotelling 
model: 1) the firm covers the market partially, i.e. 1x  , and 2) the firm covers the 
entire market i.e. 
1 1x  . For the first case, any consumer at location x  is willing to 
buy the product from firm one if 
1 0a p x   , so the aggregate demand is 
determined under 
1 0a p x   , leading to  1x a p   . Firm one’s profit under 
autarky is     1 1 1p c x p c a p     . The usual profit maximisation yields 
 1 2Ax a c   , 1
2
A a cp

 , and 
 
2
1
4
A
a c



 . However, the market is not 
completely covered by firm one, so  1 2 1Ax a c    , meaning 0.5
a c

  

. The 
subscript 1A  denotes autarky case one when the market is covered partially.  
 
 1 2Ax a c   ,    1
2
A a cp

  ,    
 
2
1
4
A
a c



    if     0.5                      (84) 
 
In addition, consumer surplus when 0.5   can be expressed as: 
 
 
 1
2
1 1
0 8
Ax
A A
a c
CS a p x dx


     
 
The welfare of the home market under autarky is the sum of consumer surplus and the 
profits of the home firm, 
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     
2 2 2
1 1 1
3
8 4 8
A A A
a c a c a c
W CS 
  
  
                                   (85) 
 
The second case occurs when 0.5
a c

  

, firm one is supplying the whole market, 
i.e. 2 1Ax  , and the price is 2Ap a   . Firm one’s profits under autarky are 
therefore  2 2 2A A Ap c x a c      . The superscript 2A  denotes autarky case two 
when the market is entirely covered. In both cases, firms two’s profits, market share 
and outputs in the home market are zero as shown in Table 4-1 in the appendix. 
 
2 1Ax  ,    2Ap a   ,    
2A a c          if    0.5                            (86) 
 
The consumer surplus of the home country under autarky when 0.5   is: 
 
 
1
2 2
0 2
A ACS a p x dx

     
 
The welfare of the home market is equal to consumer surplus 2ACS plus the profits of 
the home firm under autarky case two, i.e. 0.5  , and the market is entirely covered. 
 
 2 2 2
2 2
A A AW CS a c a c
 
                                      (87) 
 
This welfare analysis under autarky provides the benchmark for gains from trade in 
section 4.4. The Equilibria under trade will be analysed in the subsequent section.  
 
4.2.2 Trade Equilibria 
Since consumers only purchase the good if the utility generated from the consumption 
is greater or equal to zero, the utility function is given by: 
 
1 1
2 2
if buying from firm one; 
if buying from firm two;
0 if not buying at all
a p x
U a p x


 

  


                                (88) 
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Where 
1x  is the consumer’s distance to firm one, and 2x  is his/her distance to firm 
two. These distances, that are equal to the number of consumers in the market, could 
be treated as the demand for both goods. If prices and disutility of the distance are not 
too large, everyone buys from the firm that offers cheaper goods, so consumers from 
the 
1x  segment buy from firm one, and consumers from 2x  segment buy from firm 
two.  
 
Competitive market: 
When there is a consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm one and firm 
two, the market is completely covered, and this post trade home market is a duopoly 
by home firm one and foreign firm two, referred as the competitive market in this 
chapter. If the market is fully covered, then 
2 11x x  , consumer who is indifferent 
from buying at either firm is determined by  1 1 2 11a p x a p x       . Solving 
for
1x , the demands for each good are: 
 
2 1
1
1 2
2
2
2
p p
x
p p
x




 


  

                                                             (89) 
 
Assuming firm two chooses to export to country A (home market), recall that demand 
for foreign goods is represented by the number of consumers located on the 
2x
segment. Export will incur a per-unit trade cost 0k  under free trade. So each firm’s 
profit is defined as follows: 
 
          
 
  1 2 1
1 1 1
2
E
A
p c p p
p c x



  
    
  
  2 1 2
2 2 2
2
E
A
p c k p p
p c k x



   
                              (90) 
 
The home market is fully covered, the Bertrand Nash equilibrium profits, prices and 
outputs are solved by 1 1 0
E
A p   , 2 2 0
E
A p   , 
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1
3 3
3
E
A
c k
p
 
 , 2
3 3 2
3
E
A
c k
p
 
  
1
3
6
E
A
k
x



 , 2
3
6
E
A
k
x



                                             (91)
 
 
2
1
3
18
E
A
k



 , 
 
2
2
3
18
E
A
k



  
 
For country A variables, the superscript E denotes that firm two is exporting to 
country A. The prohibitive trade cost happens when 2 0
E
Ax  , that is 2
3
0
6
E
A
k
x



  , 
so 3k  . The prohibitive trade cost is increasing in the degree of product 
differentiation, so trade is more likely to happen when products are more 
differentiated
33
. After this point, the export from firm two to country A will be zero, 
and firm one will act as a monopolist in the home market, yet still facing the 
competition from foreign firm two, which only happens in Bertrand competition as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, known as the pro-competitive effect, and it will be explained 
in details in the next section. Furthermore, the consumer at point
1x  must obtain a 
positive utility: 
 
1 1
2 2 3
0
2
a c k
U a p x


  
                                        (92) 
 
That is:  2 3k a c     must hold.  
 
Local Monopoly case (uncovered market): 
If prices and disutility of the distance are too high, some consumers on the unit 
segment might choose not to buy any goods at all. In this case, home market is not 
completely covered, and firms do not compete with each other in this market, as each 
firm is a monopolist that has its own market share, and it is not affected by the other 
firm’s strategy. This is referred as Local monopoly. 
 
                                                 
33
 Because consumers can enjoy a wider varieties of goods. 
96 
 
A consumer who is indifferent between buying from firm one and firm two does not 
exist, so 
1 2 1x x  . Any customers between 0 and 1x  are willing to buy the good 
from the monopolist firm one, so the demand function that firm one faces is given by 
equating 
1 1 0U a p x    , hence 
1
1
a p
x


 , and the same argument applies for  
2
2
a p
x


 . If foreign firm two chooses to export to home country A, the profit for 
each firm is: 
 
 
  1 1
1 1 1
E
A
p c a p
p c x

 
    
 
  2 2
2 2 2
E
A
p c k a p
p c k x

  
                                  (93) 
 
Where 
2x is not equal to  11 x , as the market is not completely covered. The 
equilibrium prices, profits and outputs are solved by 1 1 0
E
A p   , 2 2 0
E
A p   , and 
denoting 2 2
E
Ax x : 
 
1
2
E
A
a c
p


    
,    
2
2
E
A
a c k
p
 
  
1
2
E
A
a c
x



    
,    
2 0
2
E
A
a c k
x

 
                                       (94) 
 
2
1
4
E
A
a c




    
,    
 
2
2
4
E
A
a c k


 
  
 
By looking at 
1Ax  and 2 Ax , only if k a c  , and 1 2 1A Ax x  , both firms supply the 
home market, so the prohibitive trade cost is k k a c   . Nevertheless, the market is 
not completely covered, to satisfy this condition, the total demand in the home market 
is less than one unit. That is, 
 
1 2
2 2
1
2
A A
a c k
x x

 
    
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That is,  2 2k a c     must hold. The question arises here: what happens in the 
home market when the trade cost is between kˆ  and k ? There is a kink in the demand 
structure in this range, so market is still completely covered, but unlike the 
competitive market, the gains from purchasing the goods from both firms become 
zero. The details of kinked demand will be discussed in the next section. 
 
If trade costs and the marginal disutility are normalized by 
k
a c
 

, and 
a c

 

, 
these three types of market structure in the home country are separated as follows: 
 
2 3 Competitive market
2 3 2 2 Kink in demand
2 2 Local monopoly
   

      
   
                       (95) 
 
The equilibrium prices, outputs and profits under the competitive market and the local 
monopoly have been derived in (91) and (94) from the trade point of view. However, 
the equilibria under the kink in demand are unknown, and have not been analysed in 
many literature. This could be discovered from Hotelling model in the following 
sections. As complication arises when considering the best response functions in each 
case, and the best response function for each firm is made up by two or three 
segments, equilibria is therefore, determined by the intersection of the two 
correspondences (
1p crosses 2p ). The following sections will go through the demand 
functions, the best reaction functions and the equilibria in the competitive market, 
kink in demand and local monopoly.  
 
4.2.3 The Nash equilibria 
In general, there are two cases of the demand functions of the Hotelling model: firstly, 
when the prices are low, the market is completely covered, so there exists a consumer 
who is indifferent between purchasing from firm one or firm two. Suppose such a 
consumer is allocated at 
1x as shown previously, i.e.  1 1 2 11a p x a p x       , 
then 2 1
1
2
p p
x


 
 . This was competitive market mentioned above, thus this 
consumer must also obtain positive utility from purchasing from either firm, which 
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means that
34
 
1 22p a p   . In addition, the constraint that 10 1x   implies that
35
 
1 2p p    
and 
1 2p p   . The demand for firm one’s product is then 1x  shown as 
in the first equation in (96). 
 
Secondly, when the prices are high, the market is not completely covered and an 
indifferent consumer does not exist, referred to as the local monopoly
36
. As an 
indifferent customer does not exist in such a market structure, the consumer located at 
the market boundary of firm one, which happens at the point when 
1 1 0U a p x     
(i.e. 1
1
a p
x


 ), would not purchase from firm two, i.e. 
1 22p a p   . The demand for firm one is summarized as: 
 
 
 
 
2 1
2 1 2 2
1 1 2
1
2 1 2
min ,2
2
, , ,
2 min ,
p p
if p p p a p
x p p a
a p
if a p p a p

  


 

 
     
 
     

        (96) 
 
Where the first equation represents the competitive market, and the second equation 
represents a monopoly. There are two possibilities with the ranges of price 
1p . One is: 
2 22p a p     , i.e. 2p a  , then the demand function 1x has a kink structure 
at 
1 22p a p   , 
 
 
2 1
2 1 2
1 1 2
1
2 1
2
2
, , ,
2
p p
if p p a p
x p p a
a p
if a p p a

 




 
    
 
    

                  (97) 
 
And the other one is: if 
2 22p a p     , i.e. 2p a   
and then 
2 1
1
2
p p
x


 
  is on the relevant range, i.e.  
                                                 
34
 Substitute the location of the indifferent consumer 
1x into the utility function 1 1 0U a p x     
35
 So the indifferent customer is between the unit segment end points: 2 10 1
2
p p 

 
   
36
 Assume the case that one firm captures the whole market is ruled out, each firm must obtain some of 
the market share. 
99 
 
 
  2 11 1 2 2 1 2, , ,          
2
p p
x p p a if p p p

  

 
                               (98) 
 
and the monopoly case does not exist. In all cases, 
1x is continuous in 1p . The 
demand function is kinked for values of 2p  such that 2p a  . Firms’ best 
response functions are derived in Appendix A, and that resulting the different 
expressions of the reaction curves listed in the end of Appendix A. As the Nash 
Equilibria  1 2,  p p  are determined by the intersection of the reaction curves 1p

 and 
2p

, we have the following situations
37
:  
1. 
1 1
4 4
    : In this case, 3 3c c c k a a          , the value of 
3
2
a
denote 
3 3
 or 
2 2 2 2
c c k
a a 

    and, 
4
3
a denote 
4 4
 or 
3 3 3 3
c c k
a a 

    , are above a . The reaction function  1 2p p 
consists of two upward sloping segments on  ,c a , it is increasing with slope 
1 2  on  , 3c c   or   2, 3 for c c k p
  , while it is increasing with slope 1 on 
 3 ,c a  or   23 , for c k a p
  . The break point is at 
2 3p c    for 1p

 and 
1 3p c k     for 2p

. There is a unique equilibrium located on the segment 
 , 3c c   at the intersection point  1 2
2
, ,
3 3
k
p p c c k  
 
     
 
 (see figure 
A1). 
 
                                                 
37
 All cases are distinguished by the term a c  and k . 
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Figure A 1: The best response correspondence when  
 
The first part of the best response function represents the competitive market 
portion with a slope of 1 2 , so the demand and the price depend on the price 
charged by the other firm. In this range, a decrease in price 1p  by will lead to 
a rise in sales by 2 . A decrease in price 2p  by   will lead to a reduction in 
price 1p  by 2  and a reduction in sales by 2 . The second part of the best 
response function is upward sloping with a slope of 1, which corresponds to the 
competitive market with pro-competitive effect. So the firm dominates the 
market but facing the competition from the other firm. A reduction in price 2p
by   will reduce the price of 1p  by  . 
 
2. 
1 1 1
4 4 4
     : This case is similar to the above case in the sense that a  is 
between 3c  and 3c k   . The reaction functions and the unique 
equilibrium are the same (see figure A1).  
 
1 1
3 3
K  
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3. 
1 1 1
4 3 3
     : This case is similar to the above case in the sense that a  is 
between c k and 3c  . The reaction functions and the unique equilibrium are 
the same (see figure A1). 
 
4. 
1 1 1
3 3 3
     : Now a  is between 3c  and 3c k    , so 3c k   is no 
longer on the segment  ,c a , but 
4
3 3
c k
a 

  is. The reaction function for 1p

has not changed, but the one for 2p

has, the relevant range becomes 
4
3
3 3
c k
c c k c a a 

        (with a   on the segment  ,c a ). The 
reaction function 2p

consists of two segments on  ,c a , it is increasing with 
slope 1 2  on 
4
,
3 3
c k
c k a 
 
   
 
, while it is decreasing with slope 1  on 
4
,
3 3
c k
a a
 
  
 
. Two reaction functions will intersect at on the increasing 
part with slope of 1 2 . Therefore there is a unique equilibrium 
 1 2
2
, ,
3 3
k
p p c c k  
 
     
 
on this range (see figure A2). 
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Figure A 2: The best response correspondence when  
 
Firm one’s best response curve is the same, but the second part of the best response 
curve for firm two is downward sloping with the slope of 1 . This range represents 
the kinked demand portion of the market, where the marginal revenue of the firm is 
discontinued, so the price of firm two, given a range of values of 1p , is set at the kink 
of the demand function. That is to say: If firm one increases its price 1p , firm two 
would decrease its price 2p  just enough to cover the market. This is the reason for the 
hump-shaped best response curve. 
 
5. 
1 1 1
3 2 2
     : Now a is greater than 
4
3 3
c
a   , and 3c  is no longer on 
the segment  ,c a , and the relevant range is 
4 4
3 3 3 3
c k c
c c k a a a 

         (with a   on the segment  ,c a ). 
Both reaction functions will increase with slope of 1 2  on 
4
,
3 3
c
c a 
 
  
 
for 
1p

and 
4
,
3 3
c k
c k a 
 
   
 
for 2p

. They will intersect on the increasing part 
1 1 1
3 3 3
K   
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if and only if the kink of the function 1p

lies below the 45 degree line, that is, 
1
4 4
3 3 3 3
c c k
p a a 
 
     
 
. This last condition is satisfied if 
 
2
3 3
k
a c    , which holds on this range of parameter values. Therefore 
there is a unique equilibrium on this range as well, 
 1 2
2
, ,
3 3
k
p p c c k  
 
     
 
 (see figure A3). 
 
 
Figure A 3: The best response correspondence when  
 
6. 
1 1 1
2 2 2
     : Now 
3
2 2
c k
a 

   is on the segment  ,c a ,  and the relevant 
range is 
4 4 3
3 3 3 3 2 2
c k c c k
c c k a a a a  
 
            (with a   
on the segment ,c a ). The graph is similar to the above one, but the reaction 
function of 2p

has three segments, it has slope 1 2  on 
4
,
3 3
c k
c k a 
 
   
 
, 
1 1 1
3 2 2
K   
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slope 1  on 
4 3
,
3 3 2 2
c k c k
a a 
  
    
 
, and slope 0 on 
3
,
2 2
c k
a a
 
  
 
. As  
2
3 3
k
a c    is satisfied within this range, two 
reaction functions will intersect at on the increasing part with slope of 1 2 . 
Again there is a unique equilibrium  1 2
2
, ,
3 3
k
p p c c k  
 
     
 
on this 
range (see figure A4). 
 
 
Figure A 4: The best response correspondence when  
 
The third part of the reaction curve for firm two is a vertical line, corresponding 
to the local monopoly portion of the market. So the demand for good two only 
depends on the price 2p , and it is a monopoly demand. In this range, a decrease 
in price 2p  by   will lead to a rise in sales by  , which is twice as much as 
that in the competitive market portion. The price of firm one has no effect on 
the demand or price of firm two. 
 
1 1 1
2 2 2
K   
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7. 
1
1
2
   : Now 
3
2 2
c
a    is on the segment  ,c a ,  and the relevant range is 
4 4 3 3
3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
c k c c k c
c c k a a a a a   
 
               (with 
a   on the segment  ,c a ). Compared with the previous case, the reaction 
function of 1p
  also has three segments, it has slope 1 2  on 
4
,
3 3
c
c a 
 
  
 
, 
slope 1  on 
4 3
,
3 3 2 2
c c
a a 
 
    
 
, and a flat line on 
3
,
2 2
c
a a
 
  
 
. It is 
known that when  
2
3 3
k
a c    , the intersection of the two reaction 
functions will occur on the increasing part, with unique equilibrium 
 1 2
2
, ,
3 3
k
p p c c k  
 
     
 
. However, for values   
2
3 3
k
a c    , the 
reaction functions will intersect on their decreasing portion as long as the break 
point 
3
2 2 2
c k a c
a 
 
   , that is,  
2
k
a c    . There are three subcases 
according to whether the segment with slope of 1  of the foreign reaction curve 
is above, within or below the segment of 1  of the home reaction curve (see 
figure A5 in the appendix). The critical value of the three cases depend on 
whether the value of 
4
3 3
c k
a 

  exceeds the monopoly price 
2
a c
for home 
firm and whether the value of 
4
3 3
c
a    exceeds the monopoly price
2
a c k 
 
for foreign firm
38
. Notice  
2
k
a c    is within this range, thus if 
 
2
k
a c     , there is a unique equilibrium where two flat lines intersect. 
This leads to the following Equilibria: 
 
                                                 
38
 If 
4
3 3 2
c k a c
a 
 
   , then  
5
6 3
k
a c    , and if 
4
3 3 2
c a c k
a 
 
   , then 
 
5
6 2
k
a c    . Therefore when the negative sloped segment of foreign reaction curve lies within 
the negative sloped segment of home reaction curve, it is case where    
5 5
6 2 6 3
k k
a c a c      . 
106 
 
 If 
1 2 1
2 3 3
     , there is a unique equilibrium 
 1 2
2
, ,
3 3
k
p p c c k  
 
     
 
 (see figure A5 below). 
 If 
2 1 5 1
3 3 6 2
       , there is an infinity of Nash Equilibria 
characterized by 1
2 4
,
3 3 3
a c c k
p a 
  
   
 
 and 
2
4 2
,
3 3 3
c a c k
p a 
  
   
 
, and 1 2 2p p a 
     (see figure A6 
below). 
 If 
5 1 5 1
6 2 6 3
       , there is an infinity of Nash Equilibria 
characterized by 1
4 3
,  
3 3 2 2
c k c k
p a a 
  
     
 
 and 
2
2
,
3 2
a c k a c k
p
    
 
 
, and 1 2 2p p a 
     (see figure A7 below). 
 If 
5 1 1
1
6 3 2
       , there is an infinity of Nash Equilibria 
characterized by 1
3
,  
2 2 2
c k a c
p a 
  
   
 
 and
2
3
,
2 2 2
a c k c
p a 
  
   
 
, and 1 2 2p p a 
     (see figure A8 
below). 
 If 
1
1 1
2
     , there is a unique Nash Equilibria 
 1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 (see figure A9 below). 
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Figure A 5: The best response correspondence when  
 
 
 
Figure A 6: The best response correspondence when  
 
1 2 1
2 3 3
K   
2 1 5 1
3 3 6 2
K K    
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Figure A 7: The best response correspondence when  
 
 
 
Figure A 8: The best response correspondence when  
5 1 5 1
6 2 6 3
K K    
5 1 1
1
6 3 2
K K    
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Figure A 9: The best response correspondence when
 
 
8. 
4 4
1
3 3
     : on this range, the overall shape of the reaction function is the 
same as the previous case, but now the two reaction functions intersect on their 
flat range. There is a unique Nash Equilibria  1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 (see 
figure A9 above). 
 
9. 
4 4 4
3 3 3
      : on this range,
4
3 3
c k
c k a 

     , and the relevant 
range is 
4 4 3 3
3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
c k c c k c
c a c k a a a a   
 
               , the 
reaction function of 2p

is composed of only two segment, it has slope 1  on 
3
,
2 2
c k
c k a 
 
   
 
, and a flat line on 
3
,
2 2
c k
a a
 
  
 
. There is a unique 
equilibria  1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 (see figure A10). 
 
1 4 4
1
2 3 3
K K    
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Figure A 10: The best response correspondence when  
 
10. 
4 4 1
3 3 3
      : On this range, the case differs from previous in the sense 
that 
4
3 3
c
c k a     , the reaction functions have the same shapes, and the 
unique equilibrium is at  1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 (see figure A10). 
 
11. 
4 1 4
3 3 3
     : This case differs from previous in the sense that 
4
3 3
c k
c a 

   which does not affect the result, the reaction functions have 
the same shapes, and the unique equilibrium is at  1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 
(see figure A10). 
 
12. 
4 3 3
3 2 2
     : On this range,
4
3 3
c
c a     , and the relevant range is 
3 3
2 2 2 2
c k c
c c k a a a 

         , the reaction function of 1p

is 
4 4 4
3 3 3
K   
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composed of only two segment, it has slope 1  on 
3
,
2 2
c
c a 
 
  
 
, and a flat 
line on 
3
,
2 2
c
a a
 
  
 
, similar to 2p

 . there is a unique equilibrium 
 1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 (see figure A11). 
 
 
 
Figure A 11: The best response correspondence when
 
 
 
13. 
3 3 3
2 2 2
      : On this range, 
3
2 2
c k
c k a 

    , this means the 
shape of the reaction function for 2p

 is a vertical line (monopoly) segmented in 
the range  ,c k a . There is a unique equilibrium  1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 
(see figure A12). 
 
4 3 3
3 2 2
K   
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Figure A 12: The best response correspondence when  
 
14. 
3 3 1
2 2 2
      : On this range, 
3
2 2
c
c k a     , again the reaction 
function of 2p

 is a vertical line (monopoly) segmented in the range  ,c k a . 
There is a unique equilibrium  1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 (see figure A12). 
 
15. 
3 1 3
2 2 2
     : On this range, 
3 3
2 2 2 2
c c k
a c a 

      , the reaction 
function of 1p

 is still composed of two segments, so the graph is the same as 
the above ones (see figure A12).  
 
16. 
3
2
  : On this range, the only relevant segment of the reaction curve 1p

is the 
flat one, same as 2p

, and therefore there is a unique equilibrium 
 1 2, ,
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
 (see figure A13). 
 
3 3 3
2 2 2
K   
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Figure A 13: The best response correspondence when  
 
Proposition 1: In Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly, there are three 
competition region: 
1. For  0 ,  2 3   , it is a competitive regime. The Nash equilibrium is 
unique and asymmetric, characterized by  1 2
2
, ,
3 3
k
p p c c k  
 
     
 
. 
The market is covered and the indifferent customer is located at
39
 
1
3
6
k
x



 .  
 
2. For  2 3  ,  2 2     , there are multiple kinked demand Equilibria. Each 
firm prices at the kink of its demand function, in the segment 
1 ,
3 2
a c a c
x
 
  
 
   
and there are three subcases: 
 
                                                 
39
 According to the formula for location 2 1
1
2
p p
x


 
   
3
2
 
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a) When 
5
2 3  ,  2
3
 
     
 
, equilibrium prices are characterized by 
1
2 4
,  
3 3 3
a c c k
p a 
  
   
 
 and 2
4 2
,  
3 3 3
c a c k
p a 
  
   
 
, and 
1 2 2p p a 
    . The market is covered, and the indifferent customer is 
located at 1
1
a p
x


 , within the segment ,  1
3 3
a c a c k
 
   
 
 
.  
 
b) When 
5 5
2  ,  3
3 2
 
     
 
, equilibrium prices are characterized by
1
4 3
,
3 3 2 2
c k c k
p a a 
  
     
 
 and 2
2
,  
3 2
a c k a c k
p
    
 
 
, 
and 1 2 2p p a 
    . The market is covered, and the indifferent customer 
is located at 1
1
a p
x


 , within the segment 1 ,  1
3 2
a c k a c k
 
    
  
 
. 
 
c) When 
5
3  ,  2 2
2
 
     
 
, equilibrium prices are characterized by 
1
3
,  
2 2 2
c k a c
p a 
  
   
 
 and 2
3
,  
2 2 2
a c k c
p a 
  
   
 
, and 
1 2 2p p a 
    . The market is covered, and the indifferent customer is 
located at 1
1
a p
x


 , within the segment 1 ,  
2 2
a c k a c
 
   
 
 
. 
 
3. When 2 2    , each firm is a monopolist: each firm sets price 
independently and the equilibrium price is  1 2, ,  
2 2
a c a c k
p p 
   
  
 
. 
 
Figure A1 to A13 show the best response functions that are made up by two or three 
segments, depending on the normalised marginal disutility of   and normalised 
transportation cost  . The first part of the best response function is a upward 
slopping segment (with slope of 1 2 ). When this part of the best response segments 
cross, the equilibrium corresponds to the competitive market equilibrium in summary 
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1: a typical Hotelling model equilibrium where the market is completely covered and 
the consumer who is indifferent from buying at either firm earns positive rents. This 
equilibrium occurs when the transportation cost   is small, i.e. it is within the range
 0,  2 3  . Define the boundary trade costs 2 3cK    . 
 
In the second part of the best response function, it is either upward sloping (with the 
slope of 1) or downward slopping (with the slope of 1 ). In the former case, the home 
market is solely supplied by one firm, facing the competition from the other firm, yet 
the equilibrium does not exist here, see figure A1 in the appendix. In the latter case, 
the best response function is downward slopping (with slope of 1 ) as shown in 
figure 3A to 10A. When the reaction functions of both firms overlap, there exists a 
continuum of equilibria. The reason is that the optimal price of firm one (two), given 
a range of values of  2 1p p , is set at the kink of the demand function, which is a 
result of a discontinuity in the marginal revenue of firm one (two). If firm two (one) 
increases its price, firm one (two) would decrease its price just enough to cover the 
market. Hence, by setting the price at the kink of the demand function, the market is 
completely covered and the indifferent consumer earns zero surplus at the point 
2 1
1
2
p p
x


 
 , the optimal price of 
1p

 
is 
1 2 2p p a 
     in this range of  2p . 
This equilibrium (summary 2) arises when the two reaction functions overlap for the 
intermediate values of the normalised transportation cost  2 3  ,  2 2     . 
Define the boundary trade costs as 2 2mK    . 
 
Finally, the third part of the reaction function is a constant 
1
2
a c
p

  for firm one, 
and 
2
2
a c k
p
 
  for firm two. When these parts of the two best response curves 
cross, both firms charge the monopoly price and part of the home market is not 
covered. Thus potentially there is no competition between these two firms in the home 
market, the best response of the firm is to charge the monopoly price, facing the high 
price charged by the other firm. This case (proposition 1 point 3) takes place when the 
normalised transportation cost is sufficiently high, i.e. 
cK  . Notice that unlike the 
classical analysis of the kinked demand equilibria in the Hotelling model, the 
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marginal costs are different for firm one and firm two in the home market, the 
reaction curve of 
2p
  and the reaction curve of 
1p
  are not symmetric with respect to 
1 2p p . However, the overlapping portions of the reaction curves still exist, implying 
that the indifferent consumer who earns zero rent is located close to the mid-point of 
the  0,1  segment, then prices and market shares of both firms are bounded. 
 
4.3 Profits and Welfare 
Welfare in a market is the sum of the consumer surplus and producer surplus. 
Consumer surplus in a Hotelling model is the area below the line U a p x   , and 
producer surplus is the profits earned my domestic firm in the home country and 
foreign country if it exports.  
 
The autarky case has been analysed in section 4.2.1, where firm one can either cover 
the whole market, or the partial market. Under free trade, when 
cK K , it is the 
competitive market region, where it comes across a prohibitive trade cost 
k
K
a c


. 
Hence within this region, if K K , the normal Hotelling competitive equilibrium 
applies, if K K , there is a pro-competitive effect, in which case firm one covers the 
entire home market, facing the competition from firm two. When 
c mK K K  , there 
is a kinked demand region, where a upper bound and a lower bound exist due to the 
nature of the marginal revenue at the kink. When 
mK K
40
, it is a local monopoly, 
where both firms supply the market, yet part of the market is not covered, so each 
firm acts as a local monopoly. Bear in mind that, if the trade cost K K , firm two 
stops exporting to the home market, then it will be an autarky. Thus trade only occurs 
when K K , which will be a necessary condition for all the above cases. There are 
two types of autarky, firm one supplies the entire home market, or supplies only 
partial market (refer back to section 4.2.1). Consequently, a trade cost and a marginal 
disutility space could be established in figure 4-1, showing all the relevant areas 
above as follows
41
: 
                                                 
40
 If normalise the prohibitive trade cost 
k
K
a c


, and the same as 
k
K
a c


 later on. 
41
 Assuming that 1a c  for the normalised trade costs K and marginal disutility   
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 Area A: a competitive region when 
cK K K   and K K  with a pro- 
competitive effect 
 Area B: a competitive region when K K , 
cK K , and K K  
 Area C: kinked demand region with a upper and a lower bound of equilibrium 
prices when 
c mK K K   and K K  
 Area D: a local monopoly region (uncovered market) when 
mK K K   
 Area E: an autarky when K K  
 
  
 
Figure 4-1: Equilibria in a normalised trade cost – marginal disutility space 
 
In this chapter, markets are assumed to be segmented, and two forms of free trade will 
be considered: unilateral free trade and multilateral free trade. Unilateral free trade is 
a one way trade, implying two firms compete as a Bertrand duopoly in the home 
country, while foreign firm faces no competition and acts as a monopolist in the 
foreign country. Multilateral free trade, on the other hand, is a two way trade. Firm 
one and firm two compete as a Bertrand duopoly in the home country as well as in the 
foreign country. Subsequently, the profits of the home firm under the multilateral free 
trade include the additional profits from exporting to the foreign market, and then the 
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welfare of home country under multilateral free trade is greater than that under 
unilateral free trade. In the following section, the profits and the welfare of these two 
types of trade will be analysed according to the areas in figure 4-1:  
 
Area A: competitive region when 
cK K K   and K K with a pro-
competitive effect 
In this region, firm two does not supply the home market, but it is a potential 
competitor for firm one. There is a pro-competitive effect: the price of the home firm 
must be lower than the price of the foreign firm, so that foreign firm does not sell in 
the home market
42
. The demand for good one in the home market is therefore one 
(
1 1x  ). Using equation (131) and the price of good one 1 2p p   , its price can be 
expressed as 
1 2p c   , while 2 3p c   . The profits of firm one in the home 
market is  
 
 1 1 1 2
E
A p c x        (99) 
 
and the welfare in area A is: 
 
 
1 1
1
1
0
     2
5
     2
2
1
     
2
W CS
a p x dx
a c
a c


 

 
   
   
  

        (100) 
 
Notice that the boundary lines
cK , K  and K  intersect at one point where 1 3   and 
1K   in the figure, so area A is a triangle. In addition, this area is on the left hand 
side of the line 0.5  , which is particularly useful when looking at gains from trade 
later on, as this is the area where firm one would have supplied the home market 
under autarky case two (i.e. the market is entirely covered).  
                                                 
42
 The critical trade cost is 3k  , 1 1x  , so the home price is smaller than the foreign price
1p c k   , 1 3 2p c c       . 
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Area B: a competitive region (
cK K , K K  and K K ) 
The profits for area B (a competitive market when K K ) has been discussed in 
equation (91), where the demand for good one in the home country is 
1
3
6
k
x



 . 
The consumer surplus is therefore: 
 
   
 
1
1
1
1 1 1 2 1 1
0
2
 1  
33 2
     
2 3 36
x
x
CS a p x dx a p x dx
k
a c k
 



        

    
 
 
 
Using the Bertrand equilibrium prices, outputs, profits from equations (91) and 
consumer surplus above, welfare of the home firm one under unilateral free trade is:  
 
   
 
1 1
2 2
2
3 33 2
   
2 3 36 18
3 6 9 4 3
   
36
u E
AW CS
k k
a c k
k k a c

 

 
  

 
 
     
     
              (101) 
 
If firm one decides to export as well, substituting the profits of firm one in the foreign 
market from equation (91), the welfare of the home firm one under multilateral free 
trade is: 
 
     
 
1 1 2
2 2 2
2
3 3 33 2
   
2 3 36 18 18
5 18 9 4
   
36
m E E
A AW CS
k k k
a c k
k k a c
 
  

  
  

  
  
      
     
  (102) 
 
Where 
1
uW represents welfare under unilateral free trade, and 1
mW represents welfare 
under multilateral free trade. As it is mentioned above, area B is right under K , so it 
is also a triangle, but 0.5   line go through this area. Thus there will be two cases in 
terms of gains from trade. 
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Area C: kinked demand region with a upper and a lower bound of 
equilibrium prices ( 
c mK K K  and K K ) 
In this region, the normalised trade cost is between 
cK  and mK , and it is smaller than 
one. In the home country, both firms sell to the home consumers and cover the entire 
market. However, the kink of the demand function determines that the optimal price 
of good one is such that 
1 2 2p p a 
    in this range of the price of good two. 
Hence, there is a upper bound and a lower bound of the equilibrium prices for both 
1p  
and 
2p . Refer back to Proposition 1 point 2, there are three cases in this region, as 
shown in Appendix A6, A7 and A8, but only the boundaries of all cases are of the 
interest. The price of good one is in a range of 
1
2
,  
3 2
a c a c
p
  
 
 
, the location of 
the indifferent customer is located within the range of 
1 ,  
3 2
a c a c
x
 
  
 
 
.  
 
With a lower bound of the equilibrium price, 
1
2
3
a c
p

 , 2
4
3 3
c
p a    , and 
1
3
a c
x


 . Consumer surplus is expressed as: 
 
   
1
1
1
1 1 1 2 1 1
0
 1  
x
x
CS a p x dx a p x dx            
 
Substitute the prices and the location of 
1x  into the above formula, consumer surplus 
is : 
 
2
2
3 2 2
9 6
l
a c a c
CS


  
   
 
Where the subscript 2l represents kinked demand lower bound equilibrium. Using the 
Bertrand equilibrium prices, outputs, profits from equations (91) and consumer 
surplus above, welfare of the home firm one under unilateral free trade is: 
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   
   
2 1
2 2
2 2
33 2 2
     
9 6 18
4 2 12 12 3
     
36
U E
l AW CS
a c ka c
a c k k a c


 
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
 
  
  
       
      (103) 
 
The welfare of the home firm one under multilateral free trade is: 
 
     
   
2 1 2
2 2 2
2 2
3 33 2 2
     
9 6 18 18
2 2 3 9 2
     
18
M E E
l A AW CS
a c k ka c
a c k a c
 
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 

  
   
   
      
  (104) 
 
With a upper bound of the equilibrium price, 
1
2
a c
p

 , 2
3
2 2
c
p a    , and 
1
2
a c
x


 . Using the expression for consumer surplus above, and substitute the prices 
and the location of indifferent consumer: 
 
    
 
2
2
4 2
h
a c a c
CS


  
   
 
Where the subscript 2h  represents kinked demand upper bound equilibrium The 
welfare of the home firm one under unilateral free trade is 
 
  
   
   
2 1
2 2
2 2
3
     
4 2 18
9 2 12 18 2
     
36
U E
h AW CS
a c ka c
a c k k a c


 
  

 
  
  
       
  (105) 
 
The welfare of the home firm one under multilateral free trade is: 
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     
   
1 1 2
2 2 2
2 2
3 3
      
4 2 18 18
9 4 9 6 2
      
36
M E E
h A AW CS
a c k ka c
a c k a c
 
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 

  
   
   
      
  (106) 
 
Overall, the welfare for firm one in the kinked demand region with lower and upper 
bound of the equilibrium prices can be summarised in the following way:  
 
 For the Unilateral case: 2 2,  
U U U
l hW W W   , where  
   
2 2
2
4 2 12 12 3
36
U
l
a c k k a c
W
  

        , and  
   
2 2
2
9 2 12 18 2
36
U
h
a c k k a c
W
  

         
  
For the Multilateral case: 2 2,  
M M M
l hW W W   , where 
   
2 2
2
2 2 3 9 2
18
M
l
a c k a c
W
 

       , and 
   
2 2
2
9 4 9 6 2
36
M
h
a c k a c
W
 

        
 
Area D: a local monopoly region (uncovered market) when 
mK K K   
In this region, both firms supply the home country, but the market is not covered 
completely, so each firm acts as a monopoly and does not compete with each other. 
The prices, outputs and profits have been discussed in equations (94): 
1
2
a c
x


 , 
2
2
1
2
a c k
x


  
   and 
 
2
1
4
E
A
a c



 , the consumer surplus in the home country 
is:   
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 
    
 
Welfare in the trade equilibrium under Unilateral free trade is: 
 
     
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  (107) 
 
Welfare in the trade equilibrium under Multilateral free trade is : 
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Area E: an autarky when K K  
This area is where the trade costs are too high for firm two to supply the home 
country. Home firm one is the only seller at home, facing no potential threat from 
foreign firm. Thus this is an autarky, and there are two cases as analysed in section 
4.2.1. When the normalised marginal disutility is smaller than 0.5 , firm one covers 
the whole market, otherwise it only covers part of the home market. The results of the 
welfares under these two cases are detailed in equations (85) and (87). The welfare of 
trade under all kinds of market structures in the Hotelling model are summarized in 
table 4-2 in the appendix. 
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4.4 Gains from Trade 
Gains from unilateral free trade 
The welfare of area A, B, C and D have been analysed under free trade, the gains 
from trade are given by subtracting welfare under autarky (85) and (87) from welfare 
under unilateral free trade or welfare under multilateral free trade. The gains from 
unilateral free trade are shown in figure 4-2 and the gains from multilateral free trade 
are shown in figure 4-3. For the case of the competitive market area A, there is a pro-
competitive effect so the Bertrand equilibrium is a boundary solution where there is 
no export from the foreign firm and the home firm acts as a monopoly. As this area is 
on the left hand side of 0.5  , hence the home market is covered entirely, and 
welfare under autarky case two, equation (87) will be applied. The gains from trade in 
area A is: 
 
2
1
1
   0
2 2
A
AG W W
a c a c


 
 
       
 
 
 
There are no gains or losses in the region A from unilateral free trade or multilateral 
free trade, this is due to the fact that home firm one sets the monopoly price and sells 
the monopoly output in the home market, which is the same as under autarky case two. 
Trade liberalisation start from autarky would have increased welfare in the 
competitive market with pro-competitive effect, but without actual trade taking place, 
there is no wasteful trade costs occurred. Thus there are no gains or losses from trade.  
 
Secondly, consider the usual Hotelling competitive market in area B, so that both 
home firm and foreign firm compete as a Bertrand duopolists to supply the home 
market, and all consumers earn positive surplus. In the trade cost-marginal disutility 
space, the 0.5   line goes through area B, splitting this area into 
1B and 2B  as 
shown in figure 4-2, here both autarky cases 1 and 2 exist when calculating gains 
from trade. Using equations (101), (87) and (85), when 0.5  , using (101) and (87), 
the gains from unilateral trade are: 
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                (109) 
 
which is referred to as area 
1B  in figure 4-2. To see whether this is a gain or a loss, a 
critical value of the normalised trade cost in terms of the marginal disutility will be 
examined, i.e. 
1 0
u
BG  , assuming 1a c  ,  
 
1
1 3    or  
u
u B
B
k
K
a c
   

 
Welfare is higher under unilateral free trade if the relative trade cost is outside the 
range of the critical values ( 3k  or k   ). Nevertheless, area 
1B is above zero 
and below 3K  , therefore 
1
u
BG is strictly negative and there are no gains from trade. 
When 0.5  , by using (101) and (85), the gains from unilateral trade are: 
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  (110) 
 
This is referred to as area 
2B  in figure 4-2. Comparing total welfare under unilateral 
free trade with total welfare under autarky as in (110), welfare is higher under 
unilateral free trade if the relative trade cost is outside the range of the critical values 
below, i.e.
2
u
BK . However, the area 2B is inside this range, therefore 2
u
BG is strictly 
negative and there are no gains from trade. 
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1
18 48 40
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u
u B
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K
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
 
 
To summarise, there are always losses from trade in area B, shown as follows: 
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In figure 4-2, start from Area A, when trade costs fall, and marginal disutility 
increases to area B, the products are more differentiated, leading to welfare gains. 
Meanwhile, the consumer surplus increases as the falling trade costs intensify the 
competition, leading to lower prices. However, home sales and profits will decrease 
for the reduced prices, the fall in the home profits overweight the rise in the consumer 
surplus as well as gains from enjoying various products. 
 
Thirdly, consider the kinked demand Bertrand equilibrium in area C, where the kink 
occurs at profit maximising price. If the firm reduces its price then it faces monopoly 
demand, but if the firm increases its price then it faces competitive demand. Since 
home firm sets its price lower than that under autarky, more sales are obtained and 
gains from trade should be positive. In figure 4-2, the 0.5   line also goes through 
area C, crossing the point where 
mK  intersects k a c  . On the left hand side when 
0.5  , using (103), (105) and (87), gains from unilateral free trade are expressed as: 
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This is shown in area 
1 2C C , the critical values of the gains above can be calculated 
by setting both 
2
u
lG  and 2
u
hG  to zero. Then the total welfare is higher under unilateral 
free trade if the relative trade cost is outside the range of the two roots of each 
equation. When 0.5  , 
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These critical values are shown in the region 
1 2C C , since 2
u
hK  is smaller than 2
u
lK  
for each marginal disutility, only 
2
u
lK will be taken into account. The area below shows 
a loss from unilateral free trade, represented as area 
1C , and the area above 2
u
lK  shows 
a gain from trade, represented as area 
2C . On the right hand side when 0.5  , using 
(103), (105) and (85), gains from unilateral free trade are expressed as: 
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which is shown in area 
3 4C C , the critical values of the gains are found by setting 
both 
2 0
u
lG   and 2 0
u
hG  . Then again the total welfare is higher under unilateral free 
trade if the relative trade cost is outside the range of the two roots of each equation. 
when 0.5  , 
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Once again, 
2
u
hK  is smaller than 2
u
lK  for each marginal disutility in area 3 4C C , so 
only 
2
u
lK will be considered. The area below 2
u
lK  
shows a loss from unilateral free trade, 
represented as area 
4C , and the area above 2
u
lK  shows a gain from trade, represented 
as area 
3C . Consequently, in the kinked demand region, the area labelled 1 4C C  
shows losses from unilateral free trade, and area 
2 3C C shows gains from trade. In 
figure 4-2, from area B to area C, marginal disutility increases further, implying 
higher differentiated products, which is clearly a welfare gain as home consumers 
face more product choices. Trade liberalisation increases consumer surplus as prices 
are reduced by an intensified competition. Again, the home sales and profits will 
decrease for the reduced prices, but the overall effect is ambiguous: the fall in the 
home profits overweight the rise in the consumer surplus plus gains from consuming 
more variety of products in area 
1 4C C , and the opposite happens in area 2 3C C , 
which is to the right of area 
1 4C C , representing more differentiated products and 
gains from trade. 
 
Finally, consider the local monopoly Bertrand equilibrium in area D of figure 4-1, so 
both home and foreign firm have a non-empty sale in the home country, yet part of 
the market is not covered by any firms. Here, both firm one and firm two set 
monopoly price and output. The gains from unilateral free trade can be calculated by 
using (107) and (87): 
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As the trade cost is smaller than a c in this region, u
DG  must be a positive. Hence 
there are always gains from unilateral free trade in the local monopoly region. This is 
due to the fact that the products are highly differentiated in this area when the home 
market is uncovered, so home consumers gain enormous welfare from a wider variety 
of goods such that the welfare losses from the reduced home sales/profits are 
dominated by the gains. 
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To summarise, there is no gains or losses in the competitive market region A with 
pro-competitive effect, and there are always losses from unilateral free trade in the 
shaded area
1B , 2B (competitive market region), 1C  and 4C (part of the kinked demand 
region). On the other hand, part of the kinked demand region 
3C , 2C  and the local 
monopoly region D always have gains from unilateral free trade. 
 
Proposition 2: In a Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly, there are 
losses from unilateral free trade in the region 
1 2 1 4B B C C   , there is no gains or 
losses in the region A , and there are always gains from unilateral free trade for the 
rest of the region under k a c  . 
 
Gains from unilateral free trade are summarized as follows: 
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Figure 4-2: Gains from unilateral free trade 
 
Gains from Multilateral free trade 
The above result can be extended to the multilateral free trade case. Theoretically, the 
case of multilateral free trade should be similar to the one under unilateral free trade 
due to the segmented markets. Yet, despite home firm one’ profits in the home market, 
it would also earn profits from the exports to the foreign country under multilateral 
free trade, adding extra positive profits itself. Thus it increases the welfare of the 
home country under free trade. If there are gains from unilateral free trade, there 
would definitely be gains from trade from multilateral free trade. If there are losses 
from unilateral free trade, there would be uncertain about the gains from multilateral 
free trade. The gains from multilateral free trade are illustrated in figure 4-3. 
 
Firstly, for the case of the competitive market region A with a pro-competitive effect, 
the Bertrand equilibrium is a boundary solution where there is no export from the 
foreign firm and the home firm acts as a monopoly. So the gains from multilateral free 
trade in this region are the same as the one under unilateral free trade, i.e. 0AG   
 
Secondly, consider the usual Hotelling competitive market in area B. Again, in the 
trade cost-marginal disutility space, the 0.5   line goes through area B, splitting this 
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area into two regions. Using equations (102), and (87), when 0.5  , the gains from 
multilateral free trade are: 
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which is referred to as area 
1 2B B  in figure 4-3. To see whether this is a gain or a 
loss, a critical value of the normalised trade cost in terms of the marginal disutility 
will be examined, i.e. 0mBlG  , and assuming 1a c  ,  
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Welfare is higher under multilateral free trade if the relative trade cost is outside the 
range of the critical values ( 3k  or 0.6k  ). Region 
1B  in figure 4-3 is between 
3  and 0.6 , therefore m
BlG is strictly negative and there are no gains from trade. 
Region
2B , on the other hand, shows strictly positive gains from multilateral free trade. 
When 0.5  , the relevant region is 
3 4B B , by using (102) and (85), the gains from 
multilateral free trade are: 
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Comparing total welfare under multilateral free trade with total welfare under autarky 
as in (117), it is higher under multilateral free trade if the relative trade cost is outside 
the range of the critical values below.  
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Only region 
4B is within this range, and region 3B is outside the range, leading 
m
BrG to 
be strictly negative in region 
4B  
and strictly positive in 
3B . Therefore, in the normal 
Hotelling competitive region, there are always gains from multilateral free trade in 
region
2 3B B , and always losses from unilateral free trade in region 1 4B B . 
Compare area B (competitive market region) in figure 4-3 to the same area in figure 
4-2, under multilateral free trade, home firm benefits from foreign sales in addition to 
the home sales under unilateral free trade. It is expected the area of losses from trade 
is smaller in this case. Figure 4-3 shows that there are gains from trade in the 
competitive market (
2 3B B ). 
 
Thirdly, consider the kinked demand Bertrand equilibrium in area C, where the kink 
occurs at profit maximising price. In figure 4-3, the 0.5   line also goes through 
area C. On the left hand side when 0.5  , using (104), (106) and (87), gains from 
multilateral free trade are expressed as: 
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Which is shown in area 
1 2C C , the critical values of the gains above are calculated 
by setting both 
2
M
lG  and 2
M
hG  to zero. Then the total welfare is higher under unilateral 
free trade if the relative trade cost is outside the range of the two roots of each 
equation. When 0.5  , 
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These critical values are shown in the region 
1 2C C , since 2
m
hK  is below this region, 
only 
2
u
lK  will be taken into account. The area below 2
u
lK  
shows a loss from unilateral 
free trade, represented as area 
1C , and the area above it shows a gain from trade, 
represented as area 
2C . On the right hand side when 0.5  , using (104), (106) and 
(85), gains from unilateral free trade are expressed as: 
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which is shown in area 
3 4C C , the critical values of the gains are found by setting 
both 
2 0
m
lG   and 2 0
m
hG  . The total welfare is higher under unilateral free trade if the 
relative trade cost is outside the range of the two roots of each. when 0.5  , 
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Once again, 
2
m
hK  is below the region 1 2C C , so only 2
m
lK  will be considered. The area 
below 
2
m
lK  
shows a loss from unilateral free trade, represented as area 
4C , and the area 
above 
2
u
lK  shows gains from trade, represented as area 3C . Consequently, in the 
kinked demand region, a small area labelled 
1 4C C  shows losses from multilateral 
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free trade, and the rest area 
2 3C C shows gains from trade. Again, the area of gains 
from trade (
2 3C C ) under multilateral free trade is larger than the one under 
unilateral free trade as shown in figure 4-2. 
 
Finally, consider the local monopoly Bertrand equilibrium in area D of figure 4-1, so 
both home and foreign firm have a non-empty sale in the home country. Here, both 
firm one and firm two set monopoly price and output. The gains from unilateral free 
trade can be calculated by using (108) and (87): 
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As u
DG  is always positive from unilateral free trade, 
m
DG  must be always positive from 
multilateral free trade in the local monopoly region. To summarise, there is no gains 
or losses in the competitive market region A with pro-competitive effect, and there are 
always losses from multilateral free trade in the shaded area
1B , 4B (part of the 
competitive market region), 
1C  and 4C (part of the kinked demand region). On the 
other hand, there are always gains from multilateral free trade in part of the 
competitive region 
2B , 3B , part of the kinked demand region 3C , 2C  and the local 
monopoly region D . 
 
Proposition 3: In a Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly, there are 
losses from multilateral free trade in the region 
1 4 1 4B B C C   , there is no gains or 
losses in the region A , and there are always gains from multilateral free trade for the 
rest of the region under k a c  . 
 
Gains from multilateral free trade are summarized as follows: 
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Figure 4-3: Gains from multilateral free trade 
 
This result is different from Fujiwara (2009)’s losses-from-trade proposition. The 
welfare effect of trade liberalisation can be decomposed as follows: 1) trade promotes 
competition, so consumer surplus increases; 2) foreign import shifted home profits 
away, reducing home firm’s welfare; 3) trade liberalisation increases wasteful 
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resources because of transport cost, and 4) the positive variety-expanding effect from 
consuming different products. While Fujiwara (2009) concludes that the negative 
effect dominants the positive effect, so there are always losses, the result here shows 
that the last effect could be strong depending on product differentiation. If the 
products are highly differentiated, trade liberalisation leads to gains from trade, and if 
products are close substitutes, trade liberalisation leads to losses from trade. The 
product space in figure 4-2 and figure 4-3 gives clear insights of how welfare related 
to different parameters at the same time. 
 
4.5 Volume of World trade 
Using the same two-country, two-firm model, where a home and a foreign monopolist 
are producing a home and a foreign good symmetrically and exporting to the other 
market (multilateral free trade), it is sufficiently to analyse the home country economy 
only. Using the same Hotelling model, each consumer alone the unit length interval 
has a taste for the home and foreign firm, each firm has an incentive to supply home 
and foreign consumers under free trade, and these firms are engaged in Bertrand 
competition. The advantage of using this model is that there is no market expansion 
effect from product differentiation. As it mentioned before,  represents marginal 
disutility in this model, when it increases, the goods are less substitutable for each 
other, competition between the firms fall, and products are more differentiated. Hence 
the higher the value of  , the higher the degree of product differentiation, and   
measures the degree of product differentiation. 
 
Under multilateral free trade, the volume of trade can be analysed in the normal 
Hotelling competitive market, the kink in demand case, and the local monopoly case 
(uncovered market). The volume of trade of the competitive market with a pro-
competitive effect is not considered here (Area A in figure 4-1), as there is no actual 
trade in this case. The total volume of trade between home and foreign market is 
measured in terms of physical quantities of exports: 
2 1
E E
A BV x x  , while 2
E
Ax  and 1
E
Bx  
are the same in the symmetric model. By using the Bertrand-Nash Equilibria prices 
and quantities that have been solved previously, we obtain: 
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Area B (Competitive market): 
Assuming that the trade cost is below the prohibitive level, 3k k   , both firms 
export to the other market, and both markets are fully covered. By using (91), the 
volume of trade in terms of quantities is: 
 
 
2 1
2 3
    = 1
6 3
E E
B A BV x x
k k
 
 

 
    (123) 
 
The effect of a change of product differentiation with respect to the volume of trade 
can be evaluated by differentiating 
BV with respect to  , which is 
23 0BV k     . Hence the volume of trade is increasing in the degree of 
product differentiation when products are close substitutes. 
 
If  increases, there is a higher degree of product differentiation, which lessens the 
competition, and the volume of world trade increases. This is due to the fact that the 
product differentiation is linked to import competition (competition of both firms in 
the home market in this case) in a negative way, implying that higher product 
differentiation will induce firms to supply more in both home and foreign market, as 
in Bernhofen (2001). In a competitive market, where market is fully covered and 
products are closer substitutes, the intensity of competition between two firms would 
be reduced by more differentiated products, therefore exporting more outputs. In 
addition, when goods are more differentiated, the volume of trade increase further, as 
consumers can enjoy a variety of goods. Hence the volume of trade increases in the 
degree of product differentiation when the market is fully covered.  
 
Area C (Kinked demand Equilibria): 
Assuming the trade cost is below the prohibitive trade cost k k , by using 
2 1 ,   1
2 3
E
A
a c a c
x
 
  
   
 
 from summary 3, with the lower bound and the upper 
bound of the outputs, the volume of trade can be expressed in the range of: 
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 
2 1
2
2 ,   2   
3
E E
C A B
a ca c
V x x
 
 
     
 
   (124) 
By differentiating 
CV with respect to  , which is from  
2 0CV a c       to 
  22 3 0CV a c      , it also shows that the volume of trade increases in the 
degree of product differentiation when the market is completely covered and the 
indifferent consumer earns zero rent. Again, the explanation is that the increase of the 
product differentiation will increase the outputs of foreign firm, therefore increase the 
volume of trade. 
 
Area D (local Monopoly) 
Assuming the trade cost is below the prohibitive trade cost k k a c   , using 
equations (94), the volume of trade is expressed as: 
 
2 1
E E
D A B
a c k
V x x

 
       (125) 
 
Differentiating 
DV with respect to  , the first derivative is 
  2 0DV a c k        , implying that the volume of world trade will decrease 
in the product differentiation when the home market is not fully covered. This is due 
to the fact that two firms do not compete with each other in either market and they act 
as individual monopolies in the home market, so an increase in product differentiation 
will not affect import competition in the home market, then export is solely caused by 
various consumers’ tastes, which has a positive effect on trade. When the market is at 
local monopoly, trade costs are high and closer to its prohibitive level (refers back to 
equation (95)), each firm is selling more in its home market than its export to the 
foreign market, as the penalty on the foreign sales is higher, leading to a negative 
effect on the volume of trade. The negative effect of waste on trade costs dominants 
the positive effect of increased various consumers’ tastes. Thus when products are 
sufficiently differentiated, the volume of trade/the market share for imports is 
decreasing in the degree of product differentiation. 
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Proposition 4: In a Hotelling model, the volume of trade in terms of quantities is 
increasing in the degree of product differentiation if the trade cost k k , 
mk k and 
k k , and it is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation if the trade cost 
mk k and k k . 
 
4.6 The profit change 
This section considers how trade costs and product differentiation affects the 
profitability of trade liberalisation, and compares the profits under free trade and 
under autarky. Here only the multilateral free trade case is considered. The total 
profits of the firms are the sum of the profits from the home firm and the profits from 
the foreign firm. Thus the total profits for firm one are 
1 1 1A B    , and they are the 
same for the symmetric firm two, i.e. 
1 2  . The profits changes across all the 
markets in the trade cost - marginal disutility space are shown in figure 4-4.  
 
Area A (competitive market with pro-competitive effect):  
In area A, when 
cK K K   and K K  there is no trade between the domestic firm 
and the foreign firm, so the home firm only makes profits in the home market, but the 
presence of pro-competitive effect would reduce the price of the home firm. by using 
(99), the profits of the home firm under multilateral free trade are 
1 2 1 2 2A A       , and the profits under autarky case two are 
2A a c    . 
As 1 3   and 1a c   in this area, the profits change from trade when there is a 
pro-competitive effect is: 
 
 21 3 0
A
A a c           (126) 
 
Clearly, this is negative, implying that the profits of the home firm under the 
competitive market with a pro-competitive effect are lower than under the autarky 
case two, when firm one covers the entire home market. This is because of the 
reduced price in the home country caused by the potential competition from the 
foreign firm. Therefore when products are more substitutable (lower  ), import 
competition induces firms to reduce their supplies and trade liberalisation has a 
negative effect on firms’ profitability. 
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Area B  
In area B, when 
cK K , K K  and K K , trade occurs between the home firm and 
the foreign firm. Both firms compete in the same market and the entire market is 
covered. Price must fall by the competition after the opening of trade in the home 
country, so are the profits of the home firm. By using (91), the total profits of the 
home firm under the free trade are 
   
2 2
1 2 1 2
3 3
18 18
E E
A A
k k 
 
 
 
      . As 
the line 0.5   goes through this area, both autarky cases one and two are to be 
considered. If 0.5  , the profit gains from trade in the competitive market are: 
 
  
2
2
1 1 2
9
A
B
k
a c 

        
 
It can be shown that profits are higher under the free trade if the relative trade cost is 
between the critical values: 
 
 11 3 2
k
a c
a c
       

   (127) 
 
The critical values are shown in figure 4-4. To the left hand side of 
1k , the profits 
change is negative, so the profits are lower under free trade than under autarky, 
whereas to the right hand side of 
1k , the profits change is positive (within the range 
of the critical values), so the profits are higher under free trade as shown in figure 4-4. 
If 0.5  , referred as area 
2B , the profits under autarky are 
 
2
1
4
A
a c



  , so the 
profits change from the trade are:  
 
     
2 2 2
1
2 2
3 3
18 18 4
A
B B
k k a c 

  
  
        (128) 
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It can be shown that profits are higher under the free trade if the relative trade cost is 
between the critical values of trade costs: 
 
 
2 22
2
3
4
2
k
a c
a c
     

 
 
This turns out that area 
2B is within the range of the above critical values, so the 
profits change is always positive in this area, implying that the profits are higher 
under free trade than under autarky. Consequently, in the competitive market, trade 
liberalisation is unprofitable if the products are less differentiated and close 
substitutes.  
 
Area C (Kinked Demand) 
In area C where a kinked demand occurs, when 
c mK K K  , and K K , trade also 
happens between the home firm and the foreign firm, and there is no overlapping of 
consumers who will be indifferent from buying the products, yet the entire market is 
covered. As it mentioned before, the price of the good is in a range, and so are the 
profits in this area. Again, the price is reduced by the competition in the home country, 
which will decrease the profits of the home firm, but the products are more 
differentiated in this region, which might increase the profits of the home firm by 
volume. This leads to the result that the profits gains from trade are uncertain when 
the demand is at the kink. When the demand function is at the kink, the profits of the 
home firm are the same as the ones in the competitive market, so the total profits of 
the home firm under the free trade are 
   
2 2
1 1 2
3 3
18 18
E E
A A
k k 
 
 
 
     . If 
0.5  , the profit gains from trade in the competitive market are: 
 
2
1 1 2
9
C B
k
a c

       . Again, it can be shown that profits are higher under 
the free trade if the relative trade cost is between the critical values: 
 
 11 3 2
k
a c
a c
       

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To the left hand side of 
1 in area C of figure 4-4 (the shaded area in area C), the 
profits change is negative, so the profits are lower under free trade than under autarky, 
whereas to the right hand side of 
1 , the profits change is positive, so the profits are 
higher under free trade. If 0.5   in region C, the profits change from the trade are:  
 
     
2 2 2
1
2 2
3 3
18 18 4
A
C C
k k a c 

  
  
        (129) 
 
It can be shown that profits are higher under the free trade if the relative trade cost is 
between the critical values of trade costs:  
2 22
2
3
4
2
k
a c
a c
     

, which is to 
the left hand side of the line 0.5  , so the profits change is always positive in this 
region, implying that the profits are higher under free trade than under autarky. 
Consequently, when the market is at the kinked demand 
1 2C C , the free trade almost 
always has a positive effect on firms’ profitability when the products are sufficiently 
differentiated. 
 
Area D (uncovered market) 
In area D, 
mK K K  , trade occurs but the home market is not completely covered, 
so both firms are monopolies in the same country. The price of the home firm under 
the local monopoly is the same as the one under autarky
43
, i.e. 
1
2
a c
p

 , and the 
price of the foreign firm is higher with trade cost k , i.e. 
2
2
a c k
p
 
 . Both firms 
sell in the home market, and the products are differentiated the most in this region, so 
the total sales/profits are higher than the autarky case, where only the home firm 
supplies the home market. Using (94), the total profits of the home firm under free 
trade are: 
       
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
4 4 4
A A
a c a c k a c k k a c
 
  
      
       . As 
this is the region where the marginal disutility is greater than 0.5, i.e. 0.5  , the 
                                                 
43
 Compare the price of firm one in equation (94) under local monopoly and the price in (84) under 
autarky, the prices of firm one are the same. 
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autarky is where the home firm covers the market partially. Therefore the profit gains 
from autarky are: 
 
 
2
1
1
4
A
D
k a c


          (130) 
 
This is clearly positive, implying that the profits under free trade are higher than 
under autarky. The home firm’s sales are the same in the home country, if it exports to 
the foreign market and still remains as a monopoly there, it will obviously gain the 
foreign market share and yet keep its home sale non-decreased.  
 
   
 
 
Figure 4-4: Profits change from free trade 
 
Consequently, the shaded area in figure 4-4 represents the negative profits change. As 
it shows that when the products are more differentiated, the competition between 
firms is less intense, then firms are able to supply more goods to the market. Trade 
liberalisation is more profitable if the trade cost is relatively low, and products are 
highly differentiated. On the other hand, when products are close substitutes and not 
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so much differentiated, trade liberalisation is unprofitable, as shown in the shaded 
area. These results are summarised in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: Total profits of the firm under free trade are higher than under 
autarky if the trade cost 
1k k  and k a c  .  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the welfare effects of trade, gains from trade, and volume of 
trade in the Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly. One of the 
advantages of using this model is that there is no market expansion effect, so 
increasing the degree of product differentiation will not affect the market size. 
Another distinc effect in the Hotelling model is that trade liberalisation enables those 
who can not buy differentiated product under autarky to consume it, so sonsumers 
gain from trade. The current research considers the kinked-demand market structure 
in the trade, which was rarely mentioned in other literature. Furthermore, the best 
reply functions are not symmetric as conventionally stated, this is due to the fact that 
foreign firm faces trade costs per unit when exporting to the home market, while the 
home firm does not have this addition marginal cost, causing asymmetric cost/demand 
in the home market.  
 
This chapter comments on Fujiwara (2009)’s result, where he shows that there are 
always losses from trade in a Hotelling model of differentiated duopoly, and proves 
that it is an incorrect statement. While he ignores the kinked-demand structure in the 
spatial model, this chapter has considered the full features of the Hotelling model, and 
uses a trade costs-marginal disutility space to demonstrate how product differentiation 
and trade costs affect firms’ welfare. Our research shows 1) there are gains from trade 
when products are highly differentiated and losses from trade when products are close 
substitutes. 2) welfare under free trade is less than welfare under autarky when the 
market is competitive; welfare under free trade is higher than welfare under autarky 
when the market is local monopoly; welfare under free trade is the same as welfare 
under autarky when there is a pro-competitive effect; and lastly welfare gain/loss is 
ambiguous when the market structure is kink in demand. 
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In addition, the volume of trade are also analysed, that it is increasing in the degree of 
product differentiation when products are close substitutes, and decreasing in the 
degree of product differentiation when products are sufficiently differentiated. When 
the products are more differentiated, the competition between firms is less intense, 
and then firms are able to supply more goods to the market. Trade liberalisation is 
more profitable if the trade cost is relatively low, and products are highly 
differentiated.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A: The best response functions 
Firm one maximises its profit by solving:  1 1 1
E
A p c x    as shown in (90) and (93). 
Given the expression for 
1x , two cases need to be distinguished according to whether 
the demand function of firm one has a kink as in (97) or not as in (98). 
 
1. If 
2p a  , there is a kink as shown in (97). The left-hand side of 1
E
A  
evaluated at the boundary 
1 22p a p    
is 
  1 2 1
1
2
p c p p 


  
 , then 
maximise it with respect to
1p , this derivative must be smaller than the 
boundary: 2
1 22
2
p c
p a p


 
    . Solving for the relative range of
2p , 
2
4
3 3
c
p a    . The right-hand side of 1
E
A  evaluated at 1 22p a p   is: 
  1 1
1
p c a p


 
 , then maximise it with respect to 
1p , we get 
1 22
2
a c
p a p

    . Solving for 
2p , 2
3
2 2
c
p a    . It is assumed that 
a c , so 
3 4
2 2 3 3
c c
a a      . Hence, there are three cases when 
2p a  , and there is a kinked structure in between:  
 
2
2 2
1 2 2
2
4
max ,            
2 3 3
4 3
2          
3 2 2 3
3
max ,            
2 2 2
p c c
p if p a
c c
p a p if a p a
a c c
a if p a

 
  
 

   
    
 

        

  
    
 
 
 
 Strict duopoly: when
2
4
3 3
c
p a    : the peak occurs on the range 
 1 2 2,2p p a p     . Firm one competes with firm two to attract 
the buyer and marginal surplus is positive. Refer back to the first 
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equation of (90), differentiate the profits 1
E
A  with respect to 1p , the 
reaction function is  
 
2
1
2
p c
p
 
      (131) 
 
and an indifferent consumer who earns positive surplus exists. This 
occurs when the trade cost k  is smaller than the prohibitive trade cost 
k . When the trade cost is greater than k , firm one has an incentive to 
set its price such that the output supply of firm two to the home market 
is zero (
2 0x  ). By setting such a limiting price, firm one can supply 
the whole market yet still facing a competition from firm two in the 
home market, i.e. 1 2
2 0
2
p p
x


 
  , then 
1p  is 2p  . This is 
referred to as pro-competitive effect in the Bertrand competition. 
Therefore the optimal price is given by 21 2max ,
2
p c
p p


  
  
 
 
in the competitive market case. 
 
 Local Monopoly: when 
2
3
2 2
c
p a    , the peak occurs when 
1 22p a p    . The indifferent consumer earns negative utility, so 
he /she is better off not to purchase from either firm, and only the 
nearest customers would make a purchase. The monopoly demand is 
 1 1x a p   . Firm one’s profit is     1 1 1 1p c x p c a p     , 
maximising it with respect to 
1p  yields  1 2x a c   , so the optimal 
price in this case is: 
1
2
a c
p

 . However, this only happens with the 
condition that  1 2 1x a c    , which means 1 2  . When 
1 2  , firm one is supplying the whole market facing no competition 
from firm two, i.e. 1
1 1
a p
x


  , then the optimal price is 1p a 
   , 
which is the same as autarky case two. Hence, no equilibrium exists 
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when one firm covers the entire market. This price is greater or equal 
to 
22a p  , thus 2p a . These two optimal prices are mutually 
exclusive
44
, depending on the value of  : 
  
2
1
2
1
               <             
2
1 3
                         - -   
2 2 2 2
a if and p a
p
a c c
if and p a




  
 
   

 
 
 Kinked Demand: when 
2
4 3
3 2 2 3
c c
a p a       . The peak occurs 
at 
1 22p a p   . On this range, the optimal strategy is to price at 
the kinked structure of the demand function, so the indifferent 
consumer earns zero surplus when purchasing from either firm. The 
optimal price is
45
 1 22p a p
    . 
 
2.  If 
2p a  , only the competitive market demand exists, as shown in (98). 
In this case, 2 1
1
2
p p
x


 
  is on the range  1 2 2,p p p    . The optimal 
price is either 
1 2p p    or 
2
1
2
p c
p
 
 , depending on the magnitude of 
the two. In addition, 2
1
2
p c
p
 
  must be smaller than 
2p  , implying 
1p c   .therefore:  
 
2
2
1
2 2
                3
2
              if   3
p c
if p c
p
p p c


 

 
 
 
     
  
                                                 
44
 Notice that when 1 2  , 
3
- -
2 2
c
a a  , and vice versa. 
45
 The utility or the surplus of the indifferent consumer is zero at the kink. i.e. 1 1 0U a p x     
where 2 1
1
2
p p
x


 
 , then 1 22p a p   is the reaction function. 
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If 
2 3p c   , all consumers are willing to purchase the good from firm one, 
as firm one sets a limiting price, such that the consumers located closer to firm 
two would obtain greater utility from buying at firm one than the surplus he 
would get from buying at firm two. Thus firm one covers the whole market, 
and the demand of good from firm one is equal to one (
1 1x  ). If 2 3p c   , 
the usual competitive market indifferent consumer exists between zero and 
one segment, then consumers closer to firm two would obtain strictly smaller 
utility from buying at firm one than buying at firm two, which is the nearest 
firm for him/her. 
 
To summarize the above, the reaction functions for firm one can be expressed as:  
For 
2p a   
 If 
2
4
3 3
c
p a     and 
2 3p c   : 
2
1
2
p c
p
    (competitive Portion of 
Demand) 
 If 
2
4
3 3
c
p a     and 
2 3p c   : 1 2p p 
    (competitive portion of 
demand) 
 If 
2
3
2 2
c
p a    , and 
1
2
  : 1
2
a c
p


 
(monopoly portion of demand) 
 If 
2p a , and 
1
2
  : 1p a 
  
 
(monopoly portion of demand) 
 If 
2
4 3
3 2 2 3
c c
a p a       : 1 22p a p
   
 
(kink in demand) 
 
For 
2p a   
 If 
2 3p c   , 1 2p p 
   (competitive portion of demand) 
 If 
2 3p c   , 
2
1
2
p c
p
   (competitive portion of demand) 
 
Unlike MÃrel and Sexton (2010), firm two and firm one in the home market are not 
symmetric, a trade cost of k  incurs when firm two supplies to the home market. Firm 
two maximises its profit, given price 
2p , by solving:  2 2 2
E
A p c k x    , as shown 
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in (90) and (93). By using the same steps as for firm one in the home market, its 
reaction function is obtained as:  
 
For 
1p a   
 If 
1
4
3 3
c k
p a 

    and 
1 3p c k    : 
1
2
2
p c k
p
     (competitive 
portion of demand) 
 If 
1
4
3 3
c k
p a 

    and 
1 3p c k    : 2 1p p 
    (competitive portion 
of demand) 
 If 
1
3
2 2
c k
p a 

   , and 
1
2
  : 2
2
a c k
p
 
 (monopoly portion of 
demand) 
 If 
1p a , and 
1
2
  : 2p a 
  
 
(monopoly portion of demand) 
 If 
1
4 3
3 2 2 3
c k c k
a p a 
 
      : 2 12p a p
    (kinked demand) 
   
For 
1p a   
 If 
1 3p c k    , then 2 1p p 
   (competitive portion of demand) 
 If  
1 3p c k    , then 
1
2
2
p c k
p
    (competitive portion of demand) 
 
The Nash Equilibria  1 2,  p p  are determined by the intersection of the reaction curves 
1p

 and 2p

. Although there are a few options in the reaction functions stated above, 
no equilibrium exists when one firm covers the entire market facing competition from 
the other firm (i.e.  1 2p p a      do not exist). For 1p

, 
2p always lies between c  
and a , and a c , 
3 4
2 2 3 3
c c
a a       as well as 
4
3 3
c
a a     . For 2p

, 
1p
always lies between c k and a , a c k  ,  as well as 
4
3 3
c k
a a 

    , and 
3 3
2 2 2 2
c c k
a a 

     , 
4 4
3 3 3 3
c c k
a a 

      , 3 3c k c     . Thus 
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the shape of the equilibrium 1p

 and 2p

 are determined by using the following 
expressions: 
 
       1c a      
       1c k a        
 
4 4
      
3 3 3
c
c a        
 
4 4 1
      
3 3 3 3
c k
c a 

         
 
4 4 4
      
3 3 3 3
c k
c k a 

          
 
4 4
      
3 3 3
c
c k a          
 
3 3
      
2 2 2
c
c a        
 
3 3 1
      
2 2 2 2
c k
c a 

         
 
3 3 3
      
2 2 2 2
c k
c k a 

          
  
3 3
      
2 2 2
c
c k a a c          
 
3 1
      
2 2 2
c
a a        
 
3 1 1
      
2 2 2 2
c k
a a 

         
 
4 1
      
3 3 3
c
a a        
 
4 1 1
      
3 3 3 3
c k
a a 

         
 
1
3       
3
c a      
 
1 1
3       
3 3
c k a         
 
1
3       
4
c a        
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 
1 1
3       
4 4
c k a           
All cases are distinguished by the term a c  and k , and the Nash equilicria are listed 
in the main text.  
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Appendix B: Tables 
Table 4-1: Profits 
 1Ax  2Ax  1p  2p  1Aπ  2Aπ  
Autarky 
( 0.5  ) 
1 0  a   a   a c    0  
Autarky 
( 0.5  ) 2
a c


 0  
2
a c
 
2
a c
  
2
4
a c


 0  
Competitive Market 
( k k ) 
1 0  2c 
 
3c 
 
2
 
0  
Competitive Market 
( k k ) 
3
6
k


 
3
6
k


 
3 3
3
c k 
 
3 3 2
3
c k 
  
2
3
18
k


 
 
2
3
18
k


 
Kinked Demand 
Lower band  3
a c


 1
3
a c


  
2
3
a c
 
4 3
3
a c  
  
2
2
9
a c


 
 
 
4 3 3
3 9
a c k
a c

 
     
   
 
Kinked Demand 
upper band 2
a c


 1
2
a c


  
2
a c
 
3 2
2
a c  
  
2
4
a c


 
 
 
3 2 2
2 4
a c k
a c

 
     
   
 
Monopoly 
(uncovered market) 2
a c


 
2
a c k

 
 
2
a c
 
2
a c k 
  
2
4
a c


 
 
2
4
a c k

 
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Table 4-2: Consumer surplus and Welfare 
 CS   1W unilateral   1W multilateral  
Autarky 
( 0.5  ) 2

 
2
a c

   
2
a c

   
Autarky 
( 0.5  ) 
 
2
8
a c


 
 
2
3
8
a c


 
 
2
3
8
a c


 
Competitive Market 
( k k ) 
5
2
a c  
 
1
2
a c  
 
1
2
a c  
 
Competitive 
Market( k k ) 
 
2
33 2
2 3 36
k
a c k




     
 23 6 9 4 3
36
k k a c  

     
 
 25 18 9 4
36
k k a c  

     
 
Kinked Demand 
Lower band 
 
2
3 2 2
9 6
a c a c

  
  
   
2 24 2 12 12 3
36
a c k k a c  

        
 
   
2 22 2 3 9 2
18
a c k a c 

       
 
Kinked Demand 
upper band 
 
2
4 2
a c a c

  
  
   
2 29 2 12 18 2
36
a c k k a c  

        
 
   
2 29 4 9 6 2
36
a c k a c 

        
Monopoly 
(uncovered market) 
   
2 22 2
8
a c k k a c

   
 
   
2 24 2
8
a c k k a c

   
 
   
2 26 3 6
8
a c k k a c

   
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Table 4-3: Gains from trade 
    1G unilateral   1G multilateral  
Competitive Market 
( k k ) 
0.5   0  
0
 
Competitive 
Market( k k ) 
0.5   
2 23 6 9
36
k k 

 
 
2 25 18 9
36
k k 

 
 
0.5   
   
226 12 18 4 3 27
72
k k a c a c  

         
   
2210 36 18 4 27
72
k k a c a c  

         
Kinked Demand 
Lower band 
0.5   
   
2 24 2 12 6 8 9
36
a c k k a c  

         
   
2 22 2 12 2 3
18
a c k a c 

        
0.5   
   
2 219 4 24 24 3
72
a c k k a c  

          
   
2 219 8 12 9 2
72
a c k a c 

         
Kinked Demand 
Upper band 
0.5      
2 29 2 12 54
36
a c k k a c  

     
 
   
2 29 4 18 3 4
36
a c k a c 

      
 
0.5   
   
2 29 4 24 36 2
72
a c k k a c  

        
 
   
2 29 8 18 6 2
72
a c k a c 

       
 
Monopoly 
(uncovered market) 
0.5      
2 2 2
8
a c k k a c

   
 
   
2 23 3 6
8
a c k k a c

   
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Table 4-4: Change in Profits  
   1    
Competitive Market 
( k k ) 
0.5    3 a c     
Competitive 
Market( k k ) 
0.5    
2
2
9
k
a c

     3 2a c     
0.5        
2 2 2
3 3
18 18 4
k k a c 
  
  
    
2 23 4
2
a c    
Kinked Demand 
Lower band 
0.5   
       
2
2 4 3 3 3 9
9
a c a c k a c a c   

                
 
 2
3
a c
 
0.5   
       
2 2
2 4 3 3 3
9 4
a c a c k a c a c 
 
                 
   
 
2 217 60 36
12 3
a c a c
a c
 

   
 
 
Kinked Demand 
Upper band 
0.5   
       
2
3 2 2 2 4
4
a c a c k a c a c   

                
 a c  
0.5   
   3 2 2 2
4
a c k a c 

             
 3
2
a c


  
Monopoly 
(uncovered market) 
0.5   
 
2
4
k a c

     a c  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This study concentrates on two aspects of international trade with Oligopoly: FDI 
versus exporting decision under Oligopoly, and trade liberalisation in a Hotelling 
model of differentiated duopoly. The trade liberalisation has led to a rapid growth in 
FDI during the experience of the 1990s, while the conventional theory predicts that a 
reduction in trade costs will discourage FDI. The first part of this study has discussed 
about this contradiction and analysed the FDI versus exporting decision by using a 
two-country four-firm model with identical products under Cournot oligopoly, 
assuing demand is linear. 
 
In the static game, a reduction in the trade cost will lead the firms to switch from 
undertaking FDI to exporting, which confirms the proximity-concentration trade-off 
theory, but conflicts with the empirical result in the 1990s. The equilibria outcomes 
show that if the fixed cost of FDI is relatively low, both firms in the same market 
choose to undertake FDI. If the fixed cost is relatively high, one firm chooses to 
export while its competitor from the same market chooses to undertake FDI. Thus, 
this study contributes to the current literature by showing that both export and FDI 
can exist as an equilibrium outcome in the world. 
 
It also shows that the static game is often a prisoners’ dilemma, where all firms might 
make lower profits when they all undertake FDI than when they export, and it is likely 
happen when the fixed cost is relatively high. If the fixed cost is sufficiently high, the 
equilibrium profits when one firm in each country undertakes FDI while its 
competitor in the same country export might be lower than the profits when all firms 
export, due to the intensified competition.  
 
The prisoners’ dilemma can be avoided in an infinitely-repeated game when all firms 
tacitly collude over their FDI versus export decisions, as collusion over FDI can be 
sustained by the threat of Nash-reversion strategies if the trade cost is sufficiently 
high. Then this study shows that a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch 
from exporting to undertaking FDI if the trade cost is sufficiently high, as a reduction 
in a sufficiently high trade costs lessen the profitability of collusion in the infinitely-
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repeated game, and that explains the experience of the increasing FDI in 1990s. 
Another contribution of this study is: it is shown that a reduction in the fixed cost may 
lead firms to switch from undertaking FDI to exporting when the fixed cost is 
relatively high. 
 
Conventionally, the demand function is assumed to be linear, as shown in chapter 2. 
To check the robustness of the result above, this study also examines the FDI versus 
exporting decisions by looking at the constant elasticity of demand function. It has 
been confirmed that all the results are quite similar. In the static game, a reduction in 
the trade cost will lead the firms switch from undertaking FDI to exporting. The same 
outcomes are achieved that two firms in the same country choose to undertake FDI if 
the fixed cost is relatively low, or one firm chooses to export while its competitor 
from the same country chooses to undertake FDI if the fixed cost is relatively high.  
 
The prisoners’ dilemmas still exist and can be avoided in an infinitely-repeated game 
when all firms tacitly collude over their FDI versus export decisions. Then a reduction 
in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI when the 
trade cost is sufficiently high.  
 
While the first part investigates the strategic choices between FDI and trade under 
oligopoly in the trade liberalisation, the second part of this study examines how trade 
liberalisation affects the welfare gains, profits, and the volume of trade in the 
Hotelling model of differentiated Bertrand duopoly. 
 
The welfare analysis has been evaluated in Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly in 
a large amount of literature, but the Hotelling model has rarely been used. One of the 
advantages of using this model is that there is no market expansion effect, so 
increasing the degree of product differentiation will not affect the market size. By 
applying the spatial model, trade liberalisation could be assessed in a different market 
structure, as in Fujiwara (2009), where he ignores an important part of the Hotelling 
model: the kinked demand market structure, and makes an unrealistic assumption 
about the parameters. This study has considered the full features of the Hotelling 
model, and uses a trade costs-marginal disutility space to demonstrate how product 
differentiation and trade costs affect welfares in trade liberalisation. 
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The purpose of the study is not to criticize Fujiwara (2009)’ losses-from-trade 
proposition, but to verify his result by looking at a full picture of the model. It proves 
that his statement of losses from trade is incorrect. The result shows that gains from 
trade could happen when products are highly differentiated, and losses from trade 
happen when products are close substitutes, because the positive effect of more 
product choices overweighs the negative effect of the decreased home sales caused by 
trade liberalisation when products are more differentiated. On the other hand, when 
products are closer substitutes, this positive effect is small relative to the total 
negative effect. 
 
Gains from trade are also investigated by looking at different market structure in the 
trade costs-marginal disutility product space. Under the unilateral free trade, when 
there is a pro-competitive effect, there are no gains or losses from trade, as trade does 
not actually occur. When the market is competitive, there are always losses from trade, 
as the fall in the home profits overweighs the rise in the consumer surplus as well as 
gains from enjoying more variety of products. When the market structure is kinked-
demand, gains from trade are ambiguous, depending on the product differentiation 
and trade costs. When there is a local monopoly, there are always gains from trade as 
the products are highly differentiated that consumer can benefit from a much wider 
range of goods. On the other hand, welfare effects under the multilateral free trade are 
similar, and gainsfrom trade are more likely to happen. 
 
Furthermore, the volume of trade are also analysed, and it is increasing in the degree 
of product differentiation when the trade cost is sufficiently low, and decreasing in the 
degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is sufficiently high. This is 
because higher trade costs cause firm selling more in its home market than its export 
to the foreign market, as the penalty on the foreign sales is higher, leading to a 
negative effect on the volume of trade. In addition, trade liberalisation is more 
profitable if the trade cost is relatively low, and products are highly differentiated. On 
the other hand, when products are close substitutes and not so much differentiated, 
trade liberalisation is unprofitable. 
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